AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGICK, SCHOLASTICK AND RATIONAL.

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Sic enim, Brute, existimo, Juris civilis magnum usum apud multos fuisse, artem in uno S. Sulpicio: quod nunquam effecisset ipsius Juris Scientia; nisi eam præterea didicisset Artem, quæ doceret rem universam tribuere in partes, latentem explicare definiendo, obscuram explanare interpretando; ambiguam primùm videre, deinde distinguere; postremò habere regulam, quâ vera et falsa judicarentur, et quæ quibus positis essent, quæque non essent consequentia. Hic enim attulit hanc artem, omnium artium maximam, quasi lucem, ad ea, quæ confuse ab alijs aut respondebantur, aut agebantur. Dialecticam mihi videris intelligere. Recte, inquam, intelligis.

Cic. de Clar. Orat.

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PREFACE.

THE following Treatiſe was compiled, and the much greater part of it printed, long ago, by an Academical Tutor, for private uſe: it being his practice to initiate his Pupils in all parts of Philoſophy, by the help of an Engliſh Introduction, adding thereto, in courſe, the Latin Definitions and principal Queſtions, with their explication.

For this purpoſe he formerly compiled and publiſhed an Introduction to Moral Philoſophy.

Logical Studies, it is well known, have been long upon the decline. For ſome centuries they, in a manner, engroſſed the attention of Academical Students of every rank. But, by the common fate of things applauded beyond their real merit, they have ſunk down into a neglect and contempt no leſs unreaſonable, than was the degree of pre-eminence unto which they had been exalted. It cannot be denied, that the old Scholaſtick form of Logick was diſguſting, and the matter of it unſatisfactory. And yet,

Cum flueret lutulentus, erat quod tollere velles.

Some years ago therefore the Compiler of theſe papers endeavoured to plead its cauſe, ſo far as it appeared capable of a reaſonable vindication; expreſſing his wiſh, that the uſeful parts of it might be retained and fitted for younger Students: For ſurely, it is of great conſequence, that thoſe, who are deſtined to appear in the world as Reaſoners, ſhould learn, what hath been long and juſtly eſteemed, the Grammar of Reaſon. *Neceſſary indeed it is for All to have their minds duly fortified againſt the impreſſion of ſuch falſities, as dreſſed in plauſible forms are apt to enſnare young men into a diſlike of the Religion of their Country, thereby deſtroying the ground of rational comfort, and future hopes, and ſubverting the very foundation of perſonal virtue. It is not every one's good fortune to meet with, and digeſt ſuch a ſovereign antidote againſt the falſe reaſonings of modern ſceptics, as hath been lately publiſhed by the ſpirited and judicious* Dr. Beattie, *nor may they know how to apply it. And the remedy, it is to be feared, may often come too late to prevent the miſchief of the diſeaſe.*

Although the Art of thinking hath received great improvements from the labour and ingenuity of many excellent Engliſh Writers, Mr. Locke, *Biſhop* Butler, *&c. yet the philoſophical matter ſerving to illuſtrate their obſervations, as it lyes in their books, is commonly too copious, the reflexions too abſtruſe to fall within the graſp of ſuch as are Novices in Thinking. Something, therefore, in a lower way, is here attempted. The Compiler claims no praiſe of Invention: Nor can he at this diſtance*

of

of time aſſign every Obſervation to its true Owner; happy! if he hath happened to adapt them properly to the uſe and ſervice of younger Students! But he well remembers, that the plan, and often the very words of P. iii. §. 5. *are taken from Biſhop* Wilkins's *Introduction to his Treatiſe of* Natural Religion; *and he acknowledges with all gratefulneſs of Reflexion, that many Obſervations alſo are borrowed from Biſhop* Butler's Analogy.

The greater part of the Notes at the bottom of the pages are intended as a ſpecimen of Scholaſtick Language.

For the purpoſe of Logical Diſputations, *ſhould they ever regain a little credit, are ſubjoined two Tables, one of Latin* Definitions, *the other of* Logical Queſtions; *many of them of good meaning, and ſome of great importance; the curſory explication of which, by a Tutor, may convey uſeful matter of Inſtruction.*

Laſtly, in order to obviate common prejudices againſt Logick, large ſpecimens of Cicero's *ſentiments upon it are ſubjoined. If it appears that the baſis of that great man's proficiency, both as an Orator and as a Philoſopher, was laid upon the Ariſtotelick plan of Logick, it may be hoped, that the young ſtudent will be induced to believe, that a little attention to it, will not neceſſarily prove baneful to good ſenſe and polite literature. He may ſee more upon this ſubject in* Reflexions upon Logick, p. 49, 50, &c.

TO THE

CONDUCTORS

OF

Juvenile Studies

IN THE

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

SIRS,

THOSE Inſtructors, who in good earneſt are willing to fulfill the duty of their Station, will carefully attend to the wants of young Perſons, and readily condeſcend to their eſtate in all its lowlineſs.

Several Great Prelates, *Burnet*, *Wake*, *Secker*, &c. upon this Principle, have ſhewn themſelves ambitious to excell in in the ſeemingly humble province of *Catechiſts*.

An eminent Prelate of the preſent time, after having diſplayed conſummate Taſte, and Erudition, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, in inveſtigating the elegancies of Sacred Poetry, hath ſuffered no diminution of his credit from writing a *Grammar* of the *Engliſh* Language.

Biſhop *Sanderſon*, when advanced to the office of King's Profeſſor of Divinity, did not diſavow the former exertion of his endeavours to be uſeful as a Tutor. His *Logick* remains a monument of his Induſtry and Judgment. It was ſuited to the Age in which it was compiled.

The learned Biſhop *Fell*, the elegant Dean *Aldrich*, both of them ſucceſſively the Glory of their Times, thought they ſaw, and endeavoured to remedy, the defects of preceeding *Logical* Inſtitutions. But Their performances too are antiquated.

Stant magni nominis Umbræ.

Something of the kind, which, not deſerving to be called the *Art of Reaſoning*, may be *an Introduction to it*, under ſanction of the above-mentioned examples, is humbly offered to your acceptance by an emerit Tutor.

AD JUVENES.

Quid poſſit Logices Sapientia dia, quid Ordo,
MANSFIELDUM ante omnes exemplar
ſumite vobis,
Queis cura Eloquij: veras hinc ducite voces.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGICK.

PART I.

SECT. I.

Of the Soul, its Powers and Operations.

THE human Body is furniſhed with various inſtruments of Senſe, whereby we receive the notice of external objects; the Eye, marvellouſly fitted for colours and figures,—the Palate for taſte,—the Noſe for ſmell,—the Ear for ſounds, and the Touch (diffuſed throughout the whole body) for other qualities.—Our daily experience may convince us, that we have Something within us which receives thoſe ſeveral notices, diſtinguiſhes them from each other, and is conſiderably affected by them; finding pleaſure and ſatisfaction in ſome;

pain and uneaſineſs in others. Hereby we are led to purſue ſome things, and avoid others; to love the former, and hate the latter. The principle of perception and choice within us is what we call the *Soul* or *Mind*.—That power which it has to perceive and diſtinguiſh things, to ſingle ſome from among the reſt, to hold them in view, and compare them together, we call the *Underſtanding*; that other power of the ſoul which is exerted in acts of choice and averſion, is called the *Will*: By this power likewiſe we begin or forbear, continue or end ſeveral actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the ſoul, ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing ſuch or ſuch a particular action.

Logick is the art of uſing our Underſtanding to the beſt advantage, both in our own enquiries after truth, and in the communication of it to others.

The operations of the underſtanding, which fall under the regulation of artificial *Logick*, are reducible to theſe three, *Simple Apprehenſion*, *Judgment*, *and Reaſoning*.

When we barely contemplate any thing, as a *book*, *houſe*, *man*, &c. whether abſent or preſent, without determining any thing concerning it, we are ſaid ſimply to *apprehend*. The form, under which a thing is repreſented within the mind, is called an *Idea* *, or ſometimes *Notion*. Some-

* *Vox ex Platonicorum Philoſophiâ deſumpta.* — *Scholaſticorum linguâ* Species (εἶδος) ſenſibiles *ſeu* intelligibiles. The word *Idea* is ſometimes taken in a large ſenſe, only for the thing that is thought upon, as it is thought upon; and in this ſenſe there are as many ideas

times this operation of the mind is otherwiſe diſtinguiſhed by the general name of *Perception*. What Perception is, every one will know better, by reflecting on what he does himſelf, when he ſees, hears, feels, &c. or thinks, than by any diſcourſe of others, or by all the words in the world without ſuch reflection. Perception, when it actually accompanies and is annexed to any impreſſion on the body made by an external object, is called *Senſation*. When ideas recur without the operation of objects on the external ſenſory, eſpecially if under the choice and conduct of the Underſtanding, it is called *Imagination*: *Conſciouſneſs*, when the mind has for its object its own operations, and the pleaſure or pain attending them; and *Intellect*, where the object is ſomething purely intellectual, appearing under no image, but is diveſted of all ſenſible qualities, as *God*, *Juſtice*, *Virtue*, *Reaſon*, *&c.* The things themſelves are called *Objects*. Words by which we expreſs them *Terms*.

We are ſaid to *Judge*, when we acknowledge an agreement or diſagreement between one thing and another. We ſignify ſuch our acknowledgment by *Affirmation* or *Denial*. The ſentence in which this is done is called a *Propoſition*, as, *Learning is uſeful*; *Ignorance is not re-*

ideas as there are intelligible objects; ſince, whatever we underſtand, is ſome way or other in the underſtanding: and in this ſenſe we may be ſaid to have an idea of God himſelf. Sometimes it is taken, according to its ſtrict propriety, for that, whereby we perceive any Being, as by its intelligible repreſentative; in which ſenſe we have no ideas, but of ſuch things as are material, whereof they are the *Images*.

putable, &c. And propoſitions are *true* or *falſe* according as the aſſertion is correſponding or not correſponding to the reality of the things ſpoken of.

We are ſaid to *Reaſon*, when we judge of a propoſition, whoſe truth or falſhood is not *immediately* perceiveable, by obſerving its agreement or diſagreement with ſome other, whoſe truth we acknowledge already. Thus it ſeems indiſputable, that *whatever contributes to the improvement of our underſtanding is uſeful*; if it can be made appear, that *Artificial Logick does thus contribute*, I infer, that *Artificial Logick is uſeful*. An argument, if drawn up into Logical form, would conſtitute one or more * *Syllogiſms*.

* To Syllogize is an arithmetical term, ſignifying the making up of an account, or the collection of the ſum of ſeveral numbers; whence, by an apt traduction, it is applied to ſignify that form of argumentation, which, for the proportion it bears to it, we call by the name of Syllogiſm: The particular ſums correſpond to the Premiſſes, and the ſum total, reſulting from them, to the Concluſion.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of Words, and their ſeveral Kinds.

IDEAS of ſeveral kinds being conveyed by their reſpective ſenſes, in a confuſed multitude, without diſtinction or connection, the mind has a power to bring them again to our view long after the objects firſt exciting them have been removed; to intermingle,, ſeparate, or throw them into various combinations and poſtures, and thereby generate new ideas of Reflection, which the Senſes were not capable of conveying; ſuch as thoſe of Willing, Remembering, Comparing, Dividing, Diſtinguiſhing, Power, Abſtraction, Relation, &c.

Language is the great inſtrument whereby we not only communicate our ideas to other perſons, but record and diſtinguiſh them in our minds. By * Words are meant † articulate ſounds, formed by the organs of ſpeech, or combinations of legible characters, ratified by the common uſe of any particular people to ſignify § *things*, and the *circumſtances* or modes under which they appear.

* *Vocum* naturalium *nomine cenſentur* Riſus, Fletus, Gemitus, *&c. quæ minime cadunt ſub Logicorum conſideratione.*

† *Quia ſyllabis & literis, tanquam* articulis, *conſtant.*

§ *Voces* primario & immediate *ſignificant conceptus loquentis*; ſecundario & mediate *res conceptas*; *inde dicuntur ſigna* ſuppoſitiva *rerum*, manifeſtativa *conceptuum. Voces ſunt vel* Categorematicæ, *ſc. Nomen & Verbum, quæ de ſe invicem* κατηγορεῖσθαι *ſeu prædicari poſſunt.*

The impoſition of Words is altogether *arbitrary*, and has never any relation to the *nature of the things* ſignified; excepting in thoſe caſes where the word is of a ſound correſponding to what the ear hears when the object denoted by it is preſented to us; as *Howl*, *Crack*, *Clang*, &c.

Hence it happens, that the *ſame* word, (the ſame compoſition of ſounds or letters) in different, nay in the ſame language, ſhall be uſed to repreſent quite *different* things. So the engliſh word *let* hath two quite contrary meanings, to *hinder*,—to *permit*. Dictionaries afford numberleſs inſtances.

The ſignification of *primitive* words being ſuppoſed, the meaning of the *derivatives* is ſometimes, though not always, thereby determined; thus, allowing the word *create* to denote the producing things out of nothing, *Creator* may properly ſignify Him who made all things.

A *Simple Idea* is a repreſentation in the mind not diſtinguiſhable into different parts, as *White*.

A *Compound*,—ſuch as *Man*, diſtinguiſhable into ſoul and body; his body into ſeveral parts, &c.

A *Singular Idea* is the repreſentative of a ſingle Being, incapable of being divided into more things of the ſame ſort, as a *Houſe*, a *Table*, a *Bed*, &c.

poſſunt.—vel, Syncategorematicæ, *ſc. aliæ orationis partes & particulæ, quæ per ſe nihil ſignificant, ſed Categorematicis adjumenti nonnihil afferunt ad certum orationis ſenſum efficiendum.*

A word

A word denoting any one *ſingle* thing is called an * *Individual.* Sometimes a word is thus uſed †, without any explicit limitation of it to *this* or *that*; as *a City*, a *Man*, &c. But generally the meaning is aſcertained either by a *proper* ‡ *name*, as *London*, *Virgil*, &c. or by ſpecifying * *ſome peculiar mark* or *character*, as *the Metropolis of England*, &c. (of which kind are all *emphatical* expreſſions, as when a perſon in *England* mentions *the Town*, *the King*) &c. To which may be added the method of diſtinguiſhing the meaning of words by epithets; or by † a *demonſtrative* article, as *this King*, *that Man*, &c.

To the claſs of *individuals* may be referred all nouns *collective*, as an *army*, *ſwarm*, *foreſt*, a *city*, a *ſtate*, the *Publick*, a *heap*, a *dozen*, &c. inaſmuch as they denote many things not taken ‡ *ſeverally*, but conſidered *all together* as united into one Idea by the power of the mind.

When any language has no ſingle word juſtly expreſſive of thoſe ſeveral particulars, which enter into our notion of a thing; or, when we have occaſion to explain at large thoſe ſeveral particulars, we make uſe of a large complication of words, or even a whole ſentence for that purpoſe; which whole ſentence will be conſidered

* All ſuch Technical terms are called *Voces ſecundæ intentionis, ſeu notionis; quippe quæ denuo rebus imponuntur ſub novo conceptu habitæ & notæ.*

† *Individuum vagum.*

‡ — *Signatum.*

* — *ex hypotheſi (quod ſupponitur eſſe unicum.)*

† — *Demonſtrativum.*

‡ *Collectivè ſumpt. non Diſtributivè.*

in

in the eye of a Logician, as an *individual* ſimple * term. As, *a Man who makes the welfare of his Country the object of his wiſhes and aim of his actions*, is equivalent to the ſingle word, *Patriot*. On the contrary, one ſingle word is often found to imply † a complex ſenſe, even that of a whole propoſition, as, *Pluit*, *it rains*.

Thoſe words, which repreſent any idea (nature or quality) that may be found in ſeveral things, are called ‡ *general*, *common*, and ſometimes *univocal*; as being applicable to ſeveral individuals in the ſame ſenſe: thus, *Man* is applicable to *Peter*, *Paul*, &c. *Virtue* to *this* or *that* virtue, viz. *gratitude*, *juſtice*, *piety*, &c. or to this or that action.

The ſame combination of ſounds or letters may have two or more different ſignifications, and then the word is ſaid to be § *equivocal*: thus, *Light* is ſometimes oppoſed to what we call *heavy*, and ſometimes uſed for what proceeds from *luminous* objects. The va-

* *Terminus complexâ voce incomplexâ re.*

† — *incomplexâ voce complexâ re.* —We ſometimes meet with an explicit Propoſition, as, *Homo eſt animal* given as an inſtance of *vox complexa*, and ſo a Syllogiſm as one of *vox decomplexa*.

‡ Such words are by Grammarians termed *Appellativa*; by Scholaſtick Logicians, *Univerſalia* (τὰ καθόλου, *quatenus innuunt aliquid, quod* ineſt *multis*) *ſeu* Prædicabilia (τὰ κατηγορούμενα, *quatenus apta ſunt* prædicari *de pluribus.*)

§ *Vox* æquivocè *in dictionibus ſcholaſticis ſæpe idem denotat quod* analogicè; *(forſan quia Ariſtoteles nullam mentionem facit de vocibus analogicis.) ſic Res dicitur* æquivocè *generari, quæ producitur à cauſâ ſpecie ſibi diſſimili. Leges injuſtæ* æquivocè *dicuntur Leges; ſc. conveniunt in generali notione Legum, ſcilicet aliquod præcipitur a poteſtate legitimâ, non autem ita ut obligatio inducatur ſubditis ad agenda illa, quæ præcipiuntur.*

riety

riety of ſuch words is very great in moſt languages, and may be accounted for from a variety of cauſes, *mere chance*, *miſtake*, *time*, *cuſtom*, &c. affording much matter of entertainment, as well as occaſion of error, to ſhallow Wits, in *puns*, *double-entendres*, &c.

A Word is often transferred from it's *proper* and *original* meaning to ſignify ſomething elſe, on account of a partial reſemblance obſerved to lye between the things ſignified, and is then ſaid to be uſed * *Analogically*: thus, *Fire* properly denotes the element ſo called, but is tranſferred to ſignify *ſprightlineſs of Fancy*, *Courage*, &c.—Such are all Metaphorical and Figurative applications of Words.

Many words are uſed with more or leſs latitude of meaning; which yet is rarely miſtaken, if we attend to the occaſion upon which they are introduced. Thus, the word *Man* properly denotes one of the human ſpecies; but is ſometimes uſed for a *Male*, ſometimes a *full-grown Perſon*, a *Corpſe*, a *Statue*, a *Picture*, &c.

When ſeveral different words ſignify the ſame thing they are ſaid to be *Synonymous*; *Homo*,

* The conſidering words as to their *original* and *analogical* meaning, will often help us in underſtanding the diſtinctions of Scholaſtick writers. It is common with them, when they conſider the nature of things, whoſe ideas are abſtract and do not fall directly within the ſphere of the imagination, to ſhew it out by more eminent properties of *matter*, *figure*, *motion*, &c. thus, *Deſire* being conſidered as a tendency of the ſoul towards ſomething, is referred to the Soul, as *terminus à quo*;—to the Object, as *terminus ad quem*. The *reaſon* of any notion is ſtiled it's *fundamentum*. From this ſource are drawn many of the words whereby we expreſs intellectual operations, as, *Apprehend*, *Perceive*, *Diſcourſe*, &c.

Man, &c. It is not very common to find two words in the ſame language perfectly Synonymous: *Happineſs*, *Pleaſure*, *Delight*, &c. denote ſeveral degrees of the ſame thing.

Thoſe words are ſaid to be *Oppoſite* which are ſo far incompatible with each other, that, although we have a clear notion of what is meant by each term ſingly taken, yet we cannot truly apply them to one and the ſame thing, at the ſame time, and in the ſame reſpect: ſuch are,

Relative and *Correlative*, as, *Father* and *Son*; *Authority* and *Obedience*.

Contrary, as, *Black*, *White*; *Hot*, *Cold*, &c.

Diſparate, as *Yellow*, *Green*, &c.

Contradictory, as, *Material*, *Immaterial*; *Even*, *Odd*, &c.

Privative, (denoting the abſence of ſome quality which ordinarily ſhould belong to a thing,) and *Poſitive*, as, *blindneſs* is oppoſed to *ſight* in Man, and *ignorance* to *knowledge* in the Underſtanding, &c.

However, things, which do perfectly coincide, may yet be conſidered as diſtinct from each other, and indeed muſt be ſo, in order to be compared, *Strength*—*Right*; *Power*—*Authority*; *Injury*—*Hurt*; *Virtue*—*Happineſs*: and *vice verſa*, things that are diſtinct from each other, may notwithſtanding be very conſiſtent.

The joining terms together, whoſe ideas are incompatible, is talking Nonſenſe, as, a *round Square*; *a Subject, or Citizen abſolutely Free and Independent*, &c.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Of the Predicaments.

WHATEVER * we think, or talk of, is either ſuppoſed to have an *exiſtence of it's own*, ſeparate from every thing elſe, or to be ſomething circumſtantial to it, giving it a different modification and appearance in the mind.—Things of the former kind are termed † SUBSTANCES, the latter, ‡ ACCIDENTS; thus, a piece of *wax* is § ſuſceptible of various *ſhapes*,

* Ens reale *apud Logicos denotat, quicquid in mundo exiſtit nullo intellectu cogitante, ut arbor, equus.* Ens rationis *ſive* intentionis, *quod per operationem intellectûs habet ſuum* eſſe; *hoc autem non obſtat, quominus* Entia rationis *aliquando dicantur de* entibus realibus, *ut notiones* ſubjecti, prædicati, generis, ſpeciei, *de hoc vel illo homine.*

† It muſt be confeſſed to be a work of ſome difficulty to ſettle clearly the preciſe notion of *Subſtance*, or to give any ſuch account of it, as may ſeem juſt in it's application to all particular ſubſtances; which are very different in their natures, and make a more proper ſubject of enquiry in other ſciences. In *Ariſtotle*'s doctrine of the Predicaments it ſeems to denote little more than the conſideration of a thing as to it's *Being*. (Οὐσία *Lat.* Eſſentia, *neque ſane aliud eſt ejus nomen Latinum.—quò pertinet quæſtio* an ſit, *&* quid ſit. *Quinct.*) Particular things, as, *John*, *Socrates*, &c. may be ſaid to have *being* in the proper and primary ſenſe of the word, and are therefore diſtinguiſhed by the name of *primæ Subſtantiæ* (αἱ πρῶται λεγόμεναι); next to them their general nature, as, *Man*, called therefore *ſecundæ Subſtantiæ* (δευτέραι Οὐσίαι.)

‡ Accidens *hîc ſumitur latiori ſignificatione pro omni eo, quod reſpondet quæſtioni factæ per* Quale, *ſive ad eſſentiam rei pertineat ſive non: aliud eſt accidens prædicabile, de quo infra.*

§ Hence Subſtances are termed *Subjects, utpote quæ accidentibus* ὑποκεῖνται, *ſubjiciuntur.*

 colours,

colours, degrees of *hardneſs*, &c. *Theſe*, though they cannot exiſt independently of the wax, which is their *ſubject*, are ſomething truly *diſtinct* from it. So, *wiſhing*, *doubting*, *judging*, &c. are accidents of the *Mind*.

Accidents, as pointing out the *manner*, in which things exiſt, are often termed *Modes*.

No ſubject can have of each ſort of accidents more than one particular at once, one *extenſion*, one *figure*, &c. For whatever of each kind is preſent in any ſubject, excludes all other of that ſort: thus, one body cannot have two ſmells, or two colours at the ſame time.

To the claſs of *Accidents* are referred,

I. The denominations of QUANTITY, taken from things being capable of *increaſe* or *diminution*, either in *extent* or *multitude*, whereby we eſtimate their equality or inequality.

II. QUALITIES, from whence things are reckoned *like* or *unlike*: ſuch are, the ſeveral *powers*, *diſpoſitions*, and *habits* of mind or body, whether implying *perfection* or *imperfection*, and theſe either natural or acquired; thoſe modifications of bodies, which immediately *ſtrike our ſenſes*, their *forms* and *figures*.

III. RELATIONS. Theſe are formed by the minds carrying it's view from one thing to another, obſerving and comparing them * in point of *mutual dependency*, *ſimilitude*, &c. and then

* —ſecundùm quid, *ſeu, aliquam partem, naturam, circumſtantiam loci vel temporis*, &c. *cui contradiſtinguitur conſideratio Entis* ſimpliciter, in ſe, & abſolute.—That great variety of Queſtions, which make ſo great a part of the old Scholaſtick Logick, and the ſtrange

giving them new * denominations, intimating ſuch reſpect: as, *Father*, *Son*; *Cauſe*, *Effect*; *bigger*, *leſs*, &c. There is nothing, but what may be conſidered with a view to ſomething elſe, and according to ſuch different views, the relations of any thing will be different: thus, the ſame *man* may ſuſtain the different relations of *Son*, *Huſband*, *Father*, *Subject*, *Magiſtrate*, *Engliſhman*, *Chriſtian*, &c. †

IV. ACTION, or the Operating of one Being upon another.

V. PASSION, or the being operated upon. Thus, when the Fire melts Wax, the Fire is the *Agent*, the Wax is the *Patient*; the melting, as occaſioned by or coming from the Fire, is the *Action*; but, as it terminates in the Wax, and produces fluidity, it is called the *Paſſion*.

The conſiderations of things in circumſtance of

VI. *Place*, anſwering to the queſtion WHERE?

VII. *Time*—WHEN?

ſtrange determinations upon ſome of them, undoubtedly took their riſe from the neceſſity which was laid upon the Schoolmen to vindicate and palliate the monſtrous doctrine of Tranſubſtantiation.

* Hence termed *denominationes externæ*.

† In every Relation there ſhould be two things, in themſelves diſtinct, or conſidered as ſuch, then a ground or reaſon for their mutual compariſon, and a name given intimating ſuch reſpect (though languages ſometimes fail herein, which is the occaſion that the relations between things are not always taken notice of) thus *Philip* and *Alexander*, as related to each other, receive the denominations of *Father* and *Son*. Their abſolute names *Philip* and *Alexander* are termed the *Subjectum* and *Terminus relationis*; their relative names *Father* and *Son*, *Relatum* and *Correlatum*; and the reaſon of their being referred to each other under thoſe names, *Fundamentum Relationis*.

VIII. POSTURE

VIII. POSTURE—*How*; as, *ſitting*, *kneeling*, *upward*, *downward*, &c.

IX. HAVING any thing in any manner annexed to them, as, a Man's being *cloathed*, *rich*, &c.—The things ſo *had* are called *Adjuncts*.

The foregoing articles are the ten * *Predicaments* of *Ariſtotle*, or thoſe general heads, to which all *Beings* and their *Affections* may be reduced. They likewiſe point out the ſeveral † *reſpects*, in which any thing may be conſidered. But ſince our Underſtanding by reaſon of the narrowneſs of it's capacity, and it's other infirmities, is ſeldom able to comprehend the *whole* of any thing by a ſingle or ſuperficial view, we find it neceſſary to reſolve our ideas into their ſeveral intelligible ‡ *parts*. Some aſſiſtance in doing this, may be received from conſidering the nature and ſeveral kinds of *general Ideas*.

(Mr. *Locke*'s general diviſion is into *Subſtance*, *Mode*, and *Relation*: theſe he ſubdivides into their ſeveral ſorts, and illuſtrates his obſervations by a variety of inſtances, taken from different ſubjects, not always to be underſtood without ſome previous knowledge of *Natural*, *Moral*, and *Metaphyſical* Philoſophy.)

* Ariſtoteli *dicuntur* categoriæ *ἀπὸ τῦ κατηγορεῖσθαι, quod vocabulum tàm aliquid de aliquo dicere, ſeu* prædicare, *ſignificat quàm accuſare.*

† *Quippe cum diverſitas* prædicandi *ſequatur non modò diverſum modum* eſſendi, *ſed diverſitatem* quæſtionum, *quæ fieri poſſunt de individuis.*

‡ *Qui in uno multa diſtinguit, illud, per metaphoram,* dividere *dicitur, adeoque* diviſionis *nomine inſignitur diſtinctio affectionum, quæ rebus conveniunt quatenus intellectui noſtro objiciuntur.*

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Of Univerſals,

WHILE we contemplate any *ſingle* object, viz. *Peter*, we have the idea of an *Individual*. We find, that we may, by omitting all that is peculiar to him (viz. his being of ſuch *particular* ſhape, turn of mind, &c.) conſider him in the ſame view with ſeveral others, as, *engliſhman*, *ſcholar*, *ſtrong*, &c. and indeed take him for a repreſentative of *all* perſons in ſuch circumſtances. Thus our idea becomes *general*. We may afterwards leave out of our idea, whatever is *common* to him, and *ſome* others, retaining only that *ſimilitude*, in which *he* and *all* men agree, and hence give him the more general denomination of *Man*. In like manner we may conſider him, as in a *certain reſpect* partaker of the ſame nature with *Dogs*, *Horſes*, &c. and call him *Animal*; and ſo proceed onward to greater degrees of generality, till at laſt, we come to the *moſt general* conſideration of him, as *Subſtance*, or *Being*. In which proceſs it may be obſerved, that in proportion as our idea is thus enlarged in it's degree of generality, it becomes a leſs adequate repreſentation of any Individual.

The act of the mind, whereby theſe univerſal ideas are formed, is termed *Abſtraction*; inaſmuch as for this purpoſe we divide or take the ideas

ideas of things to pieces, withdrawing one part from another; or in other words, we fix our attention, upon ſuch or ſuch particular reſpects, in which we have occaſion to conſider them without regarding any other. The terms, whereby we denote ſuch general ideas by themſelves, are called * *Abſtract*, as, *humanity*, *goodneſs*, &c. Thoſe, which imply their union with ſome ſubject, are called † *Concrete*, as, *man*, *good*, &c.

All our abſtractions are taken from our obſervation of ſubſtances, and their mutually affecting one another: And the Abſtract is made by an arbitrary ſeparation in our thoughts, of what Nature exhibits in the Concrete.

Univerſal ideas, as belonging to, or included in the notion of any Individual, are reducible to five ſorts, *Genus*, *Species*, *Difference*, *Property*, and *Accident*.

A Word is ſaid to denote a *Genus*, when the idea thereby ſignified is applicable to other ideas, which are general in *leſs* a degree; thus, that of *Subſtance* is applicable to *body* and *ſpirit*.

‡ *Species*, in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word, denotes a nature common to ſeveral *individuals*; as, *Man* does that of *Peter*, *Paul*, &c. Sometimes thoſe natures are termed *ſpecies*, which

* *Sc. qui res quaſi ſuâ naturâ nexas, ſed jam ſubjectis exemtas ſpectant.*

† *Sc. quorum ſignificatio ex duobus, nimirum ſubjecto & formâ, concreverit & coaluerit.*

‡ *Cicero* uſes the word *forma* to expreſs, what is here termed *ſpecies*: The word *kind* has been ſometimes ſubſtituted for *genus*, and *ſort* for *ſpecies*; but thoſe two words are ſo often uſed promiſcuouſly, that common uſe has almoſt adopted the word *ſpecies* into the Engliſh language.

are

are common to other common natures; but then it is with reference to others, that are *more* general. As * they are *ſpecies* with regard to *theſe*, ſo are they *genera* with reſpect to *others*, that are *not ſo* general: thus, *Body* is a *ſpecies* of *ſubſtance*, but a *genus* with reſpect to *animate* and *inanimate* bodies. *Animal* is a *ſpecies* of *animate* bodies, but a *genus* to *Man* and *Brute*.

Since then every *genus* contains under it † ſeveral *ſpecies*, the idea of each *ſpecies* muſt include ſomething peculiar to itſelf, and different from what is implyed in the *genus*. That leading quality which *primarily* and moſt remarkably diſtinguiſhes one ſpecies from another, is called it's ‡ *Difference*: thus, it is found upon compariſon, that *Man* agrees with other *Animals*, as *dogs*, *horſes*, &c. in the ſeveral particulars of *animal-life*, *ſenſation*, &c. but is *diſtinguiſhed* from

* Genus *reſpectu ſpecierum dicitur* totum *Logicum: cum ſignificet et comprehendat omnia quæ ſua* ſpecies, *non eſt pars* ſpeciei, *licet ſit pars* definitionis *ſpeciei*.

† It often happens, that the name of the *genus* is peculiarly applied to one of the *ſpecies*; thus the word *bellum*, though a *general* word, is almoſt entirely appropriated to *publick conteſts*. *Virtue* applied to Women, commonly denotes one ſpecies of virtue, viz. *Chaſtity*; *Virtus* Lat. applied to Man, that of *fortitude*.

‡ Of much the ſame kind is the diſtinction of things as to their *Matter* and *Form*. *Matter* anſwers to *genus*, and denotes that general nature, in which all bodies are ſuppoſed to agree; *Form* to *differentia*, and diſtinguiſhes the ſeveral ſpecies of bodies, and the ſeveral individuals from each other. Hence have expreſſions been borrowed to diſtinguiſh notions that are purely intellectual, and to ſettle the preciſe meaning of our words; thus *Fortitude* and *Juſtice* agree *materially*, in that they are virtues; but differ *formally*, the *ratio formalis* of *fortitude* being, to act with a proper intrepidity in time of danger; that of *juſtice*, to give every one his due. Hence the *genus* in a definition is termed the *material* part; the *differentia*, the *formal*.

them by the *faculty of Reaſon.** So again, the ideas *Sorrow* and *Fear*, have both of them the ſame *genus*, each being an *Uneaſineſs of Mind*, but not the ſame *Difference*; that of the former is *it's ariſing upon the thought of a Good loſt, or the ſenſe of a preſent Evil*; that of the latter, it's *ariſing upon the thought of a future Evil likely to befall us.*

The *Genus* and *Difference*, conſidered as united, are ſaid to conſtitute it's *Eſſence*† or nature: that is, we are from that conſideration determined to refer it to this or that claſs of Beings, preferably to all others, and to rank it under the general name belonging thereto. Hence this *Eſſence* is called *nominal* in contradiſtinction to the *real* natute of things, which is not in any kind of real beings, whether corporeal or ſpiritual, *perfectly* diſcoverable by us. However, a leſs degree of knowledge will enable us, either to ſort things into diſtinct claſſes ourſelves, or to refer them to thoſe, which have been formed by the diſcretion of others.

* Indeed, it may be obſerved, that in the actions of many brute creatures, there are diſcernible ſome footſteps, ſome imperfect ſtrictures and degrees of Ratiocination; ſuch a natural ſagacity as at leaſt bears a near reſemblance to Reaſon. *Form* whence it may follow, that it is not Reaſon in the general, which is the *Form* of Human Nature; but Reaſon as it is determined to Actions of Religion; of which we do not find the leaſt ſigns or degrees in Brutes: Man being the only creature in this viſible world, that is formed with a capacity of worſhipping and enjoying his Maker. Wilk. Nat. Rel. B. 2. c. 1.

† *Eſſentia* is that which *ought* to be firſt conceived in a thing, and to which all other things are underſtood as ſuperadded. (becauſe, in fixing the eſſence of a thing, not the accidental, but natural order of conception is to be attended to.)

Inſtances

Inſtances of branching out a *genus* into it's *ſpecies* according to their ſeveral degrees of ſubordination, are theſe that follow,

SUBSTANCE contains under it the ſpecies of *corporeal* and *incorporeal* ſubſtances.—CORPOREAL, *animate* and *inanimate*.—ANIMATE, *ſenſitive* and *inſenſitive*.—SENSITIVE, (or Animal) *rational* and *irrational*.—RATIONAL, (or Man) the ſeveral individuals *Peter*, *John*, &c.

BODY, *Animate* and *Inanimate*.—ANIMATE, *Vegetable* and *Animal*.—VEGETABLE, *Tree*, *Shrub*, *Flower*, &c.—TREE, *Fruit-Tree* and *Timber-Tree*.—FRUIT-TREE, *Apple*, *Pear*, *Plumb*, &c.—APPLE, the ſeveral ſpecies of Apples, *Pearmain*, *Codling*, *Nonpareil*, &c.

FIGURE, *curvilinear*, *rectilinear*, and *mixed*. RECTILINEAR, *triangle*, *parallelogram*, &c. —TRIANGLE, *ſcalene*, *iſoſcelar*, *equilateral*, &c.

LAW, *divine* and *human*.—DIVINE, *natural*, *revealed*.—REVEALED, *Patriarchal*, *Moſaick* and *Chriſtian*.—HUMAN LAW contains thoſe of particular nations, *Roman*, *Engliſh*, &c.—ENGLISH, *civil* and *eccleſiaſtical*.—CIVIL, *Common law*, *Particular cuſtoms*, *Statutes* &c*.

* Hence it appears that whatever belongs to a *genus*, belongs to it's ſeveral *ſpecies*; and whatever is included in the notion of a *ſpecies* is applicable to every *individual* contained under it. What is known of ſuch general Ideas will be true of every thing, in which that Eſſence i. e. that abſtract Idea is found. And what is once known of ſuch Ideas will be perpetually and for ever true; and

After ſettling the principal attribute, or *Difference*, we often obſerve ſome others belonging to *every* individual of the ſpecies; to that ſpecies *alone*; and *at all times*; which are called *Properties*. Theſe are therefore ſuppoſed to * *depend* upon it's *Difference*, (though we are not in *all* caſes able to perceive, that the connexion between them is neceſſary:) thus, if *rationality* be the *Difference* of *Man*, a *ſenſe of Religion* will be his *Property*.

Accidents are ſuch attributes, as are † not ſuppoſed to affect the nature or Eſſence of a thing by their ‡ abſence or preſence, ſuch are the *health*, *learning*, *beauty*, &c. of a *man*.—And indeed it would be endleſs to conſtitute a different

the Truths themſelves are termed *Eternal*. Thus, whatever makes part of the notion of *Animal*, belongs to the nature of *Man*; and whatever conſtitutes the nature of *Man*, may be found in *Peter*, *John*, &c. according to the firſt *antepredicamental* rule, *Quicquid prædicatur* (directè, affirmativè, & per ſe) *de prædicato, prædicatur etiam de ſubjecto*. The ſecond is, *Diverſorum generum non ſubalternatim poſitorum* (as, Subſtance and Figure) *diverſæ ſunt ſpecies & differentiæ. Generum autem ſubalternatim poſitorum* (as, Subſtance and Animal) *nihil prohibet eaſdem eſſe ſpecies & differentias.*

* *Differentia* conſtituit, *Proprium* conſequitur *eſſentiam.*

† Whatever makes part of the definition of a thing, or is implied in the natural notion of it, (*quod rei competit* qua tali) is ſaid to belong to it *per ſe*; all other qualities, *per accidens*. Thus, civil government *per ſe* in it's own nature tends to preſerve the happineſs of mankind; *per accidens*, it becomes the inſtrument of oppreſſion. Religion *per ſe* in it's natural tendency ſecures men's external peace, freedom and ſafety:—*per accidens*, on account of particular circumſtances, expoſes men to ſuffering.

‡ *Cum accidentia dicantur* abeſſe à ſubjecto *hoc intelligendum eſt non* abſolutè *& ſimpliciter, ſed* hypotheticè *& ſecundum quid. Non poteſt quidem ſubjectum ſecundum* exiſtentiam *ſine omnibus ſupereſſe accidentibus, (ſicut neque accidentia ſine aliquo ſubjecto.) At ſecundum* eſſentiam, *quam accidentia non ingrediuntur, ſine hoc vel illo ſubjectum exiſtere poteſt.*

claſs

claſs on account of *every* difference, which occurs in particular Beings. Our calling any quality *accidental* or *eſſential* is chiefly in reference to the *names*, whereby we mark out the ſeveral views, in which we conſider things. According to which account the ſame attribute may be *eſſential* to an individual in one reſpect, and *accidental* in another: thus, *blackneſs* of complexion is *eſſential* to an *African* conſidered as a *Negro*, but *accidental* to him as a *Man*. *Hardneſs* is *accidental* to any portion of *matter*, conſidered as *matter*; but *eſſential* to it, if called by the name of *ſtone*; if the ſmaller parts are *entirely ſeparate* from each other, we call it *ſand* or *duſt*; if *eaſy to be put out* of their preſent form without ſeparation from each other; *clay*, or *dirt*.

When we conſider things, as to their *genus*, our notion is very indeterminate and inadequate; ſuch is the conſideration of *Man*, as an *Animal*; *Mathematicks*, as *Learning*. *In ſpecie* (i. e. when we unite the *Difference* to the *Genus*) our notion becomes more determinate; as, when to the general notion of *animal* we annex the quality of *reaſon*, which according to our apprehenſion diſtinguiſhes the human kind from all other *animals*. So *Mathematicks* is *diſtinguiſhed* from all other branches of *learning*, by ſaying, that it treats concerning the nature and properties of *quantity*; whether of *extenſion* or *number*. Thoſe qualities, which are found to be conſtantly and peculiarly connected with the thing, which we conſider, though they do not appear but upon a *ſecondary* view, and come under the notion of *properties*,

properties, carry us *ſtill* further into the nature of what we conſider. Laſtly, our idea of any particular thing then becomes *compleat*, when we conſider it not only as to the *general*, *ſpecial* and *diſtinguiſhing* parts of it's nature, but together with thoſe * *accidental qualities*, which diſtinguiſh it from the other individuals of the ſame ſpecies †; thus, our notion of a particular man becomes compleat, when we conſider him not only as an *animal*, a *rational animal*, and capable of a *ſenſe of Religion*, but of ſuch a particular *ſtature*, *features*, *complexion*, *temper*, *behaviour*, &c.

SECT. V.

Of Diviſion.

THE rules of branching out a *Genus* through the whole ſcale of it's *ſpecies*, and a *ſpecies* into it's ſeveral *individuals*, (which may likewiſe be apply'd in tracing back an *individual* through it's *ſpecies*, and a *ſpecies* through it's *genera*) are,

1. The diviſion ſhould be into the moſt *immediate* parts; (*i. e.* we ſhould begin with the moſt general ideas and deſcend gradually to thoſe, that

* Hæc omnia ſimul ſumpta conſtituunt differentiam, quæ dici ſolet, *numericam*; et ſunt principium *individuationis*, quod ens aliquod ſingulare determinat in ſuo *eſſe*.

† Hinc patet cur entia ſingularia dicuntur *Individua*; ſcilicet quia dividi adinſtar *generum* et *ſpecierum* non poſſunt. *Subſtantia* dividitur in *materialem* et *immaterialem*. *Homo* in *Petrum* et *Johannem*, &c. non autem licet *Petrum* iſto modo dividere.

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are more and more determinate.) *See examples in the foregoing ſection.*

2. The parts in every diviſion ſhould be *oppoſite* (*i. e.* no part ſhould coincide with or contain the other.)

3. The parts ſingly taken ſhould contain *leſs* than the whole to be divided.

4. All the parts taken together ſhould *exhauſt* (*i. e.* contain neither more nor leſs than) the whole.

Much the ſame rules, which are laid down for the diſtribution of a Genus into it's Species are to be obſerved in the diviſion of all other ſubjects *.

How far any diviſions or ſubdiviſions are to be purſued, or which parts deſerve a particular conſideration, is a point of diſcretion, which will admit of various determinations according to the reſpective nature and circumſtances of the matter under examination, and the different views, in which it is to be conſidered.

Many of our Ideas till they are thus ſorted, lye in our mind ſo confuſedly, as to be of little or no ſervice for the purpoſes of gaining or communicating uſeful knowledge: But being, according to the foregoing rules, reduced into order, they may be diſpoſed with perſpicuity, and worked into plans ſuitable to our occaſions.

* The ſeveral kinds of diviſion are thus diſtinguiſhed by Logicians; Totum *univerſale* ſeu *Logicum* diſtribuitur in partes ſubjicibiles, ut, *Animal in hominem et brutum:* Totum *eſſentiale* ſeu *Metaphyſicum* reſolvitur in partes conſtitutivas, ut, *Homo in Corpus et Animam.* Totum *integrale* ſeu *Phyſicum* in partes quantitativas ſeu integrantes, ut, *Corpus humanum in ſua membra.*

SECT.

SECT. VI.

Of Definition.

AFTER all our care in ſettling and adjuſting our general ideas, we ſhall find that the unavoidable ambiguity, which attends the uſe of general words will be apt to intangle our underſtandings and perplex our diſcourſes. Thus, the word *Infallible* when applied to a *Rule*, means ſuch a Rule as will not deceive thoſe who know how to make a right uſe of it:—when we ſay any *Perſon* is infallible, this can be true only of God, and thoſe who are guided by his Spirit:—when we talk of infallible *Knowledge*, and infallible *Certainty*, we uſually mean ſuch as ariſes from Intuition, or from ſcientifical Demonſtration, ſuch as excludes the leaſt poſſibility of error and deception.

The deſign of *Definitions* is * to fix the idea ſignify'd by any term, ſo that it may be more eaſily carry'd along, and uſed as a principle in the courſe of our reaſonings.

In general, we may be ſaid to *define*, either when we explain a word, whoſe ſignification is unknown, or limit it, when it is uncertain: Indeed where a word admits of a double acceptation, ſomething ought to be premiſed in order to diſtinguiſh it, before we proceed to define it.

* Ut quæ ab invicem diſtincta volumus, velut agrorum fines, ex limitibus (ὅροις) ſuis dignoſcantur.

But

But a proper logical Definition is a ſentence, repreſenting preciſely, that which a word is made the ſign of, by ſeveral other, not eqnivalent or ſynonymous *, words.

In order to this we are directed, firſt, to compare the thing which is to be defined, and thereby ſettle, what is that *general nature* †, in which it more immediately agrees with other things, that are moſt like itſelf; then, we are to find out it's *ſpecifick difference*, and form our definition by compounding theſe two together ‡. as, *Logick is the Art of Reaſoning.* Here, *Art* is the more immediate general nature, wherein it agrees with *Grammar*, *Rhetorick*, &c. and the ſpecifick difference, which diſtinguiſhes it from thoſe and all other arts, is it's *directing men in the uſe of their Reaſon.—Faith is the aſſent of the mind founded upon Teſtimony:* It agrees with *knowledge* and *opinion*, as it is an *aſſent of* the mind; but it is diſtinguiſhed by the motive and ground of aſſent, *viz.* the *teſtimony* and authority of the ſpeaker.

Many of thoſe *Definitions*, which ſeem to explain the nature of things, are in reality no other

* Admittitur itaque *circulus* in definiendo, quoties in definitione occurrit terminus, cujus definitio ingreditur definitum; ut, ſi definias *annum* per *ſpatium temporis annuum.*

† *Genus proximum.* The uſe of this is to ſave the trouble of enumerating at length thoſe ſeveral particulars which enter into our notion of the *genus*; of which, as alſo of the *differentia*, unleſs we have clear and diſtinct notions, the definitions, which we form, will be of little uſe.

‡ Hence it appears, that the Logical doctrine of Definition relates entirely to the definitions of *ſpecies*, or ſubaltern *genera*, which in reſpect of ſuperior *genera* are conſidered as *ſpecies.*

than explications of what the authors of languages have eſtabliſhed to call by ſuch and ſuch names, for the better avoiding of confuſion in their ideas. This may be done ſufficiently in matters of a very abſtruſe nature without conveying any knowledge of the real nature and eſſence of thoſe things, to which ſuch names are applied.

In many caſes we cannot ſettle what is the *ſpecifick difference* of things, (*i. e.* we cannot fix upon any one attribute, which may be deemed ſufficient of itſelf to diſtinguiſh it from thoſe ſeveral others, which are included under the ſame *genus*;) and therefore our definition muſt then be formed by an enumeration of ſuch *properties*, as are obſerved to be conſtantly united in the things which we would define and no other. And indeed this is the only method in which we can pretend to define natural things; as, when we define *Gold*, to be a *metal*, *yellow*, *fuſible*, *malleable*, *heavy*, *fixed*, &c. ſo alſo, the ideas of *colour*, *conſiſtency*, and *ſweetneſs* make the complex of *Sugar*; on further experience we add other qualities of its being *brittle*, *diſſolvable*, *clammy*, *aſtringent*, &c.

Sometimes we muſt content ourſelves with reckoning up their moſt remarkable *accidental* qualities. Such explications are termed *Deſcriptions*; and are often to be met with in ſuch writings, as appeal rather to the Fancy than the Judgment, *viz.* Oratorical and Poetical.

Individuals of the ſame ſpecies cannot be defined

fined or diſtinguiſhed from each other by any method but this latter.

Since then a Definition is the explication of the meaning of a word by enumerating ſuch marks as may ſufficiently diſtinguiſh the thing ſignified, it is evident that thoſe ideas which are *ſimple*, or cannot be diſtinguiſhed into ſeveral parts, cannot be explained any otherwiſe, than by ſynonymous terms,——by a negation of the Contrary, or by pointing out the method whereby we formed them, (as in the caſe of very general words:) Were it aſked, wherein conſiſts *Similitude* or *Equality*, all attempts to define would but perplex them; yet their ideas may be aſcertained by obſerving, that upon two triangles being compared or viewed together, there ariſes to the mind an idea of *Similitude*; or upon twice two and four, the idea of *Equality*, &c. Sometime an appeal muſt be made to our perceptive faculties (as in the caſe of ſenſible qualities, *heat*, *cold*, *colour*, &c.) in which caſes all ſubſtitution of Periphraſes in the room of thoſe words will be ridiculous.

A definition ought to be,

I. *Adequate*, or ſo comprehenſive as to take in the whole, and nothing but the whole of what is to be defined *. A true account or deſcription of a thing may be very faulty, for want of being complete.

* Hinc definitio et definitum dicuntur inter ſe invicem *reciprocari*.

II. *Clear* and *plain*; for equivocal or obſcure language would deſtroy the very end and deſign of definition.

III. Compriſed in as *few* words, as is conſiſtent with making ourſelves underſtood: too great brevity is apt to render a ſentence obſcure, and prolixity to cauſe confuſion.

Inaſmuch as the ſignification of all language is arbitrary, every writer has an undoubted liberty to affix what ſenſe he pleaſes to the words which are to convey his meaning *, and to deduce what conſequences he can from ſuch an uſe of them. But when the import of a word in common uſe is plain and determinate, it would be a ridiculous impropriety in any man to recede from it, and much more unfair, to extend ſuch conſequences to any word in its uſual ſenſe, if common uſe has given it a ſenſe different from what this or that writer pleaſes to fix upon it. And it would be fooliſh, if not diſhoneſt, to deviate purpoſely from that ſenſe, which we have once given it. Confuſedneſs in the ſignification of words, indeed, is to be found more or leſs in all languages: But this is not more owing to the abſtruſe nature of the things ſpoken of, than to affectation or negligence of writers or ſpeakers in the foregoing reſpects. There is certainly great danger of uſing words, even after we have defined them, in a ſenſe different from their common one; ſo that, when we have found out conſequences that

* In this ſenſe *ſignificatio vocis deſumenda eſt ex conceptu imponentis.*

are

are true, whilſt the words are uſed in our own ſenſe, we are very apt to think them true too, after we have, without being aware of it, changed the meaning of the words, and taken in all that they ever expreſs in their moſt uſual acceptation.

In order to form a juſt notion of a writer's meaning, we ſhould have an eſpecial regard to the particular circumſtances in which, and the deſign with which, he wrote *.

There is a manner of writing peculiar to almoſt every age and country, which diſqualifies thoſe perſons from being competent judges, whoſe notions have been perpetually confined within the limits of their own age and country; thus, the force of *Oriental* expreſſions, as they occur in Scripture, is not always apprehended by a modern *European*.

Again, ſingle words, as well as ſentences, ſometimes carry in them an alluſion to ſome Hiſtorical facts, or cuſtoms, *&c.* upon the know-

* Thus the different, though not contradictory, poſitions of *St. Paul* and *St. James* about *Juſtification by Faith*, may be reconciled by conſidering, that St. Paul directs his diſcourſe to a ſort of Jewiſh Chriſtians, who retained an affection for the works of the ceremonial Law, and for Circumciſion eſpecially; he therefore took occaſion to tell them, that their Father Abraham himſelf was juſtified without ſuch works; that his eminent faith was one time counted to him for righteouſneſs or juſtification.—*St. James* found, that ſome Chriſtians miſunderſtood and perverted ſuch doctrine as this and began to pretend, that no works at all, not thoſe of piety and charity were neceſſary to their juſtification at the great day, and that their believing in Chriſt would acquit them from the guilt of all their ſins that they ſhould commit after this belief, and during the time of their Chriſtian profeſſion: and, therefore, he thought it neceſſary to tell them, that Abraham truſted not to an empty faith, but ſhewed his obedience to God's Will in the higheſt inſtances.

ledge

ledge whereof, the underſtanding of the full import of the writer does depend: hereby an expreſſion, which might originally be very clear, may in proceſs of time become obſcure, and again clear up as the traces of ſuch facts or cuſtoms can be recovered.

Sometimes words are uſed in a *Philoſophical* ſenſe, and are deſigned to convey a notion of the true nature of the things ſpoken of: When uſed in a *Vulgar* ſenſe, they are intended to expreſs only ſuch notions, as are uſually raiſed in the generality of mankind from the common and moſt obvious apprehenſion of the object: Thus, an Aſtronomer in common converſation, ſcruples not to talk of the Sun's *moving*, *riſing*, &c. Thus, a Farmer may ſwear, that ſuch a tree is the *ſame*, which has ſtood ſeveral years in the ſame place; (i. e. the ſame as to all uſes and purpoſes of common life) But in a philoſophical ſenſe it is not the ſame, unleſs it has conſiſted all along of the ſame particles.

If the meaning of a word be not aſcertained by an expreſs definition, it may fairly be preſumed to be uſed in that ſenſe, which the word uſually bears among perſons in ſuch circumſtances, as thoſe are to whom it is ſpoken *. The words *property*, *difference*, &c. have a different meaning when uſed by a Logician, from what they have when uſed by a Lawyer. Thus writers in Aſtronomy are ſuppoſed to addreſs

* In this ſenſe *ſignificatio vocis deſumenda eſt ex conceptu audientis.* Hence, &c.

themſelves

themſelves to readers *regularly* prepared for that ſtudy, and therefore freely make uſe of *Geometrical* terms, without any imputation of being obſcure: the ſame is the caſe, when writers upon abſtruſe ſubjects in *Divinity*, *Metaphyſicks*, &c. make uſe of Logical terms. Criticiſms concerning Obſcurity very often have nothing more at the bottom of them, than complaint, that every thing is not to be underſtood with the ſame eaſe; that is, Perſons cannot or do not care to undergo the fatigue of that attention, which the very nature of the thing or the manner of treating it requires. Some ſubjects are abſtruſe in their very nature: Other difficulties may ariſe from their being treated in a manner different from that which is familiar and eaſy to us. A ſubject may be treated in a manner which all along ſuppoſes the Reader acquainted with what has been ſaid upon it, both by antient and modern Writers; and with what is the preſent ſtate of Opinion in the World concerning ſuch a ſubject. This will create a Difficulty of a very peculiar kind, and even throw an obſcurity over the whole, before thoſe who are not thus informed; but thoſe who are, will be diſpoſed to excuſe ſuch a manner, and other things of the like kind, as a ſaving of their Patience.

Sometimes the meaning of a word may be ſettled by thoſe others which occur in the ſame paſſage, or by ſome other expreſſions * of the

* We ſhould be cautious of taking aſſertions alone by themſelves, but ſhould conſider the Whole of what is ſaid upon the ſubject. This is neceſſary, not only in order to judge of the truth of them, but

ſame writer; it being reaſonable to preſume, that every writer is conſiſtent with himſelf *. Thus, thoſe expreſſions, which occur in the Scripture concerning the *Eye*, *Arm*, *Repentance*, *Anger*, &c. of God, are accommodated to the manners and apprehenſions of Men, and are intended to make us conceive ſomething of God, *correſpondent* to what happens in men, who are influenced and moved by theſe affections; and, if interpreted according to the tenour of the ſacred writings †, they will be found to ſignify the varieties of God's providence, in his *care*; his immediate *interpoſition*; and the *alterations* of his dealing with mankind on account of ſome change in their behaviour.

And, indeed, when the ſubject ſpoken of is ſomething *removed* from *immediate* view, and,

but often to ſee their very meaning. When the ſame writer ſeems to differ from himſelf, or, where writers of the ſame authority ſeem to differ from each other, we muſt ſuppoſe that we do not underſtand their meaning; thus, when we find that St. Paul expreſsly attributes juſtification to Faith without the works of the Law, Gal. iii. 6. 11.—and that St. James ii. 14. expreſsly combats this opinion, that Faith, without moral works conſequent upon it, is ſufficient to juſtification; on examination, it will appear, that St. Paul is ſpeaking of the works of the Ceremonial Law, as Circumciſion; St. James of Works of the Moral Law.

* Thus, in order to ſhew that St. Paul's juſtification by Faith only without works is not intended to exclude the neceſſity of works of righteouſneſs, it may be ſufficient to ſay, that he himſelf guards againſt miſtakes, and declares, that we are by our converſion to Chriſtianity, as it were, anew created for this end, that we may perform good works, Eph. ii. 10.—that he with great vehemence recommends moral duties—commends Chriſtians for their improvements in them,—preſſes them forward with all imaginable earneſtneſs, and expreſſes the utmoſt indignation againſt the ſins of profeſſed Chriſtians.

† Ἀνθρωποπαθῶς dicta Θεοπρεπῶς ſunt intelligenda.

therefore

therefore difficult to be apprehended, we muſt be contented with ſuch repreſentation of it, as can be made by ſubſtituting our conceptions of things *directly* known, in it's ſtead, on account of ſome *ſimilitude* or *proportion* between them. Thus, a natural Hiſtorian endeavours to raiſe an idea of a ſtrange animal or plant, by pointing out the reſemblance, which it bears to ſomething that is ſuppoſed to be commonly known. But this kind of analogical language becomes neceſſary, when we offer to expreſs even our *natural* notions concerning Almighty God, and ſpiritual Beings:—And much more, when we talk or read of thoſe truths, whoſe diſcovery to mankind is entirely owing to divine *revelation*; ſuch as are the "*union of the divine and human* "*natures in the perſon of our Saviour*;" "*the* "*redemption of mankind by him*;" "*the diſtinc-* "*tion of three perſons in the unity of the God-* "*head*; *the Operations of the Holy Ghoſt*, &c." We have no language to make uſe of upon ſuch occaſions, but what was originally and with *more propriety* applicable to other things; and, therefore, conſiderable allowance ſhould be made both for the imperfection of our ideas, and the neceſſary want of adequateneſs in the manner of expreſſion; nor are we to ſtrain words, when thus applied, to the ſtrict propriety of common uſe; ſuch ways of ſpeaking being intended by way of illuſtration, they often fall infinitely ſhort of the thing intended to be illuſtrated.

It will moreover be proper to conſider whether a word be uſed in an *abſolute* or *relative*

ſenſe; for many words, which ſeem only to intend abſolute ideas, will be found upon examination to include ſome tacit relation. Thus, the words *great*, *hard*, *high*, *old*, &c. expreſs only a comparative *greatneſs*, *hardneſs*, *age*, &c. And thus the ſame thing may be capable of oppoſite denominations, according as it ſtands compared with different things, or with itſelf at different times and in different circumſtances. Thus *Angels*, *Men*, *Brutes*, &c. may all of them be ſtiled perfect in their reſpective kinds; though, when compared with each other, a Brute is leſs perfect than Man; Man than an Angel, &c. A *Youth* may be reckoned *learned* for ſuch a ſhare of learning, as would not ſecure a *grown* perſon from the juſt imputation of *Ignorance*.

PART

PART. II.

SECT. I.

Of Propoſitions, and their ſeveral kinds.

Judgment is that act of the mind, whereby we acknowledge* the relation of agreement or diſagreement between ideas. As Words are the repreſentation of our ideas, ſo Propoſitions ſerve to declare our Judgments; *affirming* one word of another, where the ideas are ſuppoſed to agree; *denying* where they diſagree; as, *Virtue is commendable*: "*Vice is not commendable*†."

Interrogations imply ſtrong aſſertions.—Affirmative interrogations ſtrongly deny: as, *Is it ſo?* q. d. It is not ſo.—Negative interrogations aſſert *Is it not ſo?* q. d. Yes it is.

In every act of Judgment there are diſtinguiſhable two principal ideas and the relation between

* I uſe the word *acknowledge* rather than *perceive*, becauſe all aſſent to the truth of a propoſition is an act of Judgment, whether the ground of that aſſent lye in our deference to the authority of ſome intelligent perſon, or in our own immediate perception.

† Diviſio Propoſitionis in Affirmativam et Negativam dicitur diviſio illius quoad *Subſtantiam*.]

them: In like manner in every propoſition there are three parts, *viz.* a *Subject* *, denoting the thing ſpoken of; a *Predicate*, denoting that which is aſſerted of it; and a *Copula*, or the verb, which connects them by affirmation or denial. And here it may be noted, that it affords a ſufficient ground for a denial, if the predicate diſagree with the ſubject in *any* reſpect: Nor can a propoſition be truly affirmed †, unleſs the predicate in the *whole* nature and notion of it be found in and agree with the Subject.

Propoſitions may be both intelligible and uſeful, though the Subject, to which thoſe Propoſitions relate, taken in it's full extent, may exceed our comprehenſion; thus, in the principles of Natural Religion, the nature of *God* and his Attributes, *Eternity*, *Omnipreſence*, *Omniſcience*, &c. are inexplicable: But yet the conſideration of his Being under thoſe characters is highly rational and uſeful.

The *ſubject* and *predicate*, though they are not always ſingle words, are to be conſidered as ſimple terms; for, as in *Grammar* a whole ſentence may be the nominative caſe to a verb, ſo in *Logick* a whole ſentence may be the ſubject or predicate of a propoſition; as "*That which* "*hath a tendency to diſturb the judgment is not* "*likely to aſſiſt men in their enquiries after truth.*" The *copula* is always the verb ſubſtantive *am*, *is*,

* Vox de quâ aliqua alia *prædicatur* (*i. e.* affirmatur aut negatur) dicitur ei *ſubjici*.

† *Niſi prædicatum inſit ſubjecto ſecundum omnia attributa ſua eſſentialia.*

are

*are, am not**, &c. of the *preſent* tenſe; for it is the preſent ſtate of union or diſagreement of our ideas that we declare, though perhaps it may be with reference to ſomething paſt or future.

It is obvious likewiſe, that the ſentences which we are ſpeaking of, muſt run in the *indicative* mood; and therefore, though *imperative*, *optative*†, &c. ſuch like forms of ſpeech may come under the notion of grammatical ſentences; yet, as they aſſert nothing, they are not ſuch in the eye of Logicians.

The three parts, *ſubject*, *predicate*, and *copula* are to be found in all propoſitions, either expreſſed or implied; as, *Scribo*‡, *I write*, *i. e.* "I" "am" "writing". *God is*, *i. e.* "God" "is" "exiſting". *Diligence will improve a man's natural faculties*, i. e. "*Diligence*" "*is*" "*that* "*which will improve*, &c."

In order to reſolve propoſitions into their diſtinct parts, ſome ſhare of Grammatical ſkill is requiſite. Without this (for inſtance) there is no knowing when the *negative* particle in a propoſition affects the copula and when not; nor conſequently, whether the propoſition belongs to the claſs of *negative* or *affirmative*; or, how far it does ſo.

The ſame ſkill is requiſite in order to clear up many other ambiguities in the manner of propo-

* Quodvis aliud verbum dicitur verbum *adjectivum*, quia in *ſum* et *adjectivum reſolvitur*.

† Tho' in theſe there is often a tacit aſſertion imply'd.

‡ Hujuſmodi propoſitiones dicuntur propoſitiones *ſecundi adjacentis*; quarum ſc. prædicata in unam vocem cum copulâ concreſcunt.

ſing.

ſing. Thus, according to the idiom of ſome languages, *(Latin* and *Engliſh)* two negative particles deſtroy each others force, and make the propoſition affirmative. In others, *(Greek* and *French)* two negatives ſtrengthen the denial.

To theſe we may add, that the introduction of negative terms into moſt languages has cauſed, that the ſame ſenſe is indifferently capable of being expreſſed in an affirmative or negative propoſition, as "*Every idle man is uſeleſs to Society.*" "*No idle man is uſeful to Society.*" And indeed aſſertions in all caſes may by this means be made to carry an affirmative form; tho' not always conſiſtently with the elegance and propriety of Language,

When any thing is abſolutely and ſimply affirmed or denied, the Propoſition is termed *Categorical**.

Thoſe propoſitions are called *Hypothetical*†, which aſſert only conditionally, as, *If a man be imprudent, he is not to be truſted.* They are equivalent to categorical ones and may be reſolved into them, as, *no imprudent man is to be truſted.*

If a predicate be affirmed or denied of a ſubject in it's whole extent, the propoſition is termed *Univerſal*; as *All Virtues are commendable*; *No Vice is commendable.*

If the affirmation or denial extends only to

* Seu propoſitio *de ineſſe*; ſc. quæ ſimpliciter dicit Prædicatum ineſſe vel non ineſſe Subjecto.

† Synecdochice omnis propoſitio compoſita dicitur *hypothetica*. ---Hæc diviſio propoſitionis in Categoricam et Hypotheticam dicitur diviſio propoſitionis quoad *ſubſtantiam*.

part

part of the Subject, the propoſition is *particular**, as, *Some pleaſures are hurtful.*

According to this account, any propoſition, which has a determinate individual for it's ſubject, is to all intents and purpoſes an *Univerſal* propoſition; though ſuch are uſually diſtinguiſhed among Logicians by the name of *ſingular* propoſitions, as, *Socrates is wiſe.*

The *univerſality* and *particularity* of propoſitions which have a general word for their ſubjects, are uſually ſignified by ſuch notes, as, *Every*, *All*†, *No*, *None*, &c. *Some*, *Many*, *Few*, &c.

If through the omiſſion of theſe notes it becomes doubtful whether a propoſition be univerſal or particular, it is then ſaid to be *indefinite.*

Not that even the inſertion of them will in all caſes prevent ambiguity; thus in *Every man is not wiſe*, the predicate is not really denied of the ſubject, in it's *whole* extent, but only of *ſome* men.—So again, when we ſay, *All the Planets are ſix. All the Planets are opake Bodies.* The predicate of the former *(Six)* is affirmed of all the Planets taken *collectively*: that of the latter *(opake Bodies)* is affirmed *diſtributively*: the former is properly a *ſingular* propoſition, becauſe the ſubject denotes one ſingle *collective* idea; the latter an *univerſal*, becauſe the predicate is truly affirmed of *each* and *every individual planet.*

* Hæc eſt diviſio propoſitionis quoad *quantitatem.*

† Such expreſſions as, *All* men are ſlaves to their paſſions, *All* the world knows this, denote a *moral* univerſality (cum in rebus *moralibus* frequentiſſima ſit) and are owing to an abuſe of language.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of the Oppoſition and Converſion of Propoſitions.

THE ſame ſubject and predicate may be combined in four ſeveral manners, and ſo be formed into four different kinds of Propoſitions. *viz.*

Univerſal affirmative, as, All Men are wiſe.
Univerſal negative, as, No Men are wiſe.
Particular affirmative, as, Some Men are wiſe.
Particular negative, as, Some Men are not wiſe.

It will be uſeful therefore to remember how far Propoſitions thus formed are conſiſtent with each other, and conſequently how far we may judge of the truth or falſhood of one from the truth or falſhood of the other.

An univerſal affirmative and an univerſal negative propoſition are termed *Contrary*; "They "may be both falſe, but can not be both true*."

A particular affirmative and particular negative are termed *ſubcontrary*; "They may be "both of them true, but cannot in any inſtance "be both of them falſe."

An univerſal affirmative, and particular negative, as alſo an univerſal negative and particu-

* Hinc dicitur, quod inter *contraria* datur medium, licet non inter *contradictoria*.

lar

lar affirmative are termed *Contradictory*. "They "can in no inſtance be both of them true, nor "both of them falſe."

The difference between *contrary* and *contradictory* Propoſitions ſhould be the more carefully obſerved, as it is common enough to find the two contending parties in a diſpute to be both of them miſtaken, while they maintain *contrary* poſitions; which may be both of them falſe.—So likewiſe as to *ſubcontrary* propoſitions, Men expreſſing themſelves indefinitely ſometimes grow angry with each other, ſuppoſing that their aſſertions are inconſiſtent; when if rightly explained, they may be both of them found to be very true.

An univerſal affirmative and particular affirmative, and an univerſal negative and particular negative are *ſubaltern*. Here, "if the univerſal "be true, the particular *muſt* be true;" *viz*, if *All men are accountable for their actions*, certainly *Some men are*.

"If the particular be falſe, the univerſal *muſt* "be ſo."

"If the univerſal be falſe, yet the particular "*may* be true." The falſeneſs of, *All men are ſincere*, does not deſtroy the Truth of, *Some men are ſincere*.

"From the mere truth of the *particular*, no-"thing more can be inferred concerning the "truth of the *univerſal*, than that it may poſſi-"bly be true, not that certainly it is ſo."

In *ſingular* propoſitions the rule of Contradictory propoſitions holds good; *viz*. as they can

not be Both true, ſo neither can they be Both falſe together. Aſſertions, tho' conſiſting of the ſame words, yet, being differently explained, are propoſitions not at all oppoſed to each other: The doctrine of oppoſition requiring that the propoſitions oppoſed to eaeh other ſhould have the ſame ſubject and predicate*.

Propoſitions are ſaid to be *converted*, when the Subject is tranſpoſed into the place of the predicate, and the predicate into the place of the ſubject, without deſtroying the truth of the propoſition.

An univerſal negative propoſition may be converted into an univerſal negative; as, "*No man* "*of true courage is raſh*," into, "*No raſh man* "*is a man of true courage.*"

A particular affirmative is convertible into a particular affirmative; as, *Some great talkers are cowards*, into, *Some cowards are great talkers.*"

An univerſal affirmative can be converted with certainty only into a particular affirmative; as,

* Poſitions may be different and yet not contradict each other, if their meaning be rightly diſtinguiſhed, thus,

Faith in Jeſus Chriſt without works { ſc. thoſe of the Ceremonial Law of Moſes, *does juſtify.* / ſc. without Works of the Moral Law, *does not juſtify.*

Theſe aſſertions are ſubcontrary, q. d. { Some faith does juſtify. / Some faith does not juſtify.

Again, *Faith in Jeſus Chriſt does juſtify*; (ſc. from the guilt of Sins committed before ſuch belief, and this, namely, in order to a better life for the future)

Faith in Jeſus Chriſt does not juſtify; (ſc. from the guilt of any ſins continued in, after this belief, and during our Chriſtian profeſſion: faith in this caſe adds to our guilt.)

All

All Men are Animals, into *Some Animals are Men.*

In ſome inſtances indeed an univerſal affirmative may be converted into an univerſal affirmative, *viz.* when the predicate contains the definition of the ſubject; whether the definition be made by the *genus* and *differentiæ* or *proprium*, or even a compleat enumeration of it's ſeveral *accidental* qualities. As, *Every man is a rational animal*, into, *Every rational animal is a man.*—*God is the creator of the univerſe*, into, *The creator of the univerſe is God.*—*A Watch is a machine of ſuch and ſuch parts adjuſted in ſuch and ſuch manner and conducive in their reſpective ways to ſhew the hour of the Day*, into, *Every machine of ſuch and ſuch parts ſo adjuſted is a Watch**.

* The rules of *Æquipollency*, or of judging concerning the truth or falſhood of a propoſition by the truth or falſhood of one equivalent to it, are uſually taken notice of here. But ſince the method laid down is accommodated only to the Latin tongue, and in that only to ſuch propoſitions as have in them a note of univerſality or particularity, which may be judged of by any one, who has but a moderate ſkill in that Language, it is omitted as unneceſſary.

SECT. III.

Of Modal and other compound Propoſitions.

THere can be no better method taken to unfold and aſcertain the meaning of ſuch propoſitions as have in them two or more ſubjects or predicates, than to conſider, what is the thing ſpoken of? what is aſſerted of it? and in what reſpect and manner?

If the propoſition contains in it another incidental aſſertion, as in theſe, *Ariſtotle*, "*who was* "*preceptor to Alexander*," *was a Philoſopher*— *All men*, "*who are pious*," *are charitable*, it ſhould be conſidered whether the incidental aſſertion be only explicative of the Subject, as in the former caſe, or determinative as in the latter. The former propoſition will be equally true if the incidental propoſition be left out; the latter will not.

It is alſo uſeful to conſider where the ſtreſs of the Aſſertion lies; for otherwiſe falſe facts may be inſinuated as true under advantage of ſomething true in a Propoſition; as, *Julius Cæſar*, "*who was a great friend to his Country*," *conquered Britain*.

"*According as Philoſophers aſſert, Nature ab-*
"*hors a Vacuum.*" Here it may be queſtion'd, whether the Propoſition relates to the "Aſ-
"ſertion

" ſertion of Philoſophers." or to " Nature's ab-
" horring a Vacuum.

It would be endleſs to enumerate the ſeveral modes of aſſerting; ſome of which are relative to the nature of the thing ſpoken of; others to the apprehenſion of the hearer or ſpeaker.

In this propoſition, " *John killed Thomas wil-*
" *fully and maliciouſly*;" there are really implied two diſtinct aſſertions, *viz.* that " *John killed*
" *Thomas*," and then, that he did it *wilfully and maliciouſly*. The former is termed the *dictum*; the latter the *modus*. Or, if we conſider a modal propoſition, under the notion of a ſimple propoſition, the *dictum* is the ſubject of it; the *modus* is the predicate; *viz.* it is aſſerted concerning the dictum, " *John killed Thomas*," that it was *wilful and malicious*: And in general, *modal* propoſitions are affirmative or negative, according as the *modus* is affirmed, or denied of the *dictum*.

The doctrine of modal propoſitions is uſually exemplified by the four modes of natural exiſtence, *Neceſſary*, *Contingent*, *Poſſible*, *Impoſſible*. viz. *It* is neceſſary *that a body have extenſion*. *It is* contingent *that it be round or ſquare*. *It is* poſſible *it may receive a new form*. *It is* impoſſible *it ſhould move itſelf*.

To Modal propoſitions may be ſubjoined a ſpecimen of that great variety of *compound* propoſitions, which is occaſioned by the uſe of ſuch Particles*, as ſignify the connexion, reſtriction,

* Sometimes the Particles are not added expreſsly, tho' the reaſon of the thing and the tenour of the diſcourſe plainly require the intelligent reader to underſtand them: thus, *Be ye angry and ſin not*,

is

diſtinction, oppoſition, emphaſis, &c. which the mind gives to ſeveral ideas or propoſitions one with another: ſuch as, "*Good Chriſtians are* often *perplexed*, never *in deſpair*.

Excluſive propoſitions, as, *Virtue* alone *will make men happy*; that is, "*Virtue will make men* "*happy*," "*Nothing elſe will*."

Exceptive, as, *All men* but *eight periſhed* in *the Flood*, that is, "*Eight perſons did not periſh* "*in the flood*;" "*Every perſon beſides did pe-* "*riſh*."

Reduplicative, as, *Men* as *animals are mortal*; that is, "*Men are animals*," "*All animals are* "*mortal*;" therefore, "*Men are mortal*." "*Men* "as *Chriſtians are obliged to acts of Mortification* "*and Self-denial*." "*Virtuous actions* as ſuch "*produce Happineſs*," is different from ſaying that *Actions which happen to be virtuous do produce happineſs*.

Copulative, as, *Good parts* and *Induſtry are neceſſary to make a Scholar*; that is, "*Induſtry is ne-*

is not an encouragement to Anger, but q. d. *Though ye be angry, Sin not*. At other times, when they are expreſſed, they are not to be interpreted with the utmoſt rigour. The rules of fair Criticiſm in many caſes require a ſupply of *excluſive* particles and ſuch tacit *exceptions*, as in point of elegance it might ſeem quite ſuperfluous to mention. In others, when they are inſerted, the extent of the excluſion is to be limited by the nature of the thing ſpoken of, and is to be underſtood in oppoſition to that thing whereto it is oppoſed, and to no other. The uſe of Particles cannot be reduced to ſettled rules; it depends altogether upon cuſtom, and differs according to the idiom of each particular language. It muſt therefore be left to every man's own obſervation and experience to judge, how far the meaning of propoſitions is thereby affected, and to draw out the whole of it into ſimple categorical aſſertions.

"*ceſſary*

" *ceſſary to make a Scholar*," " *And ſo are good* " *Parts.*"

Adverſative, as, *Pindar was ingenious* but he *was a Bœotian.* It is required in ſuch a propoſition, that not only the parts be true, as in the foregoing caſes; but that they be contradiſtinguiſhed in ſome manner to each other; for otherwiſe, though the propoſition be true, it will be impertinent.

In *Disjunctive* propoſitions two or more aſſertions are ſo connected by a disjunctive particle, that one (and but one of them) muſt be true, as *Either riches produce happineſs*, or, *Avarice is moſt unreaſonable. Either it is day*, or, *it is night.*—This kind of propoſitions are eaſily reſolvible into *Hypothetical*; as, *If Riches do not produce happineſs*, then, *Avarice is moſt unreaſonable.* The former part of the aſſertion ſo connected is termed the *antecedent*, the latter the *conſequent.* Hypothetical propoſitions do not ſo much regard the real exiſtence of things, as imply the reaſon why they do or do not exiſt; And the truth of them depends not upon the truth of the *antecedent* or *conſequent* ſingly taken, but upon the *conſequence* or connexion between them: Both the antecedent and the conſequent, conſidered as diſtinct aſſertions may be true, and yet have no connexion with one another: And on the other hand, they may be Both falſe, and yet the conſequence of one from the other be very juſt, as, *If miſery be deſirable*, then, *Wicked men act wiſely.*

The

The Aſſertion in *Hypothetical* propoſitions is equally ſtrong and abſolute as in *Categorical*. If the conſequence or *ſequel* be denied, it will be more convenient for proving if it be reſolved into one that is univerſal and categorical; the doing of which with readineſs requires not only a good attention to what is ſpoken, but alſo a good command of language. But if the reaſon implied be directly drawn from the nature of the thing, the reſolution is very eaſy, as, *If this ſtone be a magnet, therefore it draws iron.* into, *Every magnet draws iron.*

PART.

PART III.

SECT. I.

Of the nature of Syllogiſms.

WE are ſaid to *Reaſon* *, when from propoſitions, known, or granted to be true, we are led to acknowledge the truth of others: or, when not being able to perceive the agreement or diſagreement between the two terms of a propoſition *immediately*, we afterwards come to do it, by obſerving their agreement or diſagreement with ſome third: thus, in order to make it appear, that, *Men are accountable for their actions*, we may introduce the third term or idea *Free Creatures*; upon application whereof alternately as a common meaſure to *Man*, and *accountable for their actions*, we find it's congruity with Both, and infer the truth of that aſſertion in form of Syllogiſm, as,

All free creatures are accountable for their actions,

* Demonſtratio alia eſt *directa* et oſtenſiva; Alia *indirecta* et apagogica, ſeu *reductio ad impoſſibile*; ſc. cum adigitur adverſarius, ut vel negare cogatur quod antea affirmaverat, vel duas contradictorias ſimul veras eſſe fateatur, quod eſt impoſſibile.

All men are free Creatures, therefore,
All men are accountable for their actions.

Our reaſoning upon difficult ſubjects for the moſt part muſt be carried on in a regular proceſs through ſeveral Syllogiſms, before it can be brought to terminate in ſuch propoſitions, as approve themſelves to the underſtanding for undeniably true.

When the terms of a propoſition are well underſtood: When we have in view the ſeveral previous ſteps or Syllogiſms, by which, as a concluſion, it is formed; and when we perceive the dependence and connection of all theſe in ſuch a manner, that the propoſed concluſion cannot but reſult from it, we may be ſaid to have a rational conviction of it's truth.

Every regular Syllogiſm conſiſts of *three* propoſions, formed by the different combination of *three* Terms, in ſuch a manner, that if we acknowledge the truth of the *two firſt* propoſitions, we muſt neceſſarily admit the truth of the *third*.

The propoſition *to be* proved is termed the *Queſtion: after it* is proved, it receives the name of *Concluſion**: The propoſitions, *whereby* the truth of it is proved, are termed *Premiſſes*; and the connection between them, the *Conſequence*; which is uſually ſignified by ſome illative particle, as, *therefore*, *&c.*

Of the three terms, which conſtitute the propoſitions of a Syllogiſm, the Predicate of the

* Sometimes *Complexio*, vel *Connexio*.

queſtion

queſtion is called the *Major* *; the Subject, the *Minor*; and the third which is introduced for the proof of the queſtion, the *Medius* †; as being the common meaſure, whereby the ideas, ſignified by the other two, are compared, and the relation between them perceived.—Hence the propoſition, in which the *medius* is combined with the *major* term, is called the *major* propoſition ‡: That, wherein the *medius* is combined with the *minor* term, is called the *minor* § propoſition. The moſt uſual, and indeed moſt natural order, is to place the *Major* propoſition *firſt*, the *Minor ſecond*, and the *Concluſion laſt*.

It is to be obſerved, that ſuppoſing the *form* of Syllogiſms to be juſt, though we may certainly || infer the truth of the concluſion from the truth of the premiſes, yet it does not follow that the concluſion muſt be falſe, becauſe one or

* Quippe cum in propoſitione univerſali affirmativâ, (quæ potiſſima cenſetur,) Prædicatum ſolet eſſe vox *majoris*, ſaltem non *minoris* ambitûs, quam Subjectum.

† Quippe qui intercedit inter Subjectum et Prædicatum, (unde Subjectum et Prædicatum dicuntur *extrema* Quæſtionis,) quo *mediante* veritas quæſtionis oſtenditur.

‡ Sometimes *Theſis* or *Propoſitio*, quòd *proponitur* veluti baſis totius ratiocinationis. If the *minor* propoſition be placed firſt, the *major* is ſometimes called *Aſſumtio*.

§ Sometimes *Hypotheſis* or *Aſſumtio*, quaſi aſſumatur in ſubſidium ad inferendam tertiam. The *minor* is ſometimes termed *ſubſumtio*, when the *major* is placed firſt.

|| The truth of a concluſion in ſuch a caſe is ſaid to follow neceſſitate *conſequentis* (ſc. quâ aliquid *in ſe* conſideratum non poteſt non eſſe) ſeu conſequentiâ *materiali*, ſolâ vi terminorum, qui ſunt *materia* argumentationis. The truth of a concluſion rightly deduced from true premiſſes is ſaid to follow neceſſitate *conſequentiæ* (ſc. quâ aliquid non eſt *naturâ ſuâ* neceſſarium, ſed tantum ex *ſuppoſitione* alicujus Antecedentis) ſeu conſequentiâ *formali*, propter modum colligendi, qui eſt *forma* argumentationis.

other

other of the premiſes is falſe. A weak or injudicious method of endeavouring to prove an aſſertion may indeed prejudice men againſt it, but cannot invalidate it's truth. Objections againſt a Proof, and Objections againſt what is ſaid to be proved, are very different things. And, on the other hand, a propoſition may be falſe in itſelf, and yet not be ſo, in virtue of the argument brought againſt it. In the ſame manner, the plaineſt Queſtion in nature may be perplexed and obſcured by an awkward and unſkilful defence of it.

SECT. II.

Of the foundation and general rules of Syllogiſms.

THE force of Syllogiſtick reaſoning is immediately founded in theſe undoubted truths,

That, *as far as any two ideas agree to any third, ſo far they agree with one another.*

When we have two ideas, one whereof does agree to any third, and the other does not, ſo far they diſagree with one another.

The general rules to be obſerved in the formation of all Syllogiſms are theſe that follow,

I. Every Syllogiſm ſhould have in it *three* terms and no more*; *viz.* two ſignifying the two ideas concerning whoſe agreement, or diſagreement we enquire, and a third with which we compare them.

II. If *both* of the premiſſes be *negative* propoſitions, no Concluſion will follow.

III. Neither will any, if *both* be particular †.

IV. If either of the premiſſes be *negative* or *particular*, the Concluſion will be ſo likewiſe ‡.

V. The concluſion of a Syllogiſm cannot contain more than is in the premiſſes.

VI. A negative concluſion cannot follow, when both the premiſſes are affirmative §.

* Sc. ſenſu et *implicitè*, nam quoad vocem et *explicitè* poſſunt eſſe plures aut pauciores.

† *Medius* in præmiſſis ad minimum ſemel *diſtribui* debet, *i. e.* convenire cum altero *extremorum* ſecundùm *totam* ſuam extenſionem.—If it be remembered, that every *ſingular* propoſition has the nature of an *univerſal*, this rule will be found not to affect the validity of ſuch Syllogiſms, as have two ſingular propoſitions for their premiſſes.

‡ Hoc eſt, quod dici ſolet, *Concluſio ſequitur deteriorem partem.*

§ Hæc Regula pertinere dicitur ad *formam* ſyllogiſmorum; conſideratio præmiſſarum, quatenus ſunt veræ vel falſæ, reſpicit eorum *materiam*.—Syllogiſmus vitio *formæ* laborans dicitur *Paraſyllogiſmus*. Huc ſpectant verſus hi memorativi.

Syllogizari, non eſt ex particulari,
Neve negativis, recte concludere ſi vis.
Si qua præit partis, ſequitur concluſio partis:
Si qua negata præit, concluſio ſitque negata.
Lex generalis erit, medius concludere neſcit.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Of the Figures *and the* Modes.

THE doctrine of *Figures* in Logick regards the diſpoſition of the *middle* term with the terms of the queſtion in the two premiſſes.

There are four different poſitions of it poſſible, and conſequently four figures: for the *middle* term may be placed either, as,

I. A Subject in the *major* propoſition, and Predicate in the *minor*;

II. A Predicate in *Both*;

III. A Subject in *Both* *;

IV. A Predicate in the *major* propoſition and Subject in the *minor*.

But Logicians uſually confine themſelves to the three firſt; becauſe no concluſion can be drawn in the fourth figure, but what may be had more naturally in the firſt.

Beſides the difference ariſing from the different diſpoſition of the middle term with the terms of the queſtion, Syllogiſms admit of a further variation from the different nature of propoſitions, as being *univerſal* or *particular*; *negative* or *affirmative*. The doctrine of Syllogiſms conſidered in this reſpect is called the doctrine of *Modes*.

* *Sub. Præ.* primâ. *bis Præ.* ſecundâ. tertia *bis Sub.*

For

For the more compendious noting hereof, the letters A, E, I, O, have been uſually ſubſtituted, as technical marks; A, for an univerſal affirmative propoſition; E, for an univerſal negative; I, for a particular affirmative; O, for a particular negative *.

Now it may appear from the general rules of Syllogiſtick reaſoning above-mentioned, that there cannot poſſibly be other forms of Syllogiſm concluſive, than ſuch as are marked out by the following ternaries of vowels; the two firſt whereof repreſent the premiſſes, and the laſt, the concluſion of a Syllogiſm, *viz.* AAA. AAI. AEE. AEO. AII. AOO. EAE. EAO. EIO. IAI. IEO. OAO.

And of theſe ſeveral forms, that are poſſible, no others are concluſive in the firſt figure, than ſuch as have the three propoſitions *Major*, *Minor*, and *Concluſion*, anſwering to the three Vowels in the following technical line.

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio.

In the ſecond,

Ceſare, Cameſtres, Feſtino, Baroco.

In the third,

——*Darapti*
Felapton, Diſamis, Datiſi, Bocardo, Feriſon †.

* Aſſerit *A*, negat *E*, verùm generaliter ambo;
Aſſerit *I*, negat *O*, ſed particulariter ambo.

† if the letters BCD be ſuppoſed to repreſent the *Minor*, *Middle* and *Major* terms of any Argumentation, the *Modes* of Argumentation in the ſeveral *Figures*, and conſequently the different forms of Syllogiſms may be repreſented in one view, thus:

I.

Bar Omne C eſt D
ba Omne B eſt C ergo
ra Omne B eſt D

Ce Nullum C eſt D
la Omne B eſt C ergo
rent Nullum B eſt D.

Da

SECT. IV.

Of Irregular Syllogiſms and Fallacious reaſoning.

IN written diſcourſes, as well as in common converſation, the train of reaſoning is generally carried on without regard to the ſtrictneſs of Syllogiſtick form; upon preſumption, that the intelligent reader can readily ſupply the deficiency, whenever he thinks fit to bring it to the teſt of Syllogiſm.

Da Omne C eſt D
ri Aliquod B eſt C ergo
i Aliquod B eſt D

Fe Nullum C eſt D
ri Aliquod B eſt C ergo
o Aliquod B non eſt D.

II.

Ce Nullum D eſt C
ſa Omne B eſt C ergo
re Nullum B eſt D.

Ca Omne D eſt C
mes Nullum B eſt C ergo
tres Nullum B eſt D.

Feſ Nullum D eſt C
ti Aliquid B eſt C ergo
no Aliquod B non eſt D.

Ba Omne D eſt C
ro Aliquod B non eſt C ergo
co Aliquod B non eſt D.

III.

Da Omne C eſt D
rap Omne C eſt B ergo
ti Aliquod B eſt D.

Fe Nullum C eſt D
lap Omne C eſt B ergo
ton Aliquod B non eſt D.

Di Aliquod C eſt D
ſa Omne C eſt B ergo
mis Aliquod B eſt D.

Da Omne C eſt D
ti Aliquod C eſt B ergo
ſi Aliquod B eſt D.

Bo Aliquod C non eſt D
car Omne C eſt B ergo
do Aliquod B non eſt D.

Fe Nullum C eſt D
ri Aliquod C eſt B ergo
ſon Aliquod B non eſt D.

When

When the imperfection is owing merely to a defect of one of the premiſſes, the argument is called an *Enthymeme* *, as, *All perſons inveſted with authority are to be honoured*, therefore, *All Magiſtrates are to be honoured.*

Moreover, we meet with a variety of deviations from the rules above-mentioned, owing to the tranſpoſition of the terms or of the propoſitions; ſometimes through deſign, ſometimes through ignorance or inaccuracy.

Difficulties alſo ariſe in judging of other Syllogiſms, which are really concluſive, on account of the *modal*, *hypothetical* and other compounded propoſitions, which make part of them.

The ſureſt way not to miſtake, or to be miſled by the ſpecious appearance of Syllogiſtick reaſoning, will be to form and obſerve a right ſtate † of the queſtion under conſideration; *i. e.* to ſettle and attend to thoſe preciſe limitations, within which the meaning of the terms is to be reſtrained. Thus, in queſtions about *Reaſon* it may be obſerved, that the word *Reaſon* denotes ſometimes the faculty of Reaſoning,—the Habit of Reaſoning—the Art of Reaſoning—the Rules and meaſures of Reaſon—an Argument, whereby a propoſition is proved—the eſſential relations

* Quia, unâ præmiſſarum expreſſâ, altera, utut mente intelligatur, ἐν θυμῷ veluti hæreat. If, as in the inſtance given, the term occurring in the premiſs and concluſion be the *predicate* of the concluſion, the *minor* propoſition (viz. *All Magiſtrates are inveſted with authority*) is omitted; if it be the *ſubject*, the *major* is wanting.

† Quæſtio dicitur *determinari*, cum intra certos *terminos* clauditur, citra quos vera eſt, ultra eoſdem fortaſſe falſa.

between ideas—the conformity of a propoſition with thoſe eſſential relations. Such ſtating of terms will ſuggeſt ſuch diſtinctions, as may point out to us, when the premiſſes are not true in that ſenſe, which is requiſite to juſtify the concluſion.

From the neglect of caution in this reſpect, *Fallacies* commonly take their riſe, and to it they owe their ſucceſs in miſguiding men's judgments.

Some of them indeed are manifeſtly founded in ſuch groſs equivocation, as to ſerve only to puzzle a debate. Theſe are in general called *Fallaciæ dictionis*. Hereby men ſet upon ridiculing arguments inſtead of confuting them, they put nicknames upon them in order to raiſe mirth and laughter, and ſo divert the attention from them. Diſputers againſt Religion are very apt to ſubſtitute human errors in the room of divine truth,—to cavil againſt forms and figurative manners of expreſſions, as adminiſtering juſt occaſion of ridicule, when the things intended, and the truth itſelf would not. Thus, ſome have pretended to diſprove the doctrine of Grace by enquiring into the etymological meaning of two words generally uſed by Divines concerning it, viz. *Infuſion* and *Inſpiration*, and by informing the reader that they ſignify in plain Engliſh *inpouring* and *inblowing*—and what then? The word *Diſcourſe* ſignifies literally *running up and down*; but ſurely the notion of *Diſcourſing* does not therefore imply any thing in its own nature ridiculous.

Other-

Other Fallacies are more artfully and covertly introduced, ſo as to miſlead men not only in philoſophical diſquiſitions, but in the affairs of common life.——

Accordingly, we often ſee men

Confounding what is *accidental* with what is *eſſential* to a thing, and arguing from ſuch miſtake *. e. g. "*From the abuſe, to which all "ſchemes intruſted to human execution muſt be "liable, ſome men argue againſt all eſtabliſhed go-"vernment whatſoever.*"

Many a man would have died, had it not been for the Gout or a Fever: therefore *ſickneſs is a better or more perfect ſtate than Health.*

Vice and Miſery may, by the direction of Providence, in particular caſes, contribute to the benefit of mankind, therefore, *it is no man's duty to refrain from it.*

A Scriptural precept is liable to be perverted to ſerve bad purpoſes by wicked, ill-deſigning men, and, perhaps, to miſlead the weak and enthuſiaſtick, therefore *ſuch precepts cannot have come from God.*

From an aſſertion granted only in a *limited* ſenſe inferring an *univerſal* concluſion* e. g. "*Men of good and natural improved ſenſe are* "*able to judge for themſelves,* therefore, *every* "*man is to be left to his own diſcretion.*"—"*A* "*man is a maſter in this or that profeſſion,* there-"fore, *he may be allowed to dictate in any other.*" —Or *vice verſâ.*

* Fallacia Accidentis.

* —a dicto ſecundum quid, ad dictum ſimpliciter.—*et vice verſa,* —a dicto ſimpliciter ad dictum ſecundum quid.

All men are by nature equal, (viz. in reſpect of Juriſdiction or Dominion one over another) therefore *Age and Virtue, Excellency of Arts and Merit, do not give men juſt precedency*, &c.

" *A Prince has no unlimited authority to oblige* " *his Subjects to fight where, and when, and with* " *whom he pleaſes*, therefore, *he has no authority* " *at all to oblige his Subjects to make war upon* " *any people.*"

" *A Father cannot diſpoſe of the Perſons and* " *affairs of his children in what manner he will*, " therefore, *he has no authority at all over the* " *perſons or affairs of his children.*"

" *A Phyſician has in ſome inſtances of his* " *practice miſcarried*, therefore, *his advice is* " *never to be depended upon.*"

" *He that is liable to be miſtaken in any thing*, " *is liable to be miſtaken in every thing: a Judge* " *may poſſibly err in Judgment*, therefore, *he never* " *can have aſſurance that he hath judged right.*"

Applying a maxim true in the general to caſes that are particularly circumſtantiated, e. g. " *I* " *am obliged to let every man have his own*, " therefore, *I ought to return a Madman his* " *ſword.*"—" *I am to obey my Governors*, there- " fore, *my obedience is due when their commands* " *contradict thoſe of Almighty God.*"

Miſtaking the queſtion and diverting the enquiry from the main point under conſideration, and then proving what has no relation to it†.

† Ignoratio *Elenchi*. ſc. illius in quo conſiſtit redargutio: *redarguere* autem dicimur, cum diſputantem eò ducimus, ut vel affirmare cogatur, quod antea negaverat, vel negare, quod conceſſerat.

e. g.

e. g. " *A man is poor*, therefore, *he is contemp-*
" *tible*." When arguments are looſely expreſſed, perſons are often deceived by the many meanings of which the words are capable; in ſome of which an aſſertion may be true, but not to the purpoſe; in others to the purpoſe, but not true. e. g. " *Some men talk of their acting and judging*
" *conformably to right reaſon; by which they al-*
" *ways mean their own.*"

Taking that, which is concomitant with an effect, (ſuppoſing the true cauſe to be unknown) to be the cauſe of it*. e. g. " *Men profeſſing re-*
" *ligion have been very bad men*, therefore, *Re-*
" *ligion itſelf has no real tendency to make men*
" *otherwiſe.*"

Taking that for granted, which is to be proved†, e. g. " *All mankind are knaves and*
" *ſelfiſh*, therefore, *there is no ſufficient ground*
" *for confidence between man and man.*" Thus, the want of Univerſality in Revelation, and the ſuppoſed doubtfulneſs of it's Evidence, has been turned into a poſitive argument againſt it's truth: The weakneſs of which opinion may be ſhewn by obſerving the falſeneſs of thoſe ſuppoſitions on which it is founded; which are ſuch as theſe, that it cannot be thought God would have beſtowed any favours at all upon us, unleſs in the degree, which we think he might, and, which we imagine, would be moſt to our particular advantage; and alſo, that it cannot be thought he would beſtow a favour upon Any, unleſs he

* Non cauſa pro cauſâ.
† Petitio principij.

beſtowed

beſtowed the ſame upon All; ſuppoſitions, which are contradicted by every days experience of the courſe of Nature.

Inferring any thing concerning ideas in *a compounded* ſenſe, from what is true of them only in a *divided**. e. g. "*A Magiſtrate acting in his "private capacity may be diſobeyed*, therefore, *he "has no right to our obedience, when he acts in "his publick one.*" or, vice verſâ,

From what is true of things in a *compounded* ſtate, inferring concerning them in a *divided*. e. g. "A *Senate (i. e. the collective body of ſena-"tors) is to determine what is or is not inconſiſt-"ent with the public welfare*, therefore, *every ſin-"gle member may.*" Inſtances of this kind may be ſeen likewiſe in thoſe who miſrepreſent the meaning of any writer by partial and maimed quotations.

SECT. V.

Of the different kinds of Evidence *and* Aſſent *grounded thereupon.*

AFTER all our care in learning how to adjuſt the *Form* of our Reaſoning, we ſhall ſtill be at a loſs how far it may be depended upon, 'till we examine what certainty may be

* Fallacia compoſitionis et diviſionis.

had

had of thoſe *Principles*, into which we ultimately reſolve it.

Now Men have no other ordinary means of obtaining knowledge or belief of any thing, but by ſuch evidence, as relates either to the *Senſes* or *Underſtanding*.

By *Senſes* are meant thoſe faculties, whereby we are enabled to know and diſcern ſuch particular objects as are preſent; whether they are the *external* objects of our *ſight*, *hearing*, *touch*, &c. or the *internal* objects of our own mind, it's inward motions, *apprehenſions*, *inclinations*, *freedom*, and the *pleaſure* and *pain* attending them.

By *Underſtanding* is meant that faculty, whereby we are enabled to apprehend the objects of our knowledge, *general* as well as *particular*, *abſent* as well as *preſent*; and to judge of their *truth* or *falſhood*, *good* or *evil*.

The evidence, whereby the Underſtanding is determined, ariſes ſometimes from the *nature* of *things*; viz. there is ſuch a congruity or incongruity between the terms of a propoſition, or the deductions of one propoſition from another, as doth either ſatisfy the mind, or elſe leave it in ſome doubt or heſitation about it.

—Sometimes from *Teſtimony*, viz. when we depend upon the credit or relation of others for the truth or falſhood of any thing, ſuch as matters of *fact*, *accounts of perſons*, *and places at a diſtance*, which we cannot know otherwiſe, but as others do inform us.

Beſides theſe, there is a *mixt* kind of of evidence, relating both to the Senſes and Underſtanding,

ing, depending upon our own obſervation, and the repeated trials or the iſſues and events of actions or things, called *Experience*.

The kinds of aſſent proceeding from theſe ſeveral kinds of Evidence are reducible to *Knowledge*, or Certainty, *Opinion*, or Probability.

That kind of aſſent, which ariſes from ſuch plain and clear evidence, as doth not admit of any reaſonable cauſe of doubting, is called *Knowledge*, or *Certainty**. Of this there are three Kinds, *Phyſical*, *Mathematical*, *Moral*.

§ 1. *Of Senſation, External and Internal.*

Phyſical certainty depends on the firſt and higheſt kind of evidence of which human nature is capable; viz. that of immediate *Intuition*, and of *Senſe*. Nothing can be more manifeſt and plain to me, than that I now ſee ſomething, which has the appearance of ſuch a *figure*, or *colour*; that I have in my mind ſuch a *thought*, *deſire*, and *purpoſe*; and do feel within myſelf a certain power of determining my own actions, which is called *Liberty*.

He that would go about to confute me in any of theſe apprehenſions, ought to bring a proof

* Certitudo apud Scholaſticos dupliciter diſtingui ſolet: Alia *objecti* vel rei percipiendæ: Alia *ſubjecti* vel intellectûs percipientis. The *former* is that ſtate of the object, which affords juſt ground or foundation for a firm aſſent; and in this ſenſe it is, that the Scholaſtick maxim holds good, *Veritas conſiſtit in indiviſibili; nec recipit magis et minus*. The *latter* is that firmneſs of perſuaſion, whereby a man aſſents to the truth of a thing, and is ſo fully perſuaded, as to have no doubt concerning it.

that is

that is better known, and to derive his argument from ſomewhat that is more evident and certain than theſe things are; unleſs he can think to overthrow and confute that which is more plain and certain, by that which is leſs plain and certain; which is all one, as to go about to outweigh a heavy body by ſomewhat that is lighter.

The evidence here is the cleareſt of which our mind is capable; all diſputes about it can no otherwiſe be terminated but by an appeal to our inward feeling and conſciouſneſs; and any attempt to corroborate it is needleſs, and ſerves rather to perplex and confound. If *Reaſon* pretends to interpoſe, it muſt be to examine whether there be any failure in the *act* of Senſation; as, whether the Organ was *rightly diſpoſed*; for it is no wonder if every thing appears yellow to an Eye diſtemper'd with the Jaundice; nor, if a diſtemper'd Ear gives a repreſentation of Sound where there is none, and fails to do it where there is;—exerciſed upon it's *proper Object*: for our Senſes are not accommodated to the full attainment of Knowledge, but to the convenience of common life: thus our eye ſerves this latter purpoſe very well, but is unable to diſcover the minute contexture of Bodies, much leſs the nature of the Stars and Planets;—at a proper *Diſtance*: for we find from Experience that it is a Law of Nature, that the viſible Magnitudes of all objects leſſen in certain proportion to their diſtance;—in a proper *Medium*: for the ſame Experience teſtifies that the rays of Light paſſing

from one Medium into another (as from Water into Air) ſuffer a refraction, and thereby alter the apparent Magnitude and Place of Objects; —with proper *Attention:* for it is often found that things appear very different upon a tranſient ſuperficial view, from what they do upon attentive conſideration, and repeated cool examination. Men under certain circumſtances of hurry, terror, *&c.* are frighted with Shadows, miſtake Trees for Armies, *&c.*—and whether we are right or wrong in the *application* of thoſe ideas which we receive from Senſation. In purſuing this examination we are much aſſiſted by comparing the Senſations, which we have had of the ſame or different objects in different circumſtances: thus, the apparent flatneſs and ſmallneſs of the Sun's Diſk becomes perfectly reconcileable with what Aſtronomers, from a variety of circumſtances fairly laid together, affirm concerning it's Globularity and amazing Magnitude. And thus by Reaſoning upon principles of *Internal* ſenſe and the reſult of our experience, we may correct and rectify thoſe Judgments, which we ſometimes too haſtily formed by Reaſoning merely upon the repreſentations of *External* ſenſe. Senſation is the firſt *inlet* of our *ideas.* The reports of it are well ſuited to the general circumſtances of our Being. They are not *deceitful,* unleſs the Organ be evidently diſtemper'd, though they are *imperfect*; and yet, Art and Contrivance often go a great way towards correcting the erroneous reports of a diſtemper'd Senſe, and improving thoſe which are imperfect. Thus *Microſcopes* open to us the minute

minute contexture of Bodies. *Teleſcopes* bring very diſtant Objects under a diſtinct examination. We have Spectacles of various kinds adapted to various diſorders of the Eyes; and other inſtruments adapted to aſſiſt our Hearing, *&c.*

Neither is the *internal Senſation*, or the conſcious Reflection of the Mind upon what paſſes within itſelf, apt to be fallacious. We are ſo formed by Nature as to believe it's reports, which are certainly the firſt *foundation* of all our *knowledge* human and divine; and all thoſe *Axioms* and *Poſtulates**, which are termed *ſelf-evident*, owe their apparent truth and certainty to a more immediate correſpondence with it: thus, having obſerved certain Effects to be frequently repeated, we reduce them to general Rules or Laws, by which Matter acts upon Matter.

§ 2. *Of the reports of Reaſon in matters Mathematical and Metaphyſical.*

Mathematical certainty, as alſo *Metaphyſical*, belongs to propoſitions formed of abſtract ideas; which in their own natures do lye ſo open, and are ſo obvious to the underſtanding, that every man's Iudgment, if duly exerciſed, muſt neceſ-

* *Axioms* properly relate to *ſpeculative* truths, as, *the whole is greater than a part*: *A poſtulatum* to ſuch things, as appear at firſt ſight *poſſible to be done*, and moreover ſo eaſy, as to render all direction *how* to do them needleſs: as, *to draw a right line from a given point to ſome other.*

ſarily aſſent to them. In ſome caſes of this kind we *immediately* perceive the relation between the ideas by the very ideas themſelves; it appears by internal evidence, and does not admit of any additional illuſtration from without; thus, no man in his wits can help believing that "*the whole is* "*greater than a part*;" "*that contradictions can* "*not be both true*;" "*that Almighty God can nei-* "*ther deceive nor be deceived*;" that, "*where* "*there is no property there is no injuſtice.*" In others, the connection between ſome *principles** and their *concluſions* may be ſo clearly made out by the application of a common meaſure, as to enforce our aſſent unavoidably†.

Between the terms of thoſe propoſitions wherein the predication is eſſential, (i. e. whenever the *Predicate* makes part of the Definition of the Subject,) there is a neceſſary dependance, whether of Agreement or Diſagreement, and therefore their Truth is ſaid to be *eternal*, and will be true of all things conformable to ſuch abſtract ideas whenever they do exiſt; they are alſo call-

* *Principia* ſunt, quæ per ſe et ſolo intellectûs lumine cognita probari neque indigent neque poſſunt; adeoque ejus ſunt *dignitatis* (ἀξιώματος) et excellentiæ, ut per ſe habeant fidem. Principia ſunt vel *ſimpliciter prima*, (quæ omnibus vel pluribus ſcientiis ſubſternuntur) vel prima *in ſuo genere*, quæ in ſingulis ſcientiis pro principiis ſupponuntur, nec in iis probantur. ſic in Religione principium eſt *Scripturam ſacram eſſe verbum Dei*.

† Propoſitions capable of Demonſtration, in *ſpeculative* matters, are termed *Theorems*; in *practical*, *Problems*. By this latter term *Ariſtotelick* writers underſtand in general τα προβαλλόμενα, i. e. iſtiuſmodi propoſitiones inevidentes, de quibus in utramque contradictionis partem probabiliter diſputari poteſt,—*Corollaries* are propoſitions whoſe truth appears by their manifeſt and obvious connection with propoſitions already demonſtrated.

ed

ed *neceſſary**, and *unchangeable*; becauſe, *to ſuppoſe* ſuch propoſitions falſe would imply a contradiction: If they are once made ſo as to be true, they will, whenever they can be ſuppoſed to be made again at any time paſt or to come by a Mind having thoſe ideas, always be true. And yet it ſhould be remembered that, when general obſervations are often taken as Principles, they are not ſuppoſed to hold minutely and in every caſe. It will be enough if they hold in general. An exception to a general obſervation or maxim is no confutation of it. Some caution therefore is requiſite how we apply an axiom that appears plain and obvious; and it is worth conſidering carefully what conditions are requiſite to make it hold.

When we clearly and regularly make out the connection of a propoſition with any ſuch plain truth, we are ſaid to *Demonſtrate*†. The aſſent

* Ideo ſcientia dicitur eſſe de *neceſſariis*, non quod ſubjectum debet eſſe ens neceſſariò exiſtens; ſed ſufficit, ſi, poſito quod ſubjectum exiſtat, neceſſariam et immutabilem habeat connexionem cum prædicato ſuo ſeu affectione, quæ de iſto ſubjecto demonſtratur; quæ neceſſitas eſt *hypothetica*.

† Mathematici, quæ decent, ſolent adjuncto diagrammate oſtendere, ſeque propterea non rem probare, ſed (quod majorem innuit evidentiam) *demonſtrare* dicunt. Arceſſito ab illis vocabulo Syllogiſmus ſcire faciens apud Logicos vocatur *Demonſtratio*. ſc. Demonſtratio *a priori*, quâ probatur effectus ex cauſâ immediatâ.—*a poſteriori*, qua probatur cauſa ex effectu remoto. Of the *former* kind is our *proving* from the notion of a Providence, that there will be a future ſtate of retribution to good and bad men; Of the *latter*, is our proving the reality of a Providence from tokens of wiſdom and goodneſs, from the manifold appearances of deſign and of final cauſes, that they are obſervable in the conſtitution and government of the World. In like manner it is by forming our obſervations *a poſteriori*, that we trace out the eſſences of things, ſo far as they are knowable by us, and refer them to their reſpective *genera* and

produced by ſuch demonſtration, is by the ſcholaſtick writers emphatically called *Science*; tho' it is in reality owing to the imperfection of our Underſtandings, that we ſtand in need of ſuch deductions. And indeed the difference between Principles and Concluſions lyes not in the *Nature* of the *things* themſelves, but is relative to *Us*, according as our perception of a truth is immediate or mediate. That which is a *Concluſion* to *Us* may be a *Principle* to (*i. e.* be perceived intuitively by) ſuperior underſtandings. In every Diſputation ſome propoſitions muſt be ſuppoſed true by way of principles. And when the argument can by regular deduction be made to terminate in ſome ſuch principle, the concluſion may be pronounced to be fairly proved. Theſe principles will be different according to the apprehenſions of different men. When we diſpute with an *Atheiſt*, we have nothing to proceed upon but the veracity of our Senſes and Underſtanding, the Reality of things without us, and the Truth of Hiſtory. In diſputing with a *Deiſt*, we may fairly ſuppoſe the Being and Attributes of Almighty God, his Providence, Omnipotence, Omniſcience, Goodneſs, *&c.* and conſequently that the world is in a ſtate of Religion. (For this hath often been proved with accumulated evidence; from final cauſes; from abſtract reaſonings; from the moſt ancient tradition and teſti-

and *ſpecies*, and learn how to define them: By reaſoning *a priori* we argue from ſuch definitions, and from the conſideration of their eſſences infer their properties; (the Eſſence of a thing in ſuch caſe carrying the notion of a *cauſe*; the Properties, of an *effect*.)

mony;

mony; and from the general conſcience and conſent of mankind.) In diſputes with *Chriſtians*, we may take for granted not only what we lay down as principles with the Deiſts, but that the Chriſtian Revelation is true, and that it is contained in the books of Holy Scripture, particularly the New Teſtament. But to produce that for an Argument to prove a point in controverſy which is not clearer than that which is controverted, and is not or has not been ſome way acknowledged for a truth by both contending parties, is quite ridiculous. Theſe kinds of reaſoning are *Direct*.—A Concluſion is ſometimes drawn very concluſively though *indirectly*. * This is often uſed by Mathematicians; when by ſuppoſing the propoſition in queſtion *Falſe*, we are neceſſarily led into an abſurdity; which there is no other way of avoiding but by admitting the Propoſition to be True.

§ 3. *Of Moral certainty.*

Moral certainty depends more upon mixt circumſtances; and the arguments, which produce it, generally ſpeaking, conſiſt of the united force of ſeveral conſiderations. The objects here are not capable of ſuch evidence as ſhall *neceſſitate* a man's aſſent, and yet may be ſo plain, that every man whoſe judgment is free from *Prejudice* will aſſent to them†.

* Called Demonſtratio ab Abſurdo.

† Upon account of that Liberty, which we have to improve and exert our intellectual faculties or not, and which is often abuſed

In the two firſt caſes we are ſaid to be *infallibly* certain, *that is*, ſuppoſing our faculties to be true, and that we do not neglect to exert them, we may ſafely confeſs that there is a *neceſſity* that ſome things muſt be ſo as we apprehend them, and that they cannot poſſibly be otherwiſe.

If it be aſk'd, Whether, after all, we may not be deceived in our perceptions and reaſonings? I anſwer, that we can go no further. For it would be ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of theſe perceptions, whoſe truth we can no otherwiſe prove than by other perceptions of exactly the ſame kind with them, and which there is juſt the ſame ground to ſuſpect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no otherwiſe be proved than by the uſe or means of thoſe very ſuſpected faculties themſelves. Thus much may certainly be ſaid, that we are ſo conſtituted as naturally to aſſent to the reports of our Senſes and Reaſonings; and if, after all, we may be miſtaken in the cleareſt repreſentations made to us thereby, the conſtitution of our mind, from whence ſuch aſſent immediately and directly proceeds, muſt be abſurd.

In the latter caſe we have *indubitable* certainty; *that is*, though there be no natural *neceſſity*,

ſed in matters relating to our *moral* concerns, Judgment is by ſome writers ſaid to be an act of the *Will*. The ſame evidence will operate very differently, according as we are previouſly inclined and diſpoſed. Though a proof properly laid before us, and duly attended to, muſt and will inſure conviction, yet men have ſtill a great compaſs of liberty in the uſe and direction of thoſe faculties on which our aſſent depends. Let the proof be ever ſo ſtrong, and tendered to men in ever ſo rational a way, yet men may defeat it's efficacy by their own Obſtinacy, Impiety, and Perverſeneſs.

that

that things *muſt* be ſo and ſo, and that they can not poſſibly be otherwiſe without implying a contradiction; yet may we be ſo certain, as not to have any *reaſonable* cauſe of doubting, whether they are ſo or not: thus, from the *nature of things* I am *morally* certain, and can make no doubt of it, but that a mind free from prejudice and paſſion will paſs a truer judgment, than ſuch an one as is biaſſed by affections and intereſts; that men will purſue what they believe to be their real intereſt, when there can be no imaginable reaſon why they ſhould forego it.

Again, with regard to *Teſtimony*, concurrent Witneſſes about diſtant facts may be ſo *numerous*, and ſo well qualified as to their *abilities* and *integrity*, that a man muſt be a fantaſtical incredulous fool to doubt of their reality; as, *whether there was ſuch a perſon as Queen* Elizabeth; or, *ſuch a country as* Spain.

When a matter of fact lyes within the compaſs of a man's comprehenſion; the number of atteſters is too great for a colluſion; when there is no reaſon to ſuſpect them to be biaſſed by intereſt or paſſion; and their reports are not contradicted by others who were concerned both in intereſt and inclination to deny it, I can not doubt of the truth thereof. 'Tis *phyſically* poſſible that we may be deceived in ſuch caſes; but if we have no particular reaſon to apprehend that they are under the biaſs of ſome miſtake or paſſion, we have no reaſon to withold our aſſent.

Nothing can deſtroy the evidence of Teſtimony in any caſe, but utter Incredibility in the things

teſted or Contrary teſtimony; or a proof or high probability that perſons are not competent Judges of the facts to which they give teſtimony; or that they are actually under ſome indirect Influence in giving it in ſuch particular caſe. Till this be made out, the *natural* laws of human actions require that Teſtimony be admitted. The general obſervation, that human creatures are liable to be deceived from Enthuſiaſm in religion, and from Prejudices equivalent to enthuſiaſm in common matters, (*viz.* from romance, affectation, humour, a deſire to engage attention or to ſurprize, the party-ſpirit, cuſtom, little competitions, unaccountable likings or diſlikings, &c.) and in both from Negligence; and that they are ſometimes capable of diſhoneſtly endeavouring to deceive others; this does indeed weaken the evidence of teſtimony in all caſes, but does not deſtroy it in any.

Again, by the evidence of *Experience* I am to a great degree aſſured of the *ſucceſſion of night and day, winter and ſummer*; and have no ſuch reaſon to doubt, whether the *houſe, wherein I now am, ſhall this next minute fall upon me*, or, *the earth open and ſwallow it up*, as to be in continual fear of ſuch accidents. In moſt inſtances of behaviour we act upon Probable evidence; we eat and drink without Demonſtration that we ſhall receive proper nouriſhment; we uſe exerciſe without being ſtrictly certain that it will keep us in health; we engage in buſineſs where it is likely we ſhall ſucceed; and children are educated as if they were to outlive their parents; becauſe

becauſe in the ordinary courſe of nature the chances are on this ſide. When probable evidence is applied to this purpoſe, it is with propriety called *moral evidence*; and this being the principal as well as the moſt familiar uſe of it, ſuch ſort of evidence has from hence got the name of *moral* in all other inſtances.

It is obvious to obſerve here, that ſuch things, as in themſelves are *equally true* and certain, may not yet be capable of the *ſame kind* of proof, nor be made out with the *ſame degree* of evidence to *us*. Tho' concluſions in Mathematicks may be Demonſtrated in the cleareſt and moſt unqueſtionable manner, yet it is unreaſonable to expect the like *proof* in matters, that are not of like nature; ſuch as the particular concluſions in *Natural Philoſophy*, *matters of Fact* concerning times, places, perſons, actions, which depend on *Story*, and the relations of others: It will be ſatisfactory to any reaſonable man that they are made out by ſuch proof, as they are *capable* of in their reſpective kinds; eſpecially if the thing be of ſuch a nature, that better evidence could not be expected ſuppoſing the propoſition were true.

When we have for the proof of any thing a high degree of evidence, it is not the ſuggeſtion of a mere *poſſibility*, that the thing *may* be otherwiſe, that ought to be a ſufficient cauſe of doubting; nor are we juſtifiable in queſtioning the *exiſtence* of things merely becauſe we are not able to explain the *nature* of them. Propoſitions may be both intelligible and uſeful, though the ſubject to which thoſe Propoſitions relate, taken in it's

full extent, may exceed our comprehenſion; thus, in the principles of Natural Religion, *Eternity*, *Immenſity*, &c. are inexplicable; to form the idea of *Creation* is abſolutely and entirely out of our depth and beyond our reach.—And yet it is as certain that God *created* the World, as that every Effect muſt have a Cauſe. On the ſceptical principle, we might be led to doubt of our own *ſenſations*, of the *motion*, and *continuity of bodies*, &c. For we know not *how* we were made; *how* our Being is continued and preſerved; *what* the Faculties of our minds are; and upon *what* the Power of exerciſing them depends.

Such *moral* certainty may ſerve us as well to all intents and purpoſes of Uſe, though not of Curioſity, as that which is *infallible*; and indeed human nature is ſo framed as to acquieſce in it: otherwiſe, our Reaſon might prove a burthen, and a torment to us, rather than a privilege, by keeping us in a continual ſuſpence, and anxiety: and thus it is ſufficient, that matters of *Religion* are propounded in ſuch a way, as to render them highly credible, ſo that an honeſt teachable man may willingly aſſent to them, and according to the rules of prudence be juſtified in ſo doing.

If we were not able at all to diſcern, how, or in what way, the preſent life would be our preparation for another; this would be no objection againſt the Credibility of its being ſo; for we do not diſcern, how Food and Sleep contribute to the growth of the Body; nor could we have any

thought

thought that they would, before we had Experience.

We may have reaſon ſufficient to convince us that God will reward every man according to his deſerts, though we are unable to account for the permiſſion of ſuch irregularities in the world as ſeemingly contradict this End: becauſe indeed we are ignorant what is the proper way of acting in order to the moſt effectual acompliſhment of that end.

Religion pre-ſuppoſes in all thoſe who will embrace it, a certain degree of integrity and honeſty, which it was intended to try whether men have or not, and to exerciſe in ſuch as have it, in order to it's improvement; Religion pre-ſuppoſes this as much and in the ſame ſenſe, as ſpeaking to a man, pre-ſuppoſes he underſtands the Language in which you ſpeak; or, as warning a man of any danger pre-ſuppoſes that he hath ſuch a regard to himſelf, that he will endeavour to avoid it. And were common men as much in earneſt about Religion, as about their temporal affairs, they would be capable of being convinced, upon real evidence, of the truths of natural Religion, and of the evidence of Chriſtianity, though not of clearing up and anſwering Objections, ſo as to ſatisfy their curioſity. Nor indeed is ſuch knowledge at all neceſſary in Religion; for we are not capable of it with reſpect to any one thing in nature. There is no need of *abſtruſe* Reaſonings to convince an unprejudiced Underſtanding that there is a God who made and governs the world, and will

judge

judge it in righteouſneſs, though they may be neceſſary, to ſolve and clear up abſtruſe difficulties when once ſuch are raiſed.

§ 4. *Of Faith.*

What we call *Faith*, is a perſuaſion of the truth of ſomething that is affirmed upon the Teſtimony * of one that affirms it. *(Of Human Teſtimony*, See p. 73, 74.) *Divine Faith*, is the perſuaſion of the truth of thoſe things, for which we have the teſtimony of God: And here the Certainty is the greateſt, ſince He can neither be deceived nor deceive. And He may doubtleſs accompany the Revelation of his Will with ſuch a brightneſs of *internal* light and evidence, that a man may as certainly know, and be as well aſſured, that this or that particular is revealed by God, as he is in general, that what God reveals is true.

This might be to the *Prophets* and *Apoſtles* the infallible *Criterion* for them to diſcern the Divinity of their inſpirations from above. But as to *Us*, ſince God has choſen man to be the inſtrument for conveying his revelations to us; Our Faith, though it *ultimately terminates* in Divine Authority, is *immediately founded* upon Human Teſtimony, that the firſt Publiſhers of the rule of our Faith were indeed extraordinarily ſent of God, and had it by Revelation from God

* If the aſſent of the *Underſtanding* to the truths of Religion be followed by a full concurrence of the heart and *Will*, our Faith becomes *evangelical*.—My Subject leads me not into a conſideration of *Faith* as it denotes *Affiance* in God's Promiſes, and *Reliance* on the Merits of Chriſt's Death, &c.

himſelf;

himſelf; and ariſes from a collection of rational conſiderations fairly laid together. By *Reaſon* we judge of the Meaning, and alſo of the Morality and Evidence of the Scripture, *viz.* "whether the *Doctrines* therein contained are not "*poſſibly* true, nay in moſt inſtances apparently "*probable*, entirely conſonant to our beſt conceptions of the Nature of God, and of the "Condition of Man." "Whether the *Scripture-History* (particularly that of the *New Teſtament*) has not all the requiſite marks of Genuineneſs and Authenticity, that we could reaſonably expect, ſuppoſing it were true; the general turn of it very conſiſtent;—the matters related by no means generally incredible; —the narrative plain and unadorned;—quoted as genuine from the age in which it was ſaid to be written, down to the preſent;—confirmed by the events ſubſequent to, and contemporary with the miraculous facts related to be wrought in atteſtation of it, (namely, the eſtabliſhment of the Chriſtian Religion upon the belief of them) and, after all, not at all confronted by any hiſtorical allegation ſufficient to invalidate it, or even to create a doubt of it's veracity;" and "whether the atteſtation there recorded of *Miracles* wrought and *Prophecies* fulfilled be not ſufficient to confirm the *Divinity* of *Chriſt's* miſſion, and the *Certainty* * of the truths which he taught."

* In this caſe it is uſeful to diſtinguiſh between the evidence of the *Object*, and the evidence of *Teſtimony*. In *Philoſophical* matters a clear and diſtinct perception of the things themſelves may be required;

To theſe, the *direct* and *fundamental* proofs of the truth of Chriſtianity, might be added other *collateral* and *circumſtantial* ones of great variety and compaſs; which latter, though very conſiderable, yet ought never to be urged apart from the direct proofs, but alway to be joined with them: they muſt indeed be diſtinctly and ſeparately examined into, that the weight of each may be judged of upon ſuch examination, and ſuch concluſion drawn as reſults from their united force: *viz.* that great numbers of men ſhould forſake the Religion of their country; ſeparate themſelves from their friends; embrace a Religion which expoſed them to great inconveniences, I ſay, the immediate Converſion of ſuch numbers is a real preſumption of ſomewhat more than human in this matter.

And if in any part of the foregoing caſe, ſuch as the genuineneſs of the *Original* books of Scripture, the juſtice of a *Tranſlation*, &c. a man ſhould find himſelf diſqualified by the circumſtances of his education or want of learning, or opportunities of enquiry, or other incapacity, to judge for himſelf, it will be very *reaſonable* for him to ſubmit to be guided by the *Authority*

quired; in matters of *Divine Teſtimony*, it is a ſufficient ground of aſſent, that we clearly and diſtinctly perceive them to be contained in the word of God. We may ſee the force of *evidence* without ſeeing the *thing* itſelf: thus, God himſelf is inviſible, but his eternal power and godhead are clearly ſeen and evidently demonſtrated from the State of the world.—The things of a future ſtate are not *ſeen* as yet; but God has given us ſufficient proof and reaſonable *evidence* of them.

of

of other men of reputed integrity and ſkill in thoſe matters:—Their authority may be reaſonably admitted to aſſiſt and direct the doubtings of common ſenſe, but not to overrule and ſet aſide its reports in things plain and ſelf-evident.—Such deference in matters of Law, and in the buſineſs of Health, we readily pay to men of good repute in their reſpective Profeſſions.—And yet caſes ſometimes happen, of evident blunder or treachery, when a Client or Patient, much inferior in point of ſkill, may be juſtified and obliged in point of prudence, to ſet aſide and act counter to their directions.

But when we proceed to conſider the *matter* of divine Revelation, the proper employment of Reaſon is, in the firſt place, to diſtinguiſh the genuine doctrines of it from thoſe that are erroneouſly or corruptly aſcribed to it;—to conſider the importance and purport of them, with the connexion they bear one to another; and, when real difficulties occur, to find the beſt ſolutions we can to them: But it is by no means neceſſary that this be done, in all caſes, diſtinctly and preciſely. It may be ſufficient, if we can ſhew that the point, objected againſt, is not abſolutely impoſſible: And this is done by making any one ſuppoſition on which it may poſſibly be true; as in the caſe of the Reſurrection of the Body. For, ſurely, common modeſty muſt allow, that the divine teſtimony, given to any thing, is a much ſurer proof of Truth, than any difficulties alledged (which are often too much heightened by human prejudices) can be an argument of Falſehood.

Although there be no Truth above the comprehenſion of *All* Underſtanding, yet there may be ſeveral ſo to *Us*, and above *Our* Reaſon. There may be a diſproportion between the Object and Our intellectual Faculties; in which caſe we can determine nothing particularly, from barely conſidering the things themſelves. What Ideas we have, may be either partial or indeterminate. Nay, conſidering how numberleſs may be the relations of one thing to another, it is eaſy to conceive, that we may have ideas of the extremes of a propoſition, and yet be incapable of diſcerning how far thoſe extremes do agree or diſagree; our mind failing of intermediate ideas, ſerving to the proof of ſuch agreement. The *truth* of a Propoſition may be revealed, and yet the *manner* how it is true may, notwithſtanding, remain a ſecret. Even Natural Religion abounds with truths of this kind: ſuch is the Doctrine of Human Liberty, compared with that of Divine Preſcience; the Doctrine of God's Providence, &c. Here, the Doctrines revealed being made up of ſuch ideas as we are capable of receiving in the ordinary way of knowledge, Revelation is to be conſidered as a farther enforcement of ſuch important Truths, pointing out the proper conſequences into which they ſhould be purſued, and giving them a moral effect upon our behaviour. If Revelation diſcovers ſuch Truths as could not naturally be known (for want of adequate ideas) God ſtill deals with us as with Men: he does not produce in us any new Faculties, different from what we had before, to receive them; but he repreſents

repreſents them by ſome other ideas, with which they have a remote reſemblance and analogy. (See p. 32, 33.)

Many difficulties are apparently founded in our own ignorance, and cannot reaſonably be urged, but upon the ſuppoſition, that we are acquainted with the whole ſyſtem of things. They who determine peremptorily to believe no reports of tranſactions but what are natural, ſhould conſider, that the word Natural has no other diſtinct meaning, but *ſtated*, *fixed*, or *ſettled*. But what is Natural as much requires and preſuppoſes an intelligent Being to render it ſo, that is, to effect it continually, or at ſtated times, as what is Supernatural or Miraculous does to effect it for once.

Many Truths in Religion, as well as in Mathematicks, may be eſtabliſhed, not ſo much by ſhewing their neceſſary connection with ſome known Truth, as, by pointing out the great abſurdity, which will follow if we ſuppoſe the contradictory of them to be true. And the greater thoſe abſurdities are, the more ſtrongly do they evince the falſity of that ſuppoſition from whence they flow, and conſequently the truth of the Doctrine ſet aſide by that ſuppoſition: thus, the more abſurd it is to affirm, that Beaſts have the advantage of Men, and Bad men of Good, in point of happineſs; or that a ſenſual life may be preferred to to a ſevere and rigid virtue, the more clearly doth the folly and falſehood of that ſuppoſition appear, which is the parent of theſe abſurdities, *viz.* that we have hope in this life only: And the Falſehood of that ſuppoſition being proved, proves the Truth of the oppoſite doctrine, that there will be a future ſtate.

Again, the objections of Unbelievers ſometimes *prove too much*; denying a propoſition

upon principles of their own, which they do not admit as concluſive in other caſes: thus, ſome deny the Scripture to have been from God on account of the difficulties in it. But ſhould not theſe men, for the very ſame reaſon, deny that the World is under His Moral Government? So again, ſome have objected againſt the uſefulneſs of Chriſtianity, with regard to the enforcement of natural Duty and Virtue, from the perverſion of it, and from the ſuppoſition of its having had but little good influence: which ſuppoſition, (beſides its being falſe in fact) *proves too much*; becauſe it cannot be inſiſted upon, as concluſive, upon any principles, but ſuch as lead to downright Atheiſm: For the manifeſtation of the Law of Nature by Reaſon, (which, upon all principles of Theiſm, muſt have been from God,) has been perverted and rendered ineffectual in the ſame manner.

Again, when a Fataliſt pleads, that Puniſhment of Human actions is unjuſt, becauſe it is puniſhing for doing that which perſons could not avoid doing, he ſhould conſider, that if Neceſſity deſtroys the injuſtice of any crime, as Murder, *&c.* it will equally deſtroy the injuſtice of puniſhing it.

When a ſuppoſition is inconſiſtent with Reaſon, the arguments built on that ſuppoſition may be diſcarded: thus, the denial of a Particular Providence proceeds on this ſuppoſition, that multiplicity of affairs would perplex Almighty God. But as the Power of God cannot be fatigued by being exerted, nor His Knowledge be confuſed by the extent of it, and as that ſuppoſition proceeds only on a partial view of what He has actually done and ſtill continues to do in the Creation, and our judging of Him by what we feel in Ourſelves, the argument fails: and we may

ſafely

ſafely admit, that the care for the Whole conſiſts in a minute and conſtant ſupport of all the Parts.

§ 5. *Of Opinion and Doubting.*

When the evidence is leſs plain and clear, the aſſent ariſing from it is called *Opinion* or *Probability*; *viz.* though the proofs *for* a thing may preponderate any thing to be ſaid *againſt* it, yet they are not ſo weighty and perſpicuous as to exclude all doubt and fear of the contrary.

That which chiefly conſtitutes Probability is expreſſed in the word *Likely*, i. e. *Veriſimile*, *like* ſome truth, or true event; *like* it in itſelf, in it's evidence, or in ſome, more or fewer, circumſtances. The ſlighteſt poſſible Preſumption is of the nature of a Probability, and, if often repeated, will amount to Moral Certainty. Thus, a man's having obſerved the ebb and flow of the tide to day, affords ſome ſort of preſumption, though the loweſt imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow: But the obſervation of this event for ſo many days and months and ages together, as it has been obſerved by mankind, gives us a full aſſurance that it will.

And this ariſes from a more imperfect and obſcure repreſentation and conception of things, either by our *Senſes* or *Underſtandings*; by *Teſtimony* or by *Experience*; and will therefore be different according to the greater or leſs degree of clearneſs in the *proofs* made uſe of, the greater

or leſs ſimilitude between *known caſes*, and thoſe we are to judge of, and the reſpective *diligence*, *abilities*, and *impartiality* of different Men. Between the caſe of things of the ſame kind there is a parity of Reaſon, and what is applicable to one is ſo to the other. Thus, the *natural Philoſopher* endeavours to explain and ſolve the nature of a new Phænomenon; and the *Phyſician* proceeds in the management of a diſtemper by obſerving the *analogy*, which it bears to his former experiments; the *Politician* takes his meaſures to provide againſt future difficulties, from obſerving how mankind have uſually acted in ſuch and ſuch circumſtances. Thus, Aſtronomers argue from their obſervations concerning our Moon to the ſatellites of Jupiter and Saturn. Our Earth is an habitable globe, and at the ſame time ſerves as a Moon: therefore there is certainly ſome reaſon for concluding that the Globe which ſerves us for a Moon, ſhould be habitable too.

Partial views of things are apt to make men find fault with what they do not underſtand: thus, they think of remedying ſome inconveniences in the Earth by expoſing it to many much greater; they complain of wild mountains as uſeleſs deformities, not conſidering the uſe which they are of to Vegetation, production of Minerals, &c. The large expanſe of ſea is thought uſeleſs, till known how it is referred to the uſes of Commerce, and that it is the Nurſery and ſeat of numberleſs ſpecies of living Creatures, &c.

When

When we underſtand any appearance but ill, no wonder that we reaſon badly or falſely upon it. Hence, not knowing how the Soul and Body are united, and obſerving how much the Soul is impeded in it's operations by the Body, men are ſometimes apt to conſider the Soul itſelf to be material, that is, to ſuppoſe matter endued with a ſelf-moving power.

Forming our notions of the conſtitution and government of the world upon Reaſoning, without foundation for the principles which we aſſume, whether from the Nature of God or any thing elſe, is building upon mere Hypotheſis. Forming our notions upon Reaſoning from principles which are certain, but are applied to caſes, to which we have no ground to apply them, (like thoſe who explain the ſtructure of the human body, and the nature of all Diſeaſes and Medicines from mere Mathematicks) is an error a-kin to the former: ſince what is aſſumed in order to make the reaſoning applicable, is mere Hypotheſis. But it is allowed juſt, to join Abſtract Reaſonings with the obſervations of Facts, and to argue from ſuch Facts as are known, to others that are like them: thus, from that part of the divine Government over intelligent Creatures which comes under our view, we may juſtly proceed to argue upon that larger and more general Government over them which is beyond it; and from what is Preſent, to collect what is likely, credible or not incredible, will be Hereafter.

Such

Such Argumentation is ſometimes called *Induction* *; it infers an *univerſal* concluſion from having proved a thing to be true of *this*, *that*, and *other* particulars; which concluſion will be always more probable according as the induction is drawn from a greater number of examples. —*Example* therefore is a more imperfect kind of Induction, being a concluſion drawn from one or a few inſtances.

When there is no proof on either ſide of a queſtion, it is ſaid to be *Uncertain*.

When the evidence on each ſide doth equiponderate, this doth not properly beget any aſſent, but rather that Heſitation or ſuſpenſion of aſſent which we call *Doubting*. If one ſide of the Queſtion preponderates, ſo that the difference is but ſcarcely diſcernible, it is nothing more than *Conjecture*. Yet even in this caſe we may be obliged, in prudence, to order our actions in favour of that ſide, which appears to be moſt ſafe and advantageous for our own intereſt: and accordingly, the conduct of human life through the main courſe of temporal affairs is influenced and directed by *probability*, and *conjecture*. There are numberleſs inſtances, in the daily courſe of life, in which all men think it reaſonable to engage in purſuits, though the probability is greatly againſt ſucceeding; and to make ſuch proviſion for themſelves, as it is ſuppoſeable they may

* Inductio fit { poſitione / remotione } omnium individuorum ad { poſitionem ſpeciei. / remotionem generis. } ſpecierum

have

have occaſion for, though the plain acknowledged Probability is, that they never ſhall. Even *Doubting* neceſſarily implies ſome degree of evidence for that, of which we doubt. For no perſon would be in doubt concerning the truth of a number of facts ſo and ſo circumſtanced, which ſhould accidentally come into his thoughts and whereof he had no evidence at all. Between no evidence at all, and that degree of it which affords grounds of Doubt, there are many intermediate degrees—as many, as there are between that degree which is the ground of Doubt, and Demonſtration.

And thus, they who have but a doubting apprehenſion of the truth of Religion, are by that apprehenſion obliged to an awful ſolicitude about it; to conſider it with ſerioufneſs and attention and reverence; to live in the conſcientious practice of every common virtue; and, above all, to keep at the greateſt diſtance from all diſſoluteneſs and profaneneſs.

Many Propoſitions, though we experience their truth, may be perplexed with difficulties which run up into abſtruſe ſpeculations: in ſuch caſes it is natural to maintain that ſide of the Queſtion which is attended with no practical abſurdity when applied to the common affairs of life, and to govern our actions accordingly: thus, though we have every day's experience to convince us that we are free Agents, yet the ſubject does not ſtand clear of difficulties; but then, were we to act upon the contrary Principle we ſhould find

find ourſelves miſtaken in the great point of ſecuring our preſent happineſs.

§ 6. *Of the force of mixed Evidence.*

In general, it muſt be remembered, that any weakneſs in the Premiſſes of an argument muſt always affect the Concluſion; if the former are *partly demonſtrative*, *partly probable*, the Concluſion can only be deemed *probable*. Thus, *Aſtronomical Theories* may be in themſelves ſtrictly demonſtrative, and yet ſtill it may remain only a matter of *high probability*, that the motions of the celeſtial bodies are performed in a manner agreeable to ſuch Theory. So again in *Law-caſes*, the principles of reaſoning, ſo far as the abſtract nature of *Good* and *Evil*, and the definitions of *Civil Laws* are concerned, are *indubitably certain:* but when we come to apply theſe principles to a particular fact, there is often great room for a *mixture* of evidence drawn from *Reaſon*, *Experience*, *Teſtimony*, and *Conjecture*, in order to ſettle whether the Fact was really committed or no, and whether the Circumſtances attending it were ſuch, as reduce it under the cognizance of ſuch a particular Law.

The evidence, upon which moſt queſtions of difficulty, in common practice, are determined, ariſes from various coincidences of ſeveral things, ſome direct and expreſs; others circumſtantial, which ſupport and confirm each other, and in this manner prove, with more or leſs certainty, the

the point under conſideration: each of theſe things are indeed to be conſidered ſeparately but the proper force of the evidence conſiſts in the reſult of thoſe ſeveral things conſidered in their reſpects to each other, and as united into one view.

In managing circumſtantial proofs there is great room for ingenious Orators to diſplay their art by impoſing falſe or partial repreſentations on the Fancy of their Hearers, by ſelecting ſuch as favour their cauſe and heightening their importance, in the mean time, caſting a ſhade over all that makes againſt them; and all this in oppoſition to Truth and Reaſon.

Arguments *ad hominem*, proceeding upon our Adverſary's ſuppoſed principles different from our own, (and ſometimes loading him with invidious conſequences which he may diſavow) are of all others leaſt to be eſteemed: They may ſilence Him, or ſhew Him to be in the Wrong, from his own Conceſſions, without proving Ourſelves to be in the Right.

SECT. VI.

Of Scholaſtick Diſputations.

DISPUTATIONS are intended partly for trial of ſkill, partly to habituate Diſputants to the forms of Argumentation, and partly to make them better acquainted with the matter in Diſpute.

The Diſputants are ſuppoſed to be agreed in ſome general principles or propoſitions, which either more nearly or remotely affect the *Queſtion*.

It is the *Reſpondent's* buſineſs to explain the terms of the Queſtion, to clear it from all needleſs additions, to fix the true meaning and preciſe point of Enquiry, and to diſtinguiſh it from all other Queſtions, which may happen to be near a-kin to it; and, laſtly, to confirm it with proper Arguments; the doing this is called making the *Suppoſition*, or *Stating* the Queſtion.

The *Opponent* is to ſupport a propoſition contradictory to that which is maintained by the Reſpondent; and for this purpoſe his objection is to be made in the regular form of Syllogiſms; (and thoſe Categorical ones as far as may be;) always taking care to make the propoſition, which is denied by the Reſpondent, the concluſion of his next Syllogiſm: This courſe muſt from time to time be repeated, till the argument is brought to terminate in ſuch Propoſitions as are confeſſedly true.

Arguments are drawn either from the Definition of the Terms of the Queſtion—or from ſome acknowledged Principle,—or by ſhewing ſome abſurd conſequence that will ariſe from the Propoſition maintained by the Reſpondent.

The Reſpondent is to repeat the Opponent's Argument, in the ſame words in which it was propoſed, before he denies or attempts to anſwer it.

If the Syllogiſm be falſe *in form*, he is to diſcover the fault according to the Rules of Logick.

If the Propoſition to be denied be *Hypothetical*, he is ſaid to deny *the Sequel*; if *Disjunctive*,—the *Disjunction*;—if the Argument be propoſed in the form of an *Enthymeme*, then the *Antecedent* or *Conſequence*;—otherwiſe the *Major* or *Minor*.

If the Argument does not directly oppoſe the Propoſition maintained by the Reſpondent, the *Proceſs* is to be denied.

The Reſpondent is to watch narrowly, that his Opponent does not lead him unwarily to grant ſome Principle or Propoſition which is inconſiſtent with his ſide of the Queſtion. He is to carry in his mind the ſeries or courſe of his Opponent's argument, in order to judge where the Fallacy lies, when he finds himſelf involved in any difficulty.

When the Opponent has brought his Argument to terminate in Propoſitions which are Both of them true, the Reſpondent is to *diſtinguiſh** upon ſome word or Phraſe, and ſhew, that, though the Propoſition be true, yet it is not ſo in that ſenſe, which affects the Queſtion.

If the Argument to be refuted is grounded upon a Maxim or Axiom, ſuch Maxim is to be

* Adeoque quoad ſenſum *quatuor* terminos ineſſe Syllogiſmo. —Propoſitio, quæ poteſt *diſtingui*, poteſt etiam *negari*: Adhibetur autem diſtinctio ut appareat cauſa *negationis*. Diſtinctio autem vera eſt ſi ſermo ipſe ſit ambiguus, ſi res ipſæ, de quibus ſit ſermo, hoc modo inter ſe ſint diſtinctæ, vel tanquam diſtinctæ à noſtro intellectu apprehendi petant, ſuppoſito in re aliquo ſaltem fundamento, &c.

explained by ſhewing what are the particular truths which were deſigned to be comprehended under it; how far it is ſtrictly true; and then the limitations, reſtrictions, and exceptions (if there be exceptions) with which it is to be underſtood.

If a Diſtinction be made which is unſatisfactory, the Opponent is to ſhew wherein it is defective.

As to Scholaſtick *Terms*, *Rules*, and *Maxims*, Biſhop *Sanderſon* hath delineated them clearly and methodically in his Logick; with a hiſtory of Scholaſtick Writers. He hath given excellent Exemplifications in his Treatiſe, *De Conſcientiâ*, —a work, which, beſides ſolid argument on ſeveral important Queſtions, contains ſeveral ſtrokes of *Ciceronian* Eloquence, (of which, his Inaugural Oration prefixed ſhews him to have been a Maſter.) His *Sermons*, for piety, good Senſe and true Method, will always merit eſteem.—In the Logical Treatiſe, intitled, *Grammatica Rationis*, uſually aſcribed to Biſhop *Fell*, (as drawn up and publiſhed under his direction) are collected a great number of the Scholaſtick Maxims with with their Explanations.—Dr. *Wallis's* Logick is clear, but too operoſe and tedious, for the matter which it contains.—Dr. *Aldrich* is very conciſe; He hath prefixed a Hiſtory of Logick, and a ſeries of Logical Queſtions; with ſhort Determinations and applications of the principal Scholaſtick Diſtinctions, formed with great neatneſs and preciſion.

DEFINITIONES LOGICÆ.

PAR. I.

LOGICA est ars instrumentalis dirigens mentem in cognitionem rerum.

Mens est principium illud activum cujus ope cogitamus, volumus, &c.

Simplex Apprehensio est nudus rei conceptus.—seu, est actus mentis per quam rem unam concipimus per se.

Idea est imago rei menti nostræ obversans.

Percipimus aliquid cum ejus Idea menti nostræ obversatur.

Judicium est actus mentis de pluribus apprehensis pronuntiantis utrum conveniant inter se aut dissideant.

Ratiocinatio est actus mentis per quem ab unâ re cognitâ ad aliam cognoscendam deducimur, et unam rem ex aliâ inferimus.

§ 2. *Vox* est signum rei vel conceptûs ex instituto vicarium.

Individua vox est quæ unum quiddam significat.

Nomen collectivum est quod plura repræsentat in unum quasi corpus collecta.

Idea est Imago seu Repræsentatio Rei in mente.

Idea simplex in quâ plura ne mente quidem distinguere possumus.

Idea complexa est quæ ex pluribus simplicibus constat.

Vox communis est quæ naturam pluribus singularibus communem significat.

Univoca vox est cujus significatio æque convenit multis.

Univoca sunt, quorum nomen commune est, et ad illud nomen accommodata definitio est eadem.

Vox æquivoca est quæ significat res naturâ diversas et solo nomine congruentes.

Æquivoca

Æquivoca ſunt quorum nomen ſolum commune eſt, ſed ad illud nomen accommodata definitio eſt diverſa.

Analoga ſunt, quorum nomen commune eſt, ratio tamen ejus eſt prior et perfectior in uno quam in altero.

Oppoſita ſunt, quæ neque de ſe invicem, neque de eodem tertio, ſecundùm idem, eodem modo, ac tempore, vere poſſunt affirmari.

Relativa ſunt quæ alterius eſſe dicantur; ſeu, quorum unum pendet a mutua alterius affectione.

Contraria ſunt duo abſoluta, quæ ſub eodem genere maxime diſtant.

Diſparata ſunt quorum unum pluribus ejuſdem generis opponitur.

Contradictoria ſunt negatio et poſitio ejuſdem.

Privativa ſunt quæ notant abſentiam habitûs in ſubjecto capaci.

§ 3. *Prædicamentum* eſt ſeries ſeu ordinatio recta eorum quæ ob naturæ communis participationem ſub ipſo collocantur.

Ens Prædicamentale quodcunque cadit ſub aliquo capite Prædicamentali.

Ens Tranſcendentale quod non—

Subſtantia eſt ens per ſe ſubſiſtens et ſubſtans accidentibus.

Accidens eſt quod abeſſe poteſt vel abeſſe ſine ſubjecti interitu.

Quantitas continua eſt cujus partes communi termino copulantur.

Quantitas diſcreta eſt cujus partes nullo communi termino copulantur.

Qualitas eſt forma accidentalis a quâ ſubſtantia denominatur qualis.

Habitus eſt qualitas acquiſita facilitans potentiam in agendo.

Diſpoſitio eſt habitûs inchoatus.

Potentia naturalis eſt qualitas a naturâ inſita, per quam ſubjectum eſt aptum ad aliquid agendum ſive reſiſtendum.

Impotentia eſt qualitas a naturâ inſita, per quam ſubjectum eſt aptum ad aliquid patiendum.

Patibilis qualitas eſt ea quæ infert paſſionem ſenſibus.

Paſſio oritur a ſubitâ animi commotione ita ut ſtatim evaneſcat.

Figura eſt quantitatum mathematicarum diſpoſitio in corpore.

Forma eſt lineamentorum et coloris diſpoſitio in corpore animato.

Relatio

Relatio est ordo unius rei ad aliam; vel, est id per quod res ita consideratur ut referatur ad aliam.

Actio est accidens a quo aliquid dicitur *agere*.

Passio est accidens unde aliquid dicitur *pati*.

Actio immanens est quæ non causat aliquam realem mutationem in Patiente, ut *cogitatio*.

Passio correspondens dicitur *intentionalis*.

Actio transiens est quæ causat aliquam realem mutationem in Patiente.

Passio correspondens dicitur *Transmutativa*.

Ubi est accidens secundùm quod substantia dicitur esse in loco.

Quando est accidens secundùm quod substantia dicitur esse in tempore.

Situs est positio partium in toto et in ordine ad totum.

Habitus est accidens proveniens ab applicatione rerum externarum.

Adjunctum est id quod est alterius extrinsecùs, seu haberi dicitur.

§ 4. *Universale* est ens unum in multis.

Prædicabile est quod de pluribus vere, proprie, et immediate affirmatur.

Abstractio est actus cogitandi de re, non attendens ad omnia quæ ad eam partinent.

Vox abstracta est quæ notat qualitatem separatam a subjecto.

Vox concreta est quæ notat qualitatem conjunctam cum subjecto.

Universalis idea est quæ repræsentat naturam vel qualitatem pluribus rebus communem.

Genus est prædicabile quod prædicatur de pluribus *Specie* differentibus in *Quid*, (i. e. apte respondet Quæstioni factæ per Quid.)

Species est prædicabile quod prædicatur de pluribus *numero* differentibus in *Quid*.

Genus summum est quo non datur superius.

Species infima est qua non datur inferior.

Genus subalternum respectu superioris est Species, respectu inferioris est Genus.

Differentia est Prædicabile quod prædicatur de pluribus specie vel numero differentibus in *Quale quid*, (i. e. apte respondet quæstioni quâ quæritur *Qualis* sit res secundùm essentiam seu *quidditatem*.)

Differentia dicitur *Divisiva*, quatenus dividit Genus in suas Species.

Differentia

Differentia Conſtitutiva, quatenus conſtituit ſpeciem in ſuo eſſe.

Eſſentia eſt id per quod res eſt id quod eſt.

Eſſentia nominalis eſt ea proprietatum ſenſibilium congeries, per quas res corporeæ a ſe invicem diſtinguuntur.

Eſſentia realis eſt ea conſtitutio partium inſenſibilium unde proprietates corporum ſenſibiles dependent.

Proprium eſt Prædicabile quod convenit Omni, Soli, & ſemper.

Accidens eſt id quod abeſſe vel adeſſe poteſt ſubjecto ſine ejus interitu,

——— *ſeparabile* eſt quod actu ſeparari poteſt a ſubjecto.

——— *inſeparabile* eſt quod non niſi ab intellectu poteſt abſtrahi a ſubjecto.

§ 5. *Diviſio* eſt latioris in anguſtiora deductio.

§ 6. *Definitio* eſt idearum ex quibus idea definienda componitur ordinata evolutio.

Definitio Nominis eſt quæ vocis ſignificationem aliquo modo aperit.

Definitio Rei eſt oratio explicans quid ſit res, per terminos eſſentiales.

Deſcriptio eſt explicatio definiti per terminos accidentales.

P. II.

§ 1. *Judicium* eſt duarum idearum comparatio, relationiſque quæ inter eas intercedit agnitio.

Propoſitio eſt Oratio unum de alio affirmans aut negans.

Veritas propoſitionis eſt conformitas prædicati cum ſubjecto ſecundùm rei naturam.

Subjectum eſt nomen præcedens copulam cui Prædicatum attribuitur.

Prædicatum eſt nomen illud ſequens copulam, quod Subjecto attribuitur.

Copula eſt verbum ſubſtantivum connectens Prædicatum cum Subjecto.

Propoſitio Categorica eſt quæ rem enunciat abſolutè.

Propoſitio Hypothetica, quæ enunciat ſub conditione, *ſeu*, in quâ plures categoricæ connectuntur per conjunctionem conditionalem.

Propoſitio Univerſalis eſt cujus ſubjectum eſt terminus univerſalis et pro univerſis ſuis ſignificatis diſtributivè ſumptus.

Particularis

Particularis propoſitio eſt cujus ſubjectum eſt terminus communis ex parte tantùm ſignificans.

Propoſitio ſingularis eſt quæ exprimit judicium de uno individuo.

Propoſitio indefinita eſt cujus ſubjectum eſt terminus communis ſine aliquo ſigno.

Propoſitio dividitur quoad *ſubſtantiam* in Categoricam et Hypotheticam;—quoad *qualitatem* in Affirmativam et Negativam;—quoad *quantitatem* in Univerſalem et Particularem.

§ 3. *Oppoſitio* propoſitionum eſt relatio ſecundùm quam duæ propoſitiones, quæ ſubjecta et prædicata habent omnino eadem, differunt quantitate et qualitate, vel utrâque.

Converſio Propoſitionis eſt tranſlatio ſubjecti in locum prædicati, et prædicati in locum ſubjecti, ſalvâ propoſitionum veritate.

Converſio ſimplex eſt cum Quantitas propoſitionum ſervatur.

Converſio per accidens eſt quando Quantitas minuitur.

§ 4. *Propoſitio Modalis* eſt in quâ vocabulum exprimit quo modo prædicatum ineſt ſubjecto.

Propoſitio exponibilis eſt in quâ diſpoſitio prædicati cum ſubjecto quodammodo determinatur particulâ aliquâ.

P. III.

§ 1. *Argumentatio* eſt ea mentis operatio qua Propoſitio una per alias probatur.

Syllogiſmus eſt oratio, in quâ quibuſdam poſitis et præmiſſis neceſſe eſt aliud ſequi præter et propter ea quæ ſunt poſita et conceſſa.

Argumentum eſt oratio problemati per illationem faciens fidem.

§ 3. *Figura* eſt debita diſpoſitio medij termini cum extremis Quæſtionis.

Modus eſt legitima propoſitionum ſecundùm qualitatem & quantitatem determinatio.

§ 4. *Enthymema* eſt Syllogiſmus in quo una præmiſſa reticetur.

Fallacia eſt Syllogiſmus captioſus qui probabilitatem mentitur.

Fallacia Accidentis eſt cum alteri connexorum attribuitur quod ei convenit tantùm per accidens.

Fallacia a dicto ſecundùm quid ad dictum ſimpliciter eſt cum quod verum eſt tantum *ſecundùm quid*, accipitur ut *ſimpliciter* et abſolute verum.

Ignoratio Elenchi eſt cum ea pro contradictoriis ſumuntur quæ non ſunt talia.

Non cauſa pro cauſâ eſt cum aut cauſa non vera ſumitur pro pro cauſâ verâ, aut cauſa non talis pro cauſâ tali.

Petitio principij eſt cum id ſumitur tanquam principium ad probationem quod non eſt conceſſum.

Fallacia compoſitionis eſt cum conjuncta accipiuntur quæ erant accipienda diviſim.

Fallacia diviſionis eſt cum ſeorſim accipiuntur quæ ſunt accipienda conjunctim.

§ 5 *Principia argumentationis* ſunt ea, ad quæ cum ventum ſit, ulteriore probatione non eſt opus.

Senſatio eſt perceptio rerum externarum quæ organa noſtra afficiunt.

Reflexio eſt ea Mentis actio quâ animadvertit ſe percipere, perceptioniſque hujus ſibi conſcia eſt.

Senſatio interna eſt perceptio eorum quæ intra mentem peraguntur.

Ingenium eſt acumen et perſpicacitas mentis in excognitando et intelligendo.

Intellectus eſt facultas animæ rationalis, quâ res cognoſcimus deque ijs judicamus.

Ratio eſt Vis percipiendi, cogitandi, ratiocinandi.

Ingenium eſt acumen et perſpicacitas Mentis in excognitando et intelligendo.

Reminiſcentia eſt perceptio ideæ aliàs perceptæ, cum Reflexione eam aliàs notam nobis fuiſſe.

Memoria eſt habitus Mentis, quo ea faciliùs percipimus quæ aliàs a nobis ſunt percepta.

Phantaſia, ſeu vis Imaginatrix eſt ea vis Mentis, quæ ſibi corpora abſentia repræſentat in ſuis imaginibus, eas augens, minuens, varieque aſſocians pro lubitu, aut etiam res incorporeas corporum inſtar imaginans.

Scientia eſt cognitio clara et evidens, uſu rationis comparata, et quæ omnem dubitationem excludit.

Experientia eſt ſenſationum ſemper ſibi ſimilium fidelis memoria.

Veritas eſt convenientia noſtrarum idearum cum objectis.

Error eſt falſa cognitio quæ pro verâ habetur.

Idea falſa eſt, quæ objecto ſuo non reſpondet.

Judicium falſum eſt, quum de Idea ea affirmemus aut negemus quæ objecti naturæ non conveniunt.

Cognitio

Cognitio certa eſt quæ vel indubiâ ſenſatione vel certo et evidenti principio nititur.

Cognitio probabilis eſt quæ hypotheſi tanquam fundamento innititur.

Axioma eſt propoſitio quædam univerſalis per ſe nota, quâ in ſcientiâ utimur ad demonſtrandum.

Demonſtratio eſt modus ratiocinandi quo Concluſio cum indubio quodam principio ita connectitur ut de ejus veritate dubitare non poſſimus.

Demonſtratio a priori eſt cum effectus demonſtratur ex ſuâ cauſâ.

Demonſtratio a poſteriori cum cauſa demonſtratur a ſuo effectu.

Certitudo moralis eſt qualis prudentibus omnibus vel pleriſque pro certo habetur.

Certus eſt animus, qui de Judicio ſuo quantumvis velit aut conetur, dubitare nullo modo poteſt.

Fides eſt aſſenſus habitus propoſitioni propter autoritatem dicentis.

Fides divina eſt habitus quo mens inclinatur ad aſſentiendum firmiter propoſitioni inevidenti propter auctoritatem Dei.

Fides humana eſt quo mens inclinatur ad aſſentiendum propoſitioni inevidenti propter auctoritatem humanam.

Opinio eſt habitus quo mens inclinatur ad aſſentiendum, cum formidine, alicui propoſitioni propter probabilitem, quam videtur habere.

Inductio eſt argumentatio, quæ ex ſingularibus ſufficientr enumeratis colligit Univerſale.

Exemplum eſt argumentatio, in qua ex ſingulari notiore infertur ſimile ignotius.

Dubitatio eſt ſuſpenſio aſſenſûs in utramque partem.

Dubia ſunt ea in quibus nulla occurrunt evidentia Veri aut Falſi indicia.

Quæſtionum Logicarum Series.

AN Logicæ Artificialis præcepta ſint neceſſaria ad Veritatem percipiendam? *Negatur.*

—— Sint Utilia? *Affirmatur.*

An Mentis Operationum numerus ternarius recte ſtatuatur? *A.*

Simplex Apprehenſio ſit dirigibilis? *A.*

Simplex Apprehenſio ſit unquam falſa? *N.*

Dentur Innata principia? *N.*

Aliquid ſit in Intellectu quod non fuit prius in Senſu? *N.*

Omnes Ideæ Oriantur a Senſibus? *A.*

Dentur Ideæ Simplices? *A.*

Dentur Ideæ puræ Reflexionis? *A.*

Ideæ Complexæ in Animâ pro arbitrio formentur? *A.*

Ideæ Entium et Affectuum Spiritualium formentur per aſſimilationem ad Entia et Affectus Materiales? *A.*

Anima poſſit Ideas pro libitu creare aut deſtruere? *N.*

In Memoriâ Anima agit paſſive? *N.*

Vocum ſignificatio ſit arbitraria? *A.*

Voces ſignificent a Natura? *N.*

Significatio Vocis deſumenda ſit ex conceptu Imponentis. *A.*

Voces primario et immediate ſignificent Res? *N.*

Voces Analogicæ ſint admittendæ in Argumentatione? *A.*

Oppoſita poſſint dici de Eodem? *N.*

Diſtributio Entis et Affectionum in Subſtantiam et Accidens ſit maxima commoda? *A.*

Ratio Subſtantiæ univocè conveniat Entibus Spiritualibus et Materialibus. *A.*

Ullius Subſtantiæ habeamus adæquatam Ideam? *N.*

Idea Spiritûs oriatur a Senſatione et Reflexione? *A.*

Sola Accidentia ſub ſenſum cadant? *A.*

Detur Subſtantia ſine Accidentibus? *A.*

An

An Dentur Accidentia ſine Subſtantia? *N.*

Subſtantia realiter diſtinguatur ab Accidentibus? *A.*

Diviſio Qualitatum corporearum in Primarias et Secundarias ſit maxime propria? *A.*

In omni re poſſit fundari Relatio? *A.*

Relatio reverà diſtinguatur a Subjecto et Termino? *A.*

Relationes ſint tantùm Denominationes externæ? *A.*

Dentur aliquæ Relationes rebus Eſſentiales? *N.*

Relationes aliquæ ſint æternæ et immutabiles? *A.*

Relationis Morales a Nobis pro arbitrio formentur? *N.*

Diſtributio Prædicamentalis Ariſtotelica ſit juſta et maxime commoda?

Diſtributio Lockiana in Subſtantiam Modum et Relationem ſit præferenda?

Res ſint vere Univerſales ante omnem Operationem Intellectûs? *N.*

Univerſales Ideæ fiant per Abſtractionem? *A.*

Univerſalia ſint Entia Rationis? *A.*

Relationes inter Ideas Univerſales ſint reales et immutabiles? *A.*

Prædicabilium numerus quinarius rectè ſtatuatur? *A.*

Genus et Species ſint Entia Rationis? *A.*

Genus et Differentia conſtituant Eſſentiam? *A.*

Eſſentia rectè diſtinguatur in Realem et Nominalem? *A.*

Eſſentiæ rerum Reales nobis ſint ignotæ? *A.*

Species diſtinguantur a ſe invicem per eſſentias ſuas Nominales? *A.*

Individua ejuſdem Speciei differant Proprietatibus Eſſentialibus? *N.*

Diſtributio Idearum ſecundùm Genera et Species ſit utilis? *A.*

Propria ſint Rebus Eſſentialia? *A.*

Propria poſſint a Subjecto Separari? *N.*

Accidentia poſſint exiſtere ſine Subjecto? *N.*

Subſtantia poſſit exiſtere ſine Accidentibus. *N.*

Accidens poſſit migrare a Subjecto in Subjectum? *N.*

Regulæ Diviſionis Logicæ rectè ſtatuantur? *A.*

Omnia poſſint Definiri? *N.*

Definitio conſtans Genere et Differentiâ explicet Rei Eſſentiam? *A.*

Unius Rei unica tantùm ſit Definitio? *A.*

Definitiones rerum Deſcriptivæ ſint admittendæ? *A.*

In Definitionibus Termini Negativi ſint admittendi? *N.*

Regulæ Definitionis Logicæ rectè ſtatuantur? *A.*

An

An Significationes Vocum pro arbitrio utentium debeat mutari? *N.*

Diſtinctio ſignificationis in Philoſophicam et Vulgarem ſit admittenda? *A.*

Voces Analogicæ in Definitionibus ſint aliquando admittendæ? *A.*

Veritas ſolis propoſitionibus competat? *A.*

In Judiciis formandis Mens aliquando ſit Paſſiva? *A.*

Judicium ſit Actus Voluntatis? *A.*

Omnis Propoſitio conſtet ſubjecto Prædicato et Copula? *A.*

Copula eadem ſit in omnibus Propoſitionibus Logicis? *A.*

Omnis Propoſitio ſit determinate Vera vel Falſa? *A.*

Propoſitio ſingularis habeat vim Univerſalis? *A.*

Leges Oppoſitionis Propoſitionum Logicæ recte ſtatuantur. *A.*

Leges Converſionis Propoſitionum recte Statuantur? *A.*

Omnes Propoſitiones Compoſitæ ad Simplices poſſint et debeant reduci? *A.*

Leges Æquipollentiæ Propoſitionum ita poſſunt conſtitui ut omnibus Linguis inſerviant? *N.*

Syllogiſmus ſit Inſtrumentum Rationis utiliſſimum? *A.*

Principium illud, *Quæ conveniunt uni Tertio conveniunt inter ſe*, ſit propriè Fundamentum Syllogiſmi? *A.*

Canones generales Argumentationis Syllogiſticæ a Logicis recte ſtatuantur? *A.*

Methodus Argumentandi Syllogiſtica omnibus Subjectis accommodari poſſit? *N.*

Doctrina Figurarum et Modorum Syllogiſticorum ſit utilis? *A.*

Figura Quarta admitti debeat? *N.*

Fallaciæ oriantur a neglectis Syllogiſticæ argumentationis regulis? *A.*

Regularum Syllogiſticarum ope Fallaciæ in Argumentando optime detegantur? *A.*

Methodus Diſſerendi Socratica præſtet Ariſtotelicæ? *N.*

De omnibus ſemel in vitâ ſit Dubitandum? *N.*

Statuatur aliquod primum et univerſale principium cognoſcendi? *N.*

Detur aliquod certum veritatis et falſitatis Diſcrimen? *A.*

Scientia recte diſtinguatur in Senſitivam Intuitivam et Demonſtrativam? *A.*

Intellectus poſſit affirmare quod ſcit eſſe falſum? *N.*

Poſſit in hâc vitâ perfecta aliqua haberi Scientia? *A.*

An

An Evidentia haberi debeat pro Criterio Veritatis? *A.*

Veritas fundetur in rerum Natura? *A.*

Omnis Argumentatio fundetur in certis Principiis? *A.*

Repræſentationes Senſuum externorum admitti debeant pro Veris? *A.*

Senſus poſſint falli? *N.*

Senſationes internæ admitti debeant pro Veris et Indubiis? *A.*

Scientia conſiſtat in perceptione relationis inter ideas? *A.*

Repræſentationes Senſuum externorum corrigantur ope Judicij Intellectualis? *A.*

Veritas rerum objectiva ſit certa et immutabilis? *A.*

Certiora ſint quæ Diſcurſu cognoſcuntur quam quæ Senſibus percipiuntur? *N.*

Dentur aliquæ Propoſitiones æternæ Veritatis? *A.*

Scientia ſit ſolum de Univerſalibus? *A.*

Ex Præcognitis et Præconceſſis ſit omnis Ratiocinatio? *A.*

~~Demonſtrativa Scientia ſit præferenda Scientiæ Intuitivæ?~~ *N.*

Demonſtratio recte diſtinguatur in Demonſtrationem *a priori* et *a poſteriori*? *A.*

Demonſtratio a *priori* præſtet Demonſtrationi *a poſteriori*? *N.*

Omnis Scientia ſua habeat Axiomata ſibi peculiaria?

De Axiomatibus ſit Diſputandum? *A.*

Demonſtratio ſolum conveniat rebus Mathematicis? *N.*

Demonſtratio indirecta, ab Abſurdo, admitti debeat? *A.*

Certitudo Moralis in aliquibus rebus æquivaleat Demonſtrativæ Scientiæ? *A.*

Ratio humana ſit Adæquata Veritatis menſura? *N.*

Propoſitio ulla pro vera admitti debeat cujus Prædicati aut Subjecti non habemus adæquatam ideam? *A.*

Diſtinctio in ea quæ ſunt *ſupra* et quæ ſunt *contra* Rationem ſit admittenda? *A.*

Rationi Humanæ ſit fidendum? *A.*

De rebus ignotis aliquando recte inſtituatur Judicium? *A.*

Inter Fidem et Rationem detur Convenientia? *A.*

Fides innitatur principijs Rationis? *A.*

Revelationibus Divinis in Omnibus Fides ſit habenda? *A.*

Autoritas eorum quæ perhibentur inniti Divinæ Revelationi, debeat ad examen Rationis revocari? *A.*

Certæ ſint regulæ quarum ope Revelationes veræ a falſis diſcriminentur? *A.*

Diſtinctio Evidentiæ in Internam & Externam recte ſe habeat? *A.*

An

An in Judiciis noſtris inſtituendis de Autoritate Revelationis Divinæ nihil admitti debeat niſi quod Experientiæ noſtræ conveniat? *N.*

Plurium circumſtantiarum unita vis habeat vim Demonſtrationis? *A.*

In Interpretandâ Divinâ Revelatione Regulæ Critices humanæ admitti debeant? *A.*

Teſtimonium humanum haberi debeat pro ſufficienti Fiduciæ argumento? *A.*

Propoſitionum Traditionalium certitudo decurſu Temporis minuatur? *N.*

Probabilibus ſit Aſſentiendum? *A.*

Argumenta recte deducantur ab Exemplis? *A.*

In Dubijs omnis Determinatio Judicij ſit ſemper omittenda?

Argumenta *ad Hominem* aliquando admitti debeant? *A.*

Ex Falſo poſſit inferri Verum? *A.*

Scriptores conſulendi de Quæſtionibus Logicis, tàm Veteres quàm Recentiores.

Ariſtoteles, Aquinas, Suarez, Smiglecius, Iſendorn, Vallius, Euſtachius, Sanderſon, Burgerſdicius, Fell, Wallis, Du Hamel, Gaſſendus, Le Grand, Aldrich, Wolfius, Locke, Lee, Norris, Clericus, Crouſaz, Brown, Watts, Duncan, Conybeare, Butler, Wollaſton, Edw. Search, Beattie.

Conſulantur etiam Tho. Johnſon *Quæſtiones Philoſophicæ.*

SPECIMEN

SPECIMEN

LOGICÆ CICERONIANÆ;

OR,

Extracts exhibiting the Logical Sentiments of Cicero; which may be applied to illuſtrate the foregoing Introduction, according to the Pages marked in the Margin;

P. 2. ARISTOTELES tradidit præcepta plurima differendi:—et poſtea, qui Dialectici dicuntur ſpinoſiora multa pepererunt. Eum cenſeo qui eloquentiæ laude ducatur, non eſſe earum rerum omnino rudem.———

P. 3, 4. Noverit primùm vim, naturam, genera verborum, et ſimplicium et copulatorum.

Deinde quot modis, quidque dicatur; quâ ratione verum falſumne ſit, judicetur; —quid efficiatur è quoque; quid cui conſequens ſit, quidque contrarium. *Cic. Orator* p. 171. *Ox.*

P. 5. Omnis oratio conficitur ex verbis; quorum primùm nobis ratio ſimpliciter videnda eſt, deinde conjuncte. *De Orat. L.* 2.

Nomen eſt quod unicuique datur, quo ſuo quæque proprio et certo vocabulo appellantur. *De Invent.* p. 174. eſtque vel

earum rerum quæ ſunt—quæ cerni tangive poſſunt, ut *fundus, ædes*, &c.

vel earum quæ intelliguntur, quæ non eſſe dicuntur, quæ tangi demonſtrarive non poſſunt, cerni tamen animo atque intelligi poſſunt; ut ſi *uſucapionem*, *tutelam*, ſi *gentem*, ſi *aquationem* definias, quarum rerum nullum ſubeſt quaſi corpus, eſt tamen quædam conformatio inſignita et impreſſa in intelligentiâ, quam notionem voco: *Cic. Top.* p. 238.

Sunt verba rerum notæ.—Cum intelligitur quid ſignificetur, minus laborandum eſt de nomine.

P. 6. Simplicia verba partim nativa ſunt, partim reperta:

Nativa ea, quæ ſignificata ſunt ſenſu (ut *Amor*) Reperta, quæ ex his facta ſunt, (ut *Amabilis:* hæc dicuntur *Conjugata*, ſeu quæ orta ab uno varie commutantur; ut *ſapiens*, *ſapientia*, *ſapienter*, *Top.* 218.) et novata, aut ſimilitudine, aut imitatione (ut *grunnire*, *hinnire*, *mugire*) aut inflexione (ut a *fido fiducia*) aut adjunctione verborum (ut aræ *thuricremæ*, mare *velivolum*) *Par.* p. 277.

Multa ſunt verba, quæ, quaſi articuli, connectunt membra orationis, quæ formari ſimilitudine nullâ poſſunt.—*De Orat. L.* 2.

An hoc dubium eſt, quin neque verborum tanta copia ſit in ullâ quidem linguâ, res ut omnes ſuis certis ac proprijs vocabulis nominentur?—*Pro Cæcin.*

P. 7, 8. Placuit pluribus verbis dicere quod uno non potuimus, ut res intelligatur.—*De Finib.*

e. g. Qui aut tempus quid poſtulet non videt, aut plura loquitur, aut ſe oſtentat, aut eorum, quibuſcum eſt vel dignitatis vel commodi rationem non habet, aut denique in aliquo genere aut inconcinnus, aut multus eſt, is *ineptus* dicitur.—Quod vim hujus mali Græci non viderunt, ne nomen quidem ei vitio impoſuerunt: ut enim quæras omnia, quomodo Græci *ineptum* appellant, non reperies.—*De Orat. L.* 2. p. 101.

Aliquando

Aliquando aut proprium aut idem ſignificans, aut factum verbum in plura diducitur.—*Partit.* p. 281.

e. g. Quo quid miſerius, quid acerbius, quid luctuoſius vidimus? Templum ſanctitatis, amplitudinis, mentis, conſilij publici, caput urbis, aram ſociorum, portum omnium gentium, ſedem ab univerſo pop. Rom. conceſſam uni ordini, inflammari, exſcindi, funeſtari.—id eſt, *Vidimus Curiam incendi, pro Mil. and again,*

Complexus eſt illud funeſtum animal ex nefarijs ſtupris, ex civili cruore, ex omnium ſcelerum importunitate, et flagitiorum impuritate concretum. (i. e. *Complexus eſt Clodium.*) *in Piſon.*

P. 10. Tantum acceſſit (ſc. ad amorem meum erga te) ut mihi nunc denique *amare* videar, antea *dilexiſſe.*—And again, Liberaſti igitur et *urbem* periculo, et *civitatem* metu.—*Ep Fam. L.* 9. ep. 14.

Angi, mœrere, ærumnâ affici, lamentari, ſollicitari, dolere, in moleſtia eſſe, afflictari, ea verba ſingularum rerum ſunt, non, ut videntur, eaſdem res ſignificant, ſed aliquid differunt.—*Tuſc. Diſp.* iii. §. 34.

Aliquando in unum contrahitur verbum Oratio, ſeu Definitio ad unum verbum revocatur.—*Partit.* p. 281.

Quædam verba ſunt propria et certa quaſi vocabula rerum, pene unà nata cum rebus ipſis.—*De Orat. L.* 2.

P. 9. Nihil eſt in rerum natura, cujus nos non in alijs rebus poſſimus uti vocabulo et nomine.—*De Orat. L.* 2. p. 285.

Facillime animo teneri poſſunt ea, quæ percipiuntur auribus aut cogitatione, ſi etiam oculorum commendatione animis tradantur: ut res cæcas et ab aſpectûs judicio remotas, conformatio quædam et imago et figura ita notet, ut ea quæ cogitando

complecti non poſſimus, intuendo quaſi teneamus. —*De Orat. L.* 2. 223.

Tranſlata verba ea dico, quæ per ſimilitudinem ab aliâ, aut ſuavitatis aut inopiæ cauſâ, transferuntur: mutata, in quibus pro verbo proprio ſubjicitur aliud, quod idem ſignificat, ſumptum ex re aliquâ conſequenti.—*Orator* p. 322.

Tranſlatione frequentiſſime ſermo omnis utitur non modo Urbanorum ſed etiam Ruſticorum: ſiquidem eſt eorum, *gemmare* vites, *ſitire* agros, *lætas* eſſe ſegetes, *luxurioſa* frumenta.—P. 320.

Sæpe definiunt et Oratores et Poetæ per tranſlationem verbi ex ſimilitudine cum quâdam ſuavitate, ut Adoleſcentiam eſſe *florem* ætatis; Senectutem *occaſum* vitæ.—P. 279, 241.

Ut veſtis frigoris depellendi cauſâ reperta primò, poſt adhiberi cœpta eſt ad ornatum etiam corporis et dignitatem, ſic verbi tranſlatio inſtituta eſt inopiæ cauſâ, frequentata delectationis.—Quod enim declarari vix verbo proprio poteſt, id tranſlato cum eſt dictum, illuſtrat id quod intelligi volumus, ejus rei, quam alieno verbo poſuimus, ſimilitudo.—*De Orat. L.* 2. p. 282.

Ut Corporis eſt quædam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quâdam ſuavitate, ea quæ dicitur *Pulchritudo*; ſic in Animo, opinionum judiciorumque æquabilitas et conſtantia, cum firmitate quâdam et ſtabilitate virtutem ſubſequens, aut virtutis vim ipſa continens, *Pulchritudo* vocatur. Itemque viribus *Corporis* et nervis et efficacitati ſimiles ſimilibuſque verbis *Animi* vires nominantur. *Velocitas* autem Corporis *Celeritas* appellatur: quæ eadem Ingenì etiam laus habetur, propter Animi multarum rerum brevi tempore percurſionem.—*Tuſc. Diſput. L.* 4. §. 13.

Quòd verò Omnes tranſlatis et alienis magis delectantur verbis quàm proprijs et ſuis, id accidere credo, vel quòd ingenij ſpecimen eſt quoddam tranſilire

ſilire ante pedes poſita, et alia longe repetita ſumere: vel quòd is, qui audit, aliò ducitur cogitatione, neque tamen aberrat; quæ maxima eſt delectatio: vel quòd ſingulis verbis res ac totum ſimile conficitur: vel quòd omnis tranſlatio, quæ quidem ſumpta ratione eſt, ad ſenſus ipſos admoveatur, maxime oculorum, qui eſt ſenſus acerrimus.—*De Orat.* p. 284.

Nonnumquam brevitas tranſlatione conficitur; ut illud, *Si telum manu fugit*, imprudentia teli emiſſi verbis breviùs proprijs exponi non potuit, quam eſt uno ſignificata tranſlato.—*Ibid.*

Fugienda eſt omnis turpitudo earum rerum, ad quas eorum animos, qui audiunt, trahet ſimilitudo. —*Ibid.* p. 268.

P. 10. Contrariorum genera ſunt plura: unum eorum quæ in eodem genere plurimum differunt, et appellantur Diverſa, ut *frigus, calor: ſapientia, ſtultitia* (non *debilitas*); *vita, mors.*—*Inv. L.* 1. p. 178.

ex quibus, argumenta talia exiſtunt: Si ſtultitiam fugimus, ſapientiam ſequamur; et bonitatem, ſi malitiam.

Sunt alia contraria quæ privantia licet appellemus. Præpoſitio enim *in* privat verbum eâ vi, quam haberet, ſi *in* præpoſitum non fuiſſet: ut *Dignitas, Indignitas.*

Alia quoque ſunt quæ cum aliquo conferuntur; ut *duplum, ſimplum: multa, pauca: majus, minus*, &c.

Sunt etiam valde contraria, quæ appellantur Negantia, ut ſi hoc eſt, illud non eſt, ut *ſapere, non ſapere.* Hæc appellantur Diſparata.—*Inv. L.* 1. p. 78.

Intelligatur, in argumento quærendo, contrarijs omnibus contraria non convenire.—*Top.* p. 246.

P. 11, 12, 13, 14. Omnis res, quæ habet in ſe poſitam in diſceptatione aliquam controverſiam, aut facti, aut nominis, aut generis, aut actionis continet quæſtionem.

Facti præteriti, quid fiat—quid futurum ſit.

Nominis, cum quid factum ſit convenit, quo id factum nomine appellari oporteat, quæratur: ut, ſiquis ſacrum ex privato ſurripuerit, utrum *fur*, an *ſacrilegus* ſit judicandus.

Generis ſc. cum conſtat de facto et nomine, et tamen quantum et cujuſmodi omnino quale ſit quæritur; hoc modo, *juſtum* an *injuſtum*, *utile* an *inutile*, &c.

Actionis, cum cauſa ex eo pendet, quod non aut is agere videtur quem oportet; aut non cum eo quîcum oportet; aut apud quos,—quo tempore,—qua lege,—quo crimine,—qua pœna oportet:

Harum aliquam in omne cauſæ genus incidere neceſſe eſt. Nam in quam non inciderit, in eâ nihil eſſe poterit controverſiæ.—*De Invent.* L. 1. p. 155, 156, 157.

P. 15, 16. Mr. Lock ridicules the forming ſuch abſtract terms as *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, &c. B. 3. C. 8. In the following paſſage *Lentulitas*, *Appietas* certainly have an emphatical meaning. If then there be no abſurdity in conſidering any individual as to his being an *Animal*, a *Man*, &c. Why may not an abſtract term be coined to expreſs that abſtract idea?

An ego *Tibi* obviam non prodirem? primum *Appio Claudio?* deinde *Imperatori?* deinde *Amico?* ——Illud idem dicebat te dixiſſe: Quidni? Appius Lentulo, Lentulus Appio proceſſit obviam: Cicero Appio noluit? Quæſo, etiamne tu ullam *Appietatem* aut *Lentulitatem* valere apud me plus quàm ornamenta virtutis exiſtimas?—*Fam. Ep.* L. 3. Ep. 7.

P. 16, 17, &c. Quicquid eſt—de quo ratione et viâ diſputetur, id eſt ad ultimam ſui generis formam ſpeciemque redigendum.—*Orator.* p. 302.

In formis et figuris eſt aliquid perfectum atque excellens, cujus ad excogitatam ſpeciem imitando referuntur ea, quæ ſub oculos ipſos non cadunt.—Illas rerum formas appellat ideas Plato: eaſque gigni negat,

negat, et ait ſemper eſſe, ac ratione et intelligentiâ contineri; cætera naſci, occidere, fluere, labi, nec diùtius eſſe uno et eodem ſtatu.—*Id.* p. 301.

Genus eſt id quod ſui ſimiles communione quâdam, ſpecie autem differentes duas aut plures complectitur Partes.—Partes autem ſunt, quæ Generibus ijs, ex quibus emanant, ſubjiciuntur. *De Orat. L.* 1. p. 64.

Genus eſt notio ad plures differentias pertinens.—Forma eſt notio cujus differentia ad caput Generis et quaſi fontem referri poteſt. Formæ igitur ſunt hæ, in quas Genus ſine ullius prætermiſſione dividatur. Ut ſiquis *Jus* in *Legem*, *Morem*, *Æquitatem* dividat.—*Top.* p. 240.

Genus eſt quod plures partes amplectitur; ut *Animal*; *Cupiditas*. *Inv.* p. 13.

Pars eſt quæ ſubeſt Generi; ut *Equus*; *Amor*, *Avaritia*.—*De Inv.* p. 172.

Sæpe eadem res alij Genus, alij Pars eſt. Nam *Homo Animalis* pars eſt; *Thebani* aut *Trojani* Genus.—*Ib.*

Quod Genere idem eſt, fit aliud, quod parte quâdam et Specie differat.—*Occaſio* eſt pars *Temporis* habens in ſe alicujus rei idoneum faciendi aut non faciendi opportunitatem. Quare cum *Tempore* hoc differt: nam Genere utrumque idem eſſe intelligitur: verum in *Tempore* ſpatium quodammodo declaratur, quod in annis aut anno, aut in aliquâ anni parte ſpectatur: in *Occaſione*, ad ſpatium temporis, faciendi quædam opportunitas intelligitur adjuncta.—*De Inv. L.* 1. p. 177.

The force of Oratorical Climax turns upon a Diviſion analogous to that of Genus into Species.

e. g. Ornatiſſime de meo conſulatu locutus eſt, ut ita diceret; ſe, quòd eſſet Senator, quod Civis, quòd Liber, quod Viveret, mihi acceptum referre: quoties Conjugem, quoties Domum, quoties Patriam videret,

videret, toties ſe beneficium meum videre. *L.* 1. *ad Att. Ep.* 13.

(*Vivens* dividitur in *Liberum* et *Servum*; *Liber* in *Civem* et *Inquilinum*; *Civis* in *Senatorem* et *Plebeium*. *Patria* chara—*Domus* charior—*Conjux* chariſſima.)

P. 22, 23. Diviſio eſt cum Genus in Formas ſine ullius prætermiſſione dividitur; ut ſi quis *Jus* in *legem*, *morem*, *æquitatem* dividat.—In diviſione formæ ſunt (quas Græci ἰδέας vocant.

Partitio—cum res ea, quæ propoſita eſt, quaſi in membra diſcerpitur; ut ſiquis Jus civile dicat id eſſe, quod in Legibus, in Senatuſconſultis, Rebus Judicatis, Juriſperitorum Auctoritate, Edictis Magiſtratuum, More, Æquitate conſiſtat. In partitione quaſi membra ſunt, ut Corporis; caput, humeri, manus, &c. —*Top.* p. 238, 253.

Partitio, rerum diſtributam continens expoſitionem, hæc habere debet, Brevitatem, Abſolutionem, Paucitatem.—*Brevitas* eſt, cum niſi neceſſarium nullum aſſumitur verbum. Hæc in hoc genere idcirco utilis eſt, quòd rebus ipſis et partibus cauſæ, non verbis neque extraneis ornamentis animus auditoris tenendus eſt. *Abſolutio* eſt, per quam omnia, quæ incidunt in cauſam, genera, de quibus dicendum eſt, amplectimur. In quâ partitione videndum eſt ne aliquod Genus utile relinquatur.—*Paucitas* in partitione ſervatur, ſi Genera ipſa rerum ponuntur, neque permiſte cum Partibus implicantur. —— *De Inv.* p. 171, 172.

Sunt alia præcepta partitionum, quæ ad hunc uſum oratorium non tantopere pertinent, quæ verſantur in Philoſophiâ, ex quibus ea ipſa tranſtulimus, quæ convenire videbantur, quorum nihil in cæteris artibus inveniebamus.—*Ibid.*

Vitandum eſt, ne cujus Genus poſueris, ejus ſecum aliquam diverſam ac diſſimilem Partem ponas in eâdem diviſione.—*De Inv. L.* 1. p. 172.

Genera

P. 23. Genera ipſa rerum ne permiſte cum Partibus implicentur. Qui ita partitur " Oſtendam propter " *cupiditatem* et *audaciam* et *avaritiam* adverſariorum " omnia incommoda ad remp. perveniſſe:" is non intellexit in partitione expoſito Genere Partem ſe generis admiſcuiſſe. Nam Genus eſt omnium nimirum libidinum *cupiditas*, ejus autem ſine dubio Pars eſt *Avaritia*.—*ib.*

Partitione ſic utendum eſt, ut nullam partem relinquas.—*Top.* p. 241.

Si Genera rerum exponantur, vitium eſt; ſi Genus ullum prætermittatur.——Si ſingulorum generum Partes, deeſſe aliquam Partem et ſuperare mendoſum eſt.—*De Orat. L.* 2. p. 124.

Partium enumeratio tractatur hoc modo, Si neque cenſu, neque vindicta, nec teſtamento liber factus eſt, non eſt liber: Neque eſt ulla earum rerum; —Non igitur eſt liber.—*Top.* p. 229.

Illud — pertinet ad paucitatem, nè plura quam ſatis eſt, demonſtraturos nos dicamus, hoc modo: Oſtendam adverſarios, quod arguimus, et *potuiſſe facere*, et *voluiſſe* et *feciſſe*: nam *feciſſe* oſtendere ſatis eſt.—*De Inv.* p. 172.

Cum a Genere ducetur argumentum; non neceſſe erit id uſque a capite (i. e. a genere maxime remoto) arceſſere: Sæpe etiam citra licet, dummodo ſupra ſit, quod ſumitur, quàm id, ad quod ſumitur.——*Top.* p. 243.

P. 23. Explicatis his generibus ac modis diſceptationum, nihil ſane ad rem pertinet, ſi qua in re diſcrepavit ab Antonij Diviſione noſtra Partitio: eadem enim ſunt membra in utriſque diſputationibus, ſed paulo ſecus a me atque ab illo partita ac diſtributa.—*De Orat. L.* 3. p. 269.

Ut omne nomen ex aliquibus, non ex omnibus literis ſcribitur, ſic omnem in cauſam non omnis ar-

gumentorum copia ſed eorum neceſſaria pars aliqua conveniet.—*De Inv.* p. 84.

P. 24. Cum ambigue multa dicantur, qui eloquentiæ laude ducatur, noverit quo modo quidque eorum dividi explanarique oporteat.——Et Quoniam in omnibus quæ ratione docentur et via, primum conſtituendum *quid* quidque ſit; (niſi enim inter eos, qui diſceptant convenit quid ſit illud de quo ambigitur, nec recte diſſeri, nec unquam ad exitum perveniri poteſt;) explicanda verbis mens noſtra de quâque re, atque involuta rei notitia definiendo aperienda eſt.—*Orator.* p. 171, 172.

Hæc patefactio quaſi rerum opertarum, cum quid quidque ſit aperitur, Definitio eſt.—" Finis ultimus *eſt id* quo omnia quæ recte fiunt referuntur, neque id ipſum uſquam refertur.—*De Finib. L.* 2. *ſub. init.*

Definitio eſt earum rerum quæ ſunt ejus rei propriæ quam definire volumus brevis et circumſcripta quædam explicatio.—*De Orat. L.* 1. p. 65.

Bonum definiſſes, aut " quod eſſet naturâ appeten-" dum:" aut " quod prodeſſet:" aut " quod juva-" ret:" aut " quod liberet."—*De Finib. L.* 2. *ſub init.*

Non dubium eſt quin definitio Genere declaretur et Proprietate quadam.—*Partit.* p. 291.

P. 25. Cum ſumpſeris ea quæ ſunt ejus rei quam definire velis cum alijs Communia, eo uſque perſequere dum Proprium efficiatur, quod nullam aliam in rem transferri poſſit. " Hæreditas eſt Pecunia," commune adhuc, multa enim genera ſunt Pecuniæ. Adde quod ſequitur, " quæ morte alicujus ad " quempiam pervenit:" nondum eſt definitio: multis enim modis ſine hæreditate teneri mortuorum pecuniæ poſſint. Unum adde verbum, " Jure:" jam a communitate res disjuncta videbitur, ut ſit explicata definitio, " Hæreditas eſt pecunia, quæ " morte alicujus ad quempiam pervenit jure." Nondum eſt ſatis; adde, " nec ea aut legato, teſta-

" mento,

" mento, aut poſſeſſione retenta:" confectum id eſt.—*Top.* p. 239.

Si quæreretur, quiſnam Juriſconſultus vere nominaretur, eum dicerem, " Qui Legum et Conſuetudinis qua privati in Civitate uterentur, et ad reſpondendum et ad agendum, et ad cavendum peritus eſſet.—*De Orat. L.* 1. p. 73.

Definitio quaſi involutum evolvit id de quo quæritur; Ejus argumenti talis eſt forma.

Jus civile eſt æquitas conſtituta ijs, qui ejuſdem civitatis ſunt, ad res ſuas obtinendas.

Ejus autem æquitatis utilis eſt cognitio

Utilis eſt ergo juris civilis ſcientia.

Top. p. 229.

P. 26. Naturam ipſam definire difficile eſt: partes autem ejus enumerare eas, quarum indigemus ad hanc præceptionem, facilius eſt. — *De Inv. L.* 1. p. 174.

Definitio genere declaratur et proprietate quadam, aut etiam communium frequentiâ: ex quibus proprium quid ſit eluceat. Sed quoniam de proprijs oritur plerumque magna diſſenſio, definiendum eſt ſæpe ex contrarijs, ſæpe etiam ex diſſimilibus, ſæpe ex partibus.—*Partit. Orat.* p. 291.

Alia eſt, cum inter doctos homines de ijs ipſis rebus quæ verſantur in artibus, verborum definitio, ut cum quæritur quid ſit Lex, quid ſit Civitas. In quibus hoc præcipit ratio atque doctrina, ut vis ejus rei quam definias, ſic exprimatur, ut neque abſit quidquam neque ſuperſit. — " *In cauſis utile* " *erit*," omni dicendi copia *dilatare* quid *ſit*. Etenim definitio primùm reprehenſo verbo uno aut addito aut demto ſæpe, extorquetur è manibus: deinde genere ipſo doctrinam redolet; exercitationemque pene puerilem: tum in ſenſum et in mentem judicis intrare non poteſt; ante enim præterlabitur, quàm percepta eſt.—*De Orat. L.* 2.

Uter (Accuſator ſive Defenſor) definiendo deſcribendoque verbo magis id ad ſenſum Judicis, opinionemque penetrarit, et uter ad communem verbi vim, et ad eam præceptionem quam inchoatam habebunt in animis ij qui audient, magis et propiùs acceſſerit, is vinçat neceſſe eſt. — *Partit.* p. 220, *Ox.*

Commune ſit hoc præceptum, ut cum uterque definierit, quàm proxime potuerit ad communem ſenſum, vimque verbi, tum ſimilibus exempliſque eorum, qui ita locuti ſunt, ſuam definitionem, ſententiamque confirmet.—*Ib.* p. 319.

Quemadmodùm res obſcuræ dicendo fiunt apertiores: ſic res apertæ obſcuriores fiunt oratione.—*De Inv.* p. 277.

Philoſophi, et ij quidem non mediocres, Orationem nullam putabant illuſtriorem ipſa evidentia reperiri poſſe, nec ea, quæ tam clara eſſent, definienda cenſebant.—*Acad. Qu. L.* 2, p. 77, *Davis.*

Velim definires quid ſit voluptas. — Quaſi quis, inquit, ſit qui quid ſit voluptas neſciat, aut qui, quo magis id intelligat, definitionem aliquam deſideret.—*De Finib. L.* 2, *ſub init.*

Mala Definitio eſt cum aut communia deſcribit, h. m. "Seditioſus eſt is, qui malus atque "inutilis, eſt civis." Nam hoc non magis ſeditioſi quàm calumniatoris, quàm alicujus hominis improbi vim deſcribit. — Aut falſum quiddam dicit, hoc pacto: "Sapientia eſt pecuniæ acquirendæ intelli-"gentia."—Aut aliquid non graye aut magnum continens, ſic: "Stultitia eſt immenſæ gloriæ cupiditas." Eſt hæc quidem ſtultitia, ſed ex parte quadam non ex omni genere definita —*De Invent.* p. 201.

Quæcunque eſt hominis definitio, una in Omnes valet.—*De Leg.* 1, p. 326.

P. 27, 28. Quid enim agant, ſi cum aliquid definiverint, roget eos quiſpiam, num illa definitio poſſit

in

in aliam rem transferri quamlibet? Si poſſe dixerint; quid dicere habeant, cur illa vera definitio ſit?—*Acad. Qu. L.* 2, p. 104, *Davis.*

Diviſa et ſimplex propoſitio quoties utiliter haberi poteſt, primum debet eſſe aperta atque lucida, tum brevis, nec ullo ſupervacuo onerata verbo.

In Definitionibus nec abeſſe quidquam decet nec redundare.—*De Orat. L.* 2.

Sæpe res parum eſt intellecta longitudine magis, quàm obſcuritate narrationis.—*De Inv. L.* 1. p. 37.

—— Quæ tu ſi alio nomine vis vocare, nihil repugno. Satis enim mihi eſt, te jam bene accepiſſe, quid dicam, id eſt, quibus rebus hæc nomina imponam. — *Acad. Frag. L.* 2. *cit. Auguſtin. cont. Acad.*

Quædam verba novamus et facimus ipſi, i. e. ab ipſo qui dicit ipſa gignuntur ac fiunt, vel conjungendis verbis vel ſine conjunctione.—*De Orat. L.* 2, p. 282.

An hoc dubium eſt quin — neque quidquam opus ſit verbis, cum ea res, cujus cauſâ verba quæſita ſint, intelligatur.—*Pro Cæcin.*

Quæ Lex, quod ſenatus conſultum, quod magiſtratûs edictum, quod fœdus, aut pactio, quod (ut ad privatas res redeam) teſtamentum, quæ judicia, aut ſtipulationes, aut pacti, aut conventi formula non infirmari, aut convelli poteſt, ſi ad verba rem deflectere velimus; conſilium autem eorum, qui ſcripſerunt et rationem et auctoritatem relinquamus? —*Pro Cæcin.*

P. 29. Cum quid ſenſerit ſcriptor obſcurum eſt, quod ſcriptum duas pluresve res ſignificat, primum, ſi fieri poteſt, demonſtrandum eſt non eſſe ambigue ſcriptum, propterea quod omnes in conſuetudine ſermonis ſic uti ſolent eo verbo, uno pluribuſve, in eâ ſententia, in qua is qui dicet accipiendum eſſe demonſtrabit. Deinde ex ſuperiore et ex

inferiore

inferiore ſcripturâ docendum id quod quæratur fore perſpicuum: Quare, ſi ipſa ſeparatim ex ſe verba conſiderentur, omnia aut pleraque ambigua viſum iri: Quæ autem ex omni conſiderata ſcriptura perſpicua fiant, hæc ambigua non oportere exiſtimari. — Deinde quâ in ſententiâ ſcriptor fuerit ex cæteris ejus ſcriptis et factis, dictis, animo, atque vitâ ejus, ſumi oportebit, et eam ipſam ſcripturam, in qua illud inerit ambiguum de quo quæritur, totam omnibus ex partibus pertentare:—nam facile, quid veriſimile ſit eum voluiſſe qui ſcripſit, ex omni ſcripturâ et ex perſonâ ſcriptoris, atque ijs rebus quæ perſonis attributa ſunt, conſiderabitur. Deinde erit demonſtrandum, ſiquid ex ipſa re dabitur facultatis, id quod adverſarius intelligat, multo minus commodè fieri poſſe, quám id quod nos accipimus.—Ac diligenter illud quoque attendere oportebit ut de eo quod adverſarius intelligat aliâ in lege cautum eſſe doceatur. Permultum autem proficiet illud demonſtrare quemadmodum ſcripſiſſet, ſi id, quod adverſarius accipiat, fieri aut intelligi voluiſſet.—Deinde quo tempore ſcriptum ſit quærendum eſt, ut quod eum voluiſſe in ejuſmodi tempore veriſimile ſit intelligatur.—*De Invent. L.* 2, p. 261.—264, *Ox.*

P. 30. Cum diſceptatio verſatur in ſcriptis, uterque hanc ſignificationem, qua utetur ipſe, dignam ſcriptoris prudentiâ eſſe defendet: Uterque id, quod adverſarius ex ambigue ſcripto intelligendum eſſe dicet, aut abſurdum, aut inutile, aut iniquum, aut turpe eſſe defendet, aut etiam diſcrepare cum cæteris ſcriptis, vel aliorum, vel maxime, ſi poterit, ejuſdem. Quamque defendet ipſe, eam rem et ſententiam quemvis prudentem et juſtum hominem, ſi integrum datur, ſcripturum fuiſſe; eamque ſententiam quam ſignificari poſſe dicet, nihil habere aut captionis, aut vitij: contrariam autem ſi probarit

fore,

fore, ut multa vitia ſtulta, iniqua, contraria conſequantur.—*Id. Partit.* p. 321.

P. 33. Facillime animo teneri *poſſunt* ea, quæ percipiuntur auribus aut cogitatione, ſi etiam oculorum commendatione animis *tradantur*: ut res cæcas et ab aſpectûs judicio remotas, conformatio quædam et imago et figura ita *notet*, ut ea quæ cogitando complecti non *poſſimus*, intuendo quaſi teneamus.—*De Orat. L.* 2, p. 223.

PAR. II.

P. 35. De Perceptione hactenus: nunc de Aſſenſione atque Approbatione pauca dicemus: non quod non latus locus ſit: ſed paullo ante jacta ſunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim quæ eſſet in ſenſibus explicabamus, ſimul illud aperiebatur, comprehendi multa, et percipi ſenſibus: quod fieri ſine aſſenſione non poteſt.—*Acad. Qu. L.* 4, p. 18.

The reaſon why we meet with ſo few obſervations in Cicero, directly applicable to the ſecond part of Logick, may be ſeen.—De Orat. L. 3, *p.* 244, 245.——Neque vero diſputemus, quibus rebus aſſequi poſſimus, ut ea, quæ dicamus intelligantur.—Nemo enim extulit eum verbis, qui ita dixiſſet, ut qui adeſſent, intelligerent quid diceret; ſed contemſit eum, qui minus id facere potuiſſet.

In his Orator, *p.* 171, *he mentions it as one of the* tenenda Oratori, *and to be ſought for among the* Dialectici—"Quot modis quidque dicatur, qua ratione "verum falſumne ſit judicetur," —*which, in that paſſage, certainly refers to ſomething diſtinct from the third operation of the mind, or Reaſoning, properly ſo called.*

Quod in univerſo ſit probatum, in parte ſit probari neceſſe.—*Orator.* p. 310.

P. 44. Hoc mihi videor videre, eſſe quaſdam cum adjunctione neceſſitudines, quaſdam ſimplices et abſolutas. Nam aliter dicere ſolemus, "neceſſe eſt "Caſilinenſes,

" Caſilinenſes ſe dedere Hannibali;" aliter autem; " neceſſe eſt Caſilinum venire in Hannibalis poteſ- " tatem." Illic in ſuperiore adjunctio eſt hæc, " niſi " malint fame perire." Si enim id malint non eſt neceſſe: hoc inferius; non item: propterea quod ſive velint Caſilinenſes ſe dedere, ſive famem perpeti, atque ita perire, neceſſe eſt Caſilinum venire in Hannibalis poteſtatem.—*De Inv.* L. 2, p. 124.

PAR. III.

It muſt be confeſſed, that the Syllogiſms which occur in Cicero do not exactly anſwer the models preſcribed in the ſchools; though he appears to have been no ſtranger to them.

P. 49. Argumenti concluſio quæ eſt Græce Ἀπόδειξις ita definitur, " Ratio, quæ ex rebus perceptis ad id " quod non percipiebatur adducit."—*Acad. Q. L.* 2, p. 87, *Davis.*

Melius geruntur ea, quæ conſilio, quam quæ ſine conſilio, adminiſtrantur.

Nihil autem melius quàm omnis mundus adminiſtratur.

Conſilio igitur mundus adminiſtratur.

Hoc genus argumentandi ſumme eſt ab Ariſtotele atque a Peripateticis et Theophraſto frequentatum: Deinde a Rhetoribus ijs qui elegantiſſimi atque artificioſiſſimi putati ſunt.—*De Invent. L.* 2, p. 188.

The reaſon why Cicero ſays that all Ratiocination conſiſts of five *parts is, becauſe he thinks it proper to ſubjoin the proof immediately to both the* Propoſitio (*Major*) *and the* Aſſumptio (*Minor.*) *Accordingly after having given an inſtance drawn out according to that plan he ſays,* Nobis commodior illa partitio videtur eſſe, quæ in quinque partes diſtributa eſt quam omnes ab Ariſtotele et Theophraſto profecti maxime ſecuti ſunt.—*De Inv. L.* 1, p. 64.

" Efficere

Artis eſt ea efficere (ſc. breviter et probabiliter exponere) ſingulis argumentationibus ita concludendis ut efficiatur quid ſit conſequens ijs, quæ ſumentur ad quamque rem confirmandam. — *Orator.* p. 174.

Concludi argumentum non poteſt niſi his, quæ ad concludendum ſumpta erunt, ita probatis, ut falſa ejuſmodi nulla poſſint eſſe.—*Acad. Q. L.* 2, p. 19.

Ex quo poſtulabimus nobis illud quod dubium ſit, concedi, dubium eſſe id ipſum non oportebit. — *De Invent. L.* 1. p. 184.

P. 50. Hæc mirabilia videri intelligo: ſed cum certe ſuperiora firma ac vera ſint, his autem ea conſentanea et conſequentia, ne de eorum quidem veritate eſt dubitandum.—*De Finib. L.* 3.

Teneamus etiam illud neceſſe eſt, cum conſequens aliquod falſum eſt, illud cujus id conſequens ſit, non poſſe eſſe verum.—*id. L.* 4.

Poteſtis principia (*concluſionem*) negare cum extrema conceditis?—*Pro Cæcin.*

(*The Concluſion, being there placed firſt, and the reaſon ſubjoined, is therefore, called* principium.)

Propoſitio eſt pars argumentationis per quam breviter locus is exponitur, ex quo omnis vis oportet emanet ratiocinationis.

Aſſumptio, per quam id, quod ex propoſitione ad oſtendendum pertinet, aſſumitur.

Complexio, per quam id, quod conficitur ex omni argumentatione, breviter exponitur. — *De Inv. L.* 1, p. 65.

Quod eſt bonum, omne laudabile eſt:

Quod laudabile eſt, omne honeſtum eſt:

Bonum igitur quod eſt honeſtum eſt. — *De Fin. L.* 3.

P. 56. Non omnia, quæcunque loquimur, mihi videntur ad artem et ad præcepta eſſe revocanda.—*De Orat. L.* 2, p. 110.

In ipſa argumentatione convenit Oratorem, non ſtatim a Propoſitione incipere, nec ſemper quinque partibus abuti, neque eâdem ratione expolire partitiones, ſed tum ab Aſſumptione incipere licet, tum ab Approbatione alterutrâ, tum utrâque uti.—*De Inv. L.* 1. p. 195. *Ox.*

Obſervare diligenter oportet, et quid ſumatur, et quid ex his conficiatur.—*De Inv. L.* 1. p. 200.

Ante aliquid conceſſum eſſe nihil proderit, ſi ei diſſimile erit id, cujus cauſâ illud concedi primum voluerimus.—*De Inv. L.* 1, p. 184, *Ox.*

Omnis Argumentatio reprehenditur, ſi aut ex ijs quæ ſumpta ſunt, non conceditur unum plurave: aut his conceſſis, complexio confici ex his negatur: aut ſi genus ipſum argumentationis vitioſum oſtenditur: aut ſi contra firmam argumentationem alia æque firma, aut firmior ponitur.—*Id.* p. 196, *Ox.*

P. 58. Amphiboliæ ſpecies ſunt innumerabiles.—Aut vocibus accidit ſingulis aut conjunctis. Singula afferunt errorem cum pluribus rebus aut hominibus (eadem appellatio eſt, ὁμωνυμια dicitur) ut Gallus. Utrum enim avem, an nomen, an fortunam corporis, ſignificet incertum eſt. — Verba quoque quædam diverſos intellectus habent, ut cerno *(cernere farinam cernere bello, cernere hæreditatem)* quæ ambiguitas pluribus modis accidit. Unde fere lites—ineptæ cavillationes.——*Quinctil. L.* 7, *c.* 9.

P. 62. Argumentatio videtur eſſe inventum ex aliquo genere, rem aliquam aut probabiliter oſtendens aut neceſſariò demonſtrans.—*De Inv.* p. 178.

Omnis argumentatio aut per Inductionem tractanda eſt aut per Ratiocinationem.

Inductio eſt oratio quæ rebus non dubijs captat aſſenſionem, ejus, quicum inſtituta eſt; quibus aſſenſionibus facit, ut illi dubia quædam res propter ſimilitudinem earum rerum, quibus aſſenſit, probetur.—Hoc modo ſermonis plurimùm Socrates uſus eſt; propterea

propterea quod ipſe nihil afferre ad perſuadendum voluit, ſed ex eo, quod ſibi ille dederat, quicum diſputabat, aliquid conficere malebat; quod ille ex eo, quod jam conceſſiſſet, neceſſario approbare deberet. Hoc in genere præcipiendum nobis videtur; primùm, ut illud, quod inducemus per ſimilitudinem, ejuſmodi ſit, ut ſit neceſſe concedi. Nam, ex quo poſtulabimus nobis illud, quod dubium ſit, concedi; dubium eſſe id ipſum, non oportebit. Deinde illud, cujus confirmandi cauſâ fiet Inductio, videndum eſt, ut ſimile ſit ijs rebus, quas res quaſi non dubias induxerimus. Nam ante aliquid nobis conceſſum eſſe nihil proderit, ſi ei diſſimile erit id, cujus cauſâ illud concedi primum voluerimus.—*De Inv. L.* 1. p. 184, *Ox.*

Ratiocinatio eſt oratio ex ipſâ re probabile aliquod eliciens, quod expoſitum et per ſe cognitum ſuâ ſe vi et ratione confirmet. — Primùm conveniet exponere ſummam argumentationis, ad hunc modum: " Melius accurantur quæ conſilio geruntur " quàm quæ ſine conſilio adminiſtrantur." — Eam deinceps rationibus varijs et quàm copioſiſſimis verbis approbari oportebit, hoc modo: " Domus ea " quæ ratione regitur, omnibus inſtructior eſt rebus " et apparatior quàm ea quæ temere et nullo con- " ſilio adminiſtratur. Exercitus is, cui præpoſitus " eſt ſapiens et callidus Imperator, omnibus par- " tibus commodius regitur, quàm is qui ſtultitiâ et " temeritate alicujus adminiſtratur. Eadem Na- " vigij ratio eſt. Nam navis optime curſum con- " ficit ea, quæ ſcientiſſimo gubernatore utitur." Cum Propoſitio ſit hoc pacto approbata. — Ex vi Propoſitionis oportet aſſumere id quod oſtendere velis, hoc pacto; " Nihil autem omnium rerum " melius quàm omnis mundus adminiſtratur." Hujus Aſſumptionis alia porro inducatur Approbatio, hoc modo: " Nam et ſignorum ortus et obitus de-

" finitum quendam ordinem ſervant, et annuæ com-
" mutationes non modo quâdem ex neceſſitate ſem-
" per eodem modo fiunt: verùm ad utilitates quo-
" que rerum omnium ſunt accommodatæ, et
" diurnæ nocturnæque viciſſitudines nullâ in re
" unquam mutatæ quidquam nocuerunt. Quæ
" ſigno ſunt omnia, non mediocri quodam conſilio
" naturam mundi adminiſtrari." Quinto loco inducatur Complexio ea, quæ aut id infert ſolum, quod ex omnibus partibus cogitur, hoc modo: " *Con-*
" *ſilio* igitur Mundus adminiſtratur:" aut unum in locum cum conduxerit breviter Propoſitionem, et Aſſumptionem, id adjungit, quod ex his conficitur, ad hunc modum: " Quod ſi melius geruntur ea, quæ
" conſilio, quàm quæ ſine conſilio adminiſtrantur;
" nihil autem omnium rerum melius quàm omnis
" mundus adminiſtratur, conſilio igitur mundus
" adminiſtratur."—*Ib.* p. 187, 188.

Different Forms or Modes of Argumentation, as they are recited by Cic. Top. *p.* 248, 249, 250, Ox.

1. MODUS Concluſionis primus, in quâ cum primum aſſumpſeris, conſequitur id quod annexum eſt, ut

Si homo eſt animal eſt.
Atqui Homo eſt, ergo
Animal eſt.

2. Cum id quod annexum eſt, negaris, ut id, quoque cui fuerit annexum, negandum ſit, ut

Si Homo non eſt, Animal non eſt.
Animal autem non eſt, igitur
Homo non eſt.

3. Cum

3. Cum aliqua conjuncta negaris, et his alia negatio rursus adjungitur, et ex his primum sumpseris, ut, quod relinquitur tollendum sit, ut,

Non et Homo et non Animal est.
Atqui est Homo.
Ergo Animal est.

Reliqui Dialecticorum Modi plures sunt, qui ex disjunctionibus constant, ut

4. *Aut Dies est aut Nox est.*
Dies autem est.
Non igitur Nox est.
5. *Aut Dies est aut Nox est.*
Non autem Dies.
Nox igitur est.

Quæ conclusiones idcircó ratæ sunt, quòd in disjunctione plus uno verum esse non potest. Quod si sit medium, quod præter alterutrum esse possit, nec vera est Propositio, nec rata conclusio, ut, *Aut album est aut nigrum*, falsum est; esse enim præterea *rubrum* potest.

Addatur Conjunctionum negantia.

6. *Non et Nox et Dies est.*
Nox autem est,
Non igitur Dies est.
7. *Non et Nox et Dies est.*
Non autem Nox est.
Dies igitur est.

Ex his Modis Conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur; in quo est fere tota Dialectica.

P. 56. Illud volumus intelligi, nos probe tenere alijs quoque rationibus tractari argumentationes in philosophiâ multis et obscuris, de quibus certum est artificium constitutum. Verum illa nobis abhorrere ab usu oratorio videntur.—*De Invent.* p. 195, *Ox.*

An inſtance of Scholaſtick Diſputation on a Logical Queſtion, drawn out with very little alteration from Cic. de Invent. *L.* 1, *p.* 188, *&c.*

AN Argumentationis partitio in quinque partes ſit commodior? Affr.

(Sc. Propoſitio, Propoſitionis Approbatio, Aſſumptio, Aſſumptionis Approbatio, Complexio.)

Si Approbatio in ratiocinatione ſit ſeparata a Propoſitione et Aſſumptione ergo quinque ſunt parteſi ſed Approbatio eſt ſeparata a Propoſitione et Aſſumptione, Ergo, &c.

Probatur Minoris prior pars.

(This Proſyllogiſm is added as neceſſary to introduce the following:)

Si quadam in argumentatione ſatis eſt uti Propoſitione et non oportet adjungere approbationem propoſitioni; quadam autem in argumentatione infirma eſt propoſitio niſi adjuncta ſit approbatio: ſeparatum quiddam eſt a propoſitione approbatio: Prob. Seq. Quod enim adjungi et ſeparari ab aliquo poteſt, id non poteſt idem eſſe, quod eſt id ad quod adjungitur, et a quo ſeparatur.

(Then follows the proof of this aſſertion)

Eſt autem quædam argumentatio in qua propoſitio non indiget approbatione, et quædam in qua nihil valet abſque approbatione.

Separata eſt igitur a Propoſitione Approbatio.

(Then follows the proof of the Minor.)

Probatur Minoris pars prior.

Quæ propoſitio in ſe quiddam continet perſpicuum eo quod conſtare inter omnes neceſſe eſt, hanc velle approbare et firmare nihil attinet.

Eſt hujuſmodi *propoſitio.*

Eſt igitur quædam propoſitio quæ non indiget approbatione.

Hæc

Hæc eſt argumentatio in qua Propoſitio in ſe quiddam continet perſpicuum, &c.

Si quo die iſta cædes Romæ facta eſt, Ego Athenis eo die fui, intereſſe in cæde non potui.

Fui autem Athenis eo die. — (Hoc ſi non conſtat, indiget approbationis.)

Igitur in cæde intereſſe non potui.

Majorem, quia perſpicue *vera* eſt, nihil attinet approbari.

(Probatur Minoris Proſyllogiſmi pars poſterior, ſc. Approbationem *(Aſſumptionis)* ſeparatam eſſe ab Aſſumptione.)

Si quadam in argumentatione ſatis eſt uti Aſſumptione, et non oportet adjungere Approbationem Aſſumptioni, quadam autem in argumentatione infirma eſt Aſſumptio; niſi adjuncta ſit Approbatio: ſeparatum quiddam eſt extra Aſſumptionem Approbatio.

Eſt autem argumentatio quædam in qua Aſſumptio non indiget Approbatione, quædam autem in qua nihil valet ſine Approbatione.

Separata eſt igitur ab Aſſumptione Approbatio.

(*Minoris poſterior pars* perſpicua eſt.)

Minoris prior pars.

Quæ perſpicuam omnibus veritatem continet Aſſumptio nihil indiget Approbationis.

Eſt hujuſmodi *Aſſumptio.*

Ergo, &c.

Hæc eſt argumentatio ejuſmodi.

Si oportet ſapere, dare operam philoſophiæ convenit.

(Hæc propoſitio indiget approbationis.)

Oportet autem ſapere.

Igitur dare operam Philoſophiæ convenit. *ſed in hac argumentatione* Aſſumptio perſpicua eſt.

Ergo eſt Aſſumptio quædam quæ Approbatione non indiget. —*De Inv. L.* 1, p. 190, *Ox.*

Si qui ex una parte putabunt conſtare Argumentationem, poterunt dicere, ſæpe Argumentationem nullius neque Approbationis neque Complexionis indigere.—Sed nobis ambiguitate nominis videntur errare. Nam Argumentatio nomine uno res duas ſignificat, ideo quod et inventum aliquâ in re probabile aut neceſſarium Argumentatio vocatur, et ejus inventi artificioſa expolitio. Quando igitur proferent aliquid hujuſmodi—Inventum proferent non Expoſitionem. Nos autem de expolitionis partibus loquimur; nihil igitur ad hanc rem ratio illa pertinebit. Atque hac Diſtinctione alia quoque

quæ

quæ videbuntur officere huic partitioni, propulsabimus, si qui aut Assumptionem aliquando tolli posse putant, aut Propositionem: quæ siquid habet probabile aut necessarium, quoquo modo commoveat auditorem necesse est. Quod si solum spectaretur id, quod inventum est, ac nihil, quo pacto tractaretur id, quod esset excogitatum, referret, nequaquam tantum inter summos Oratores et mediocres interesse existimaretur.— *Id.* p. 193.

M. T. Ciceronis *Orationis pro Archiâ Poetâ Resolutio Logica secundùm* Tho. Fregium; *qui et cæterarum* Ciceronis *Orationum argumenta consimili Logico filo deduxit.*

In Exordio inseritur prævia Quæstio,

An *Eloquentia Ciceronis debeat Archiæ prodesse?* A.

Si Ciceronis eloquentia, hortatu et præceptis Archiæ conformata, alijs profuit, debet et ipsi Archiæ prodesse;

Sed primum,

Ergo et postremum.

Objici potuit Ciceronem esse Oratorem, Archiam verò Poetam.

Omnes Artes habent commune vinculum:

Ergo Et Oratoria et Poetica.

De insolito et novo Reo, novum et inusitatum genus dicendi est instituendum;

Archias insolitus et novus Reus est,

Novum *ergo* et inusitatum genus instituo: et oro ut id patienter audiatis, et me liberius loqui permittatis.

Quæritur *An Archias sit a civibus Romanis segregandus?* Neg.

Qui Civis est, et Civitate dignus, non est a civibus segregandus;

At Archias est Civis, et Civitate dignus;

Non ergo est a civibus segregandus.

Probatio prioris partis Minoris.

Qui Civitati fœderatæ adscriptus est, et habuit, tempore Legis latæ, in Italia domum, et sexaginta diebus apud Prætorem professus est, is Civis Romanus est.

At Archias hæc habet omnia.

Ergo est Civis.

Probatio

Probatio ſecundæ partis, eum eſſe Civitate dignum.

Omnes Poetæ ſunt ornandi et conſervandi;
Archias eſt Poeta.
Ornandus ergo et conſervandus.

1. *Probat Majorem oſtendendo Poeticam facultatem eſſe utilem.*

Quod conducit ad fructum publicum eſt utile;
Multus publicus fructus oritur ex Poetica facultate; ergo Poetica facultas eſt utilis.

Illi reprehendendi ſunt, qui ex Poetica nullum communem fructum faciunt;
At Ego (*Cicero*) communem fructum ſemper ſpectavi.
Non *ergo* ſum reprehendendus.

2. *Poetarum Lectio conducit ad exempla morum honeſtorum.*

Si nulla præcepta et exempla honoris mihi propoſuiſſem, non objeciſſem me unquam periculis.
At in Poetis multa ſunt Præcepta et Exempla.
Ergo me objeci periculis.

3. *Poetarum Lectio inſervit Delectationi.*

Communiſſima delectatio et remiſſio eſt humaniſſima et liberaliſſima.
At Poetices delectatio eſt communiſſima.
Eſt *ergo* humaniſſima et liberaliſſima.

4. *Poetarum Scripta inſerviunt Gloriæ communi.*

Qui illuſtrat nomen populi Romani is eſt civitate dignus.
Archias illuſtrat gloriam laudemque populi Romani.
Eſt *ergo* civitate dignus.

Major confirmatur exemplis eorum qui Poetas amant propter gloriam ſibi ab ijs conciliatam.

In quâ urbe Imperatores armati Poetarum nomen et muſas coluerunt, in eâ non debent togati Judices a Muſarum honore et Poetarum ſalute abhorrere;
At Romæ Imperatores Poetas coluerunt.
Romæ *igitur* Judices debent colere Poetas.

Si non eſſet ſtudium gloriæ immortalis, nemo res magnas gereret:
At eſt ſtudium gloriæ in optimo quoque:
Ergo res magnæ geruntur.

In *Peroratione continetur repetitio brevis argumentorum, confirmatione deductâ ex inſigni pudore, dignitate et ingenio Archiæ.*

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